Iptables Tutorial 1.1.10

Oskar Andreasson

blueflux@koffein.net

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by Oskar Andreasson

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Chapter 1. Introduction

Why this document was written

Well, I found a big empty space in the HOWTO's out there lacking in information about the iptables and netfilter functions in the new Linux 2.4.x kernels. Among other things, I'm going to try to answer questions that some might have about the new possibilities like state matching. Is it possible to allow passive FTP to your server, but not allow outgoing DCC from IRC as an example? I will build this all up from an example rc.firewall.txt

(http://www.boingworld.com/workshops/linux/iptables-tutorial/scripts/rc.firewall.txt) file that you can use in your /etc/rc.d/ scripts. Yes, this file was originally based upon the masquerading HOWTO for those of you who recognize it.

Also, there's a small script that I wrote just in case you screw up as much as I did during the configuration available as rc.flush-iptables.txt

(http://www.boingworld.com/workshops/linux/iptables-tutorial/scripts/rc.flush-iptables.txt).

How it was written

I've placed questions to Marc Boucher and others from the core netfilter team. A big thanks going out to them for their work and for their help on this tutorial that I wrote and maintain for boingworld.com. This document will guide you through the setup process step by step, hopefully make you understand some more about the iptables package. I will base most of the stuff here on the example rc.firewall file since I find that example to be a good way to learn how to use iptables. I have decided to just follow the basic chains and from there go down into each and one of the chains traversed in each due order. This tutorial has turned a little bit harder to follow this way but at the same time it is more logical. Whenever you find something that's hard to understand, just consult this tutorial.

About the author

I'm someone with too many old computers on my hands, sitting with my own *LAN* and wanting them all to be connected to the Internet, at the same time having it fairly secure. The new iptables is a good upgrade from the old ipchains in this regard. Before, you could make a fairly secure network by dropping all incoming packages not destined to certain ports, but this would be a problem with things like passive *FTP* or outgoing *DCC* in *IRC*, which assigns ports on the server, tells the client about it, and then lets the client connect. There was some child diseases in the iptables code that I ran into in the beginning, and in some respects I found the code not quite ready for release in full production. Today, I'd recommend everyone who uses ipchains or even older ipfwadm etc to upgrade unless they're happy with what their current code is capable of and if it does what they need it to.

Dedications

First of all I would like to dedicate this document to my wonderful girlfriend Ninel. She has supported me more than I ever can support her to any degree. I wish I could make you just as happy as you make me.

Second of all, I would like to dedicate this work to all of the incredibly hard working Linux developers and maintainers. It is people like those who makes this wonderful operating system possible.

Chapter 2. Preparations

This chapter is aimed at getting you started and to help you understand the role netfilter and **iptables** play in Linux today. This chapter should hopefully get you set up and finished to go with your experimentation and installation of a firewall which should hopefully run smoothly in the future.

Where to get iptables

The **iptables** userspace package can be downloaded from the netfilter homepage (http://netfilter.samba.org/). The **iptables** package also makes use of kernel space facilities which can be configured into the kernel during **make configure**. The necessary pieces will be discussed a bit further down in this document.

Kernel setup

To run the pure basics of **iptables** you need to configure the following options into the kernel while doing **make** config or one of it's related commands:

CONFIG_PACKET - This option allows applications and programs that needs to work directly to certain network devices. An example would be tcpdump or snort.

CONFIG_NETFILTER - This option is required if you're going to use your computer as a firewall or gateway to the internet. In other words, this is most definitely required if for anything in this tutorial to work at all. I assume you'll want this since you're reading this at all.

And of course you need to add the proper drivers for your interfaces to work properly, ie. Ethernet adapter, *PPP* and *SLIP* interfaces. The above will only add some of the pure basics in iptables. You won't be able to do anything to be pretty honest, it just adds the framework to the kernel. If you want to use the more advanced options in IPTables, you need to set up the proper configuration options in your kernel. Here we will show you the options available in a basic 2.4.9 kernel and a brief explanation :

CONFIG_IP_NF_CONNTRACK - This module is needed to make connection tracking. Connection tracking is used by, among other things, *NAT* and *Masquerading*. If you need to firewall machines on a *LAN* you most definitely should mark this option. For example, this module is required by the *rc.firewall.txt* to work.

CONFIG_IP_NF_FTP - This module is required if you want to do connection tracking on *FTP* connections. Since *FTP* connections are quite hard to do connection tracking on in normal cases conntrack needs a so called helper, this option compiles the helper. If you don't add this module you won't be able to FTP through a firewall or gateway properly.

CONFIG_IP_NF_IPTABLES - This option is required if you want do any kind of filtering, *masquerading* or *NAT*. It adds the whole iptables identification framework to kernel. Without this you won't be able to do anything at all with iptables.

CONFIG_IP_NF_MATCH_LIMIT - This module isn't exactly required but it's used in the example *rc.firewall.txt*. This option provides the LIMIT match, that adds the possibility to control

how many packets per minute that's supposed to be matched with a certain rule. For example, -m limit -limit 3/minute would match a maximum of 3 packets per minute. This module can also be used to avoid certain Denial of Service attacks.

CONFIG_IP_NF_MATCH_MAC - This allows us to match packets based on *MAC* addresses. Every Ethernet adapter has it's own *MAC* address. We could for instance block packets based on what *MAC* address used and block a certain computer pretty well since the *MAC* address don't change. We don't use this option in the *rc.firewall.txt* example or anywhere else.

CONFIG_IP_NF_MATCH_MARK - This allows us to use a **MARK** match. For example, if we use the target **MARK** we could mark a packet and then depending on if this packet is marked further on in the table, we can match based on this mark. This option is the actual match **MARK**, and further down we will describe the actual target **MARK**.

CONFIG_IP_NF_MATCH_MULTIPORT - This module allows us to match packets with a whole range of destination ports or source ports. Normally this wouldn't be possible, but with this match it is.

CONFIG_IP_NF_MATCH_TOS - With this match we can match packets based on their *TOS* field. *TOS* stands for *Type Of Service*. *TOS* can also be set by certain rules in the *mangle* table and via the ip/tc commands.

CONFIG_IP_NF_MATCH_TCPMSS - This option adds the possibility for us to match *TCP* packets based on their *MSS* field.

CONFIG_IP_NF_MATCH_STATE - This is one of the biggest news in comparison to **ipchains**. With this module we can do stateful matching on packets. For example, if we've already seen trafic in two directions in a *TCP* connection, this packet will be counted as **ESTABLISHED**. This module is used extensively in the *rc.firewall.txt* example.

CONFIG_IP_NF_MATCH_UNCLEAN - This module will add the possibility for us to match *IP*, *TCP*, *UDP* and *ICMP* packets that looks strange or are invalid. We could for example drop these packets, but we never know if they are legitimate or not. Note that this match is still experimental and might not work perfectly in all cases.

CONFIG_IP_NF_MATCH_OWNER - This option will add the possibility for us to do matching based on the owner of a socket. For example, we can allow only the user root to have Internet access. This module was originally just written as an example on what could be done with the new iptables. Note that this match is still experimental and might not work for everyone.

CONFIG_IP_NF_FILTER - This module will add the basic *filter* table which will enable you to do basic filtering. In the *filter* table you'll find the *INPUT*, *FORWARD* and *OUTPUT* chains. This module is required if you plan to do any kind of filtering on packets that you receive and send.

CONFIG_IP_NF_TARGET_REJECT - This target allows us to specify that an *ICMP* error message should be sent in reply to incoming packets instead of plainly dropping them dead to the floor. Mind you that *TCP* connections are always reset or refused with a *TCP RST* packet.

CONFIG_IP_NF_TARGET_MIRROR - This allows packets to be bounced back to the sender of the packet. For example, if we set up a *MIRROR* target on destination port *HTTP* on our *INPUT* chain and someone tries to access this port we would plainly bounce his packets back to himself and finally he would see his own homepage.

CONFIG_IP_NF_NAT - This module allows *network* address translation, or NAT, in its different forms. This option gives us access to the nat table in iptables. This option is required if we want to do port forwarding, masquerading, etcetera. Note that this option is is not required for firewalling and masquerading of a *LAN*, but mostly is, unless you are able to provide unique IP addresses for all hosts. Hence, this option is required for the example *rc.firewall.txt* script to work properly, and most definitely on your network if you do not have the ability to add unique IP addresses as specified above.

CONFIG_IP_NF_TARGET_MASQUERADE - This module adds the **MASQUERADE** target. For instance if we don't know what IP we have to the Internet this would be the preferred way of getting the IP instead of using *DNAT* or *SNAT*. In other words, if we use *DHCP*, *PPP*, *SLIP* or some other connection that dynamically assigns us an IP, we need to use this target instead of *SNAT*. Masquerading gives a slightly higher load on the computer than *NAT* does, but will work without us knowing the IP in advance.

CONFIG_IP_NF_TARGET_REDIRECT - This target is useful together with *proxies* for example. Instead of letting a packet pass right through, we remap them to go to our local box instead. In other words, we have the possibility to make a *transparent proxy* this way.

CONFIG_IP_NF_TARGET_LOG - This adds the **LOG** target to **iptables** and the functionality of it. We can use this module to log certain packets to syslogd and hense see the packet further on. This could be useful for forensics or debugging a script you're writing.

CONFIG_IP_NF_TARGET_TCPMSS - This option can be used to overcome Internet Service Providers and servers who block *ICMP Fragmentation Needed* packets. This can result in webpages not getting through, small mails getting through while larger mails don't get through, ssh works but scp dies after handshake, etcetera. We can then use the *TCPMSS* target to overcome this by clamping our *MSS* (Maximum Segment Size) to the *PMTU* (Path Maximum Transmit Unit). This way, we'll be able to handle what the authors of netfilter themself call "criminally braindead ISPs or servers" in the kernel configuration help.

CONFIG_IP_NF_COMPAT_IPCHAINS - Adds a compatibility mode with the old **ipchains**. Do not look at this as any real long term solution for solving migration from Linux 2.2 kernels to 2.4 kernels since it may well be gone with kernel 2.6.

CONFIG_IP_NF_COMPAT_IPFWADM - Compatibility mode with old *ipfwadm*. Do absolutely not look at this as a real long term solution.

As you can see, there is a heap of options. I have briefly explained what kind of extra behaviours you can expect from each module here. These are only the options available in a vanilla Linux 2.4.9 kernel. If you would like to get a look at more options, I suggest you look at the *patch-o-matic* functions in *netfilter* userland which will add heaps of other options in the kernel. *POM* fixes are additions that are supposed to be added in the kernel in the future but has not quite reached the kernel yet. These functions should be added in the future, but has not quite made it in yet. This may be for various reasons such as the patch not being stable yet, to Linus Torvalds being unable to keep up or not wanting to let the patch in to the mainstream kernel yet since it is still experimental.

You will need the following options compiled into your kernel, or as modules, for the *rc.firewall.txt* script to work. If you need help with the options that the other scripts needs, look at the example firewall scripts section.

• CONFIG_PACKET

- CONFIG_NETFILTER
- CONFIG_CONNTRACK
- CONFIG_IP_NF_FTP
- CONFIG_IP_NF_IRC
- CONFIG_IP_NF_IPTABLES
- CONFIG_IP_NF_FILTER
- CONFIG_IP_NF_NAT
- CONFIG_IP_NF_MATCH_STATE
- CONFIG_IP_NF_TARGET_LOG
- CONFIG_IP_NF_MATCH_LIMIT
- CONFIG_IP_NF_TARGET_MASQUERADE

The above will be required at the very least for the *rc.firewall.txt* script. In the other example scripts I will explain what requirements they have in their respective section. For now, lets try to stay focused on the main script which you should be studying now.

userland setup

First of all, let's look at how we compile the **iptables** package. This compilation goes quite a lot hand in hand with the kernel configuration and compilation so you are aware of this. Certain distributions comes with the **iptables** package preinstalled, one of these are Red Hat 7.1. However, in Red Hat 7.1 it is disabled per default. We will check closer on how to enable it on this, and other distributions further on in this chapter

Compiling the userland applications

First of all unpack the iptables package. Here, we have used the *iptables 1.2.3* package and a vanilla 2.4.9 kernel. Unpack as usual, using bzip2 -cd iptables-1.2.3.tar.bz2 | tar -xvf - (this can also be accomplished with the tar -xjvf

iptables-1.2.3.tar.bz2, which should do pretty much the same as the first command. However, this may not work with older versions of **tar**). Hopefully the package should now be unpacked properly into a directory named *iptables-1.2.3*. For more information read the iptables-1.2.3/INSTALL file which contains pretty good information on compiling and getting the program to run.

After this, there is the option to install extra modules and options etcetera to the kernel. The step described here will only check patches that are pending for inclusion to the kernel, there are some even more experimental patches further along, which may only be available when you do some other steps.

Note

Some of these are highly experimental and may not be a very good idea to install. However, there are heaps of extremely interesting matches and targets in this installation step so don't be afraid of at least looking at them. To do this step we do something like this from the root of the iptables package:

make pending-patches KERNEL_DIR=/usr/src/linux/

The variable KERNEL_DIR should point to the actual place that your kernel source is located at. Normally this should be /usr/src/linux/ but this may vary, and most probably you will know yourself where the kernel source is available.

Note

This only asks about certain patches that are just about to enter the kernel anyways. There might be more patches and additions that the developers of netfilter are about to add to the kernel, but is a bit further away from actually getting there. One way to install these are by doing the following:

make most-of-pom KERNEL_DIR=/usr/src/linux/

The above command would ask about installing parts of what in netfilter world is called **patch-o-matic**, but still skip the most extreme patches that might cause havoc in your kernel. Note that we say ask, because that's what these commands actually do. They ask you before anything is changed in the kernel source. To be able to install *all* of the *patch-o-matic* stuff you will need to run the following command:

make patch-o-matic KERNEL_DIR=/usr/src/linux/

Don't forget to read the help for each patch thoroughly before doing anything. Some patches will destroy other patches while others may destroy your kernel if used together with some patches from *patch-o-matic* etc.

Note

You may totally ignore the above steps if you don't want to patch your kernel, it is in other words not necessary to do the above. However, there are some really interesting things in the *patch-o-matic* that you may want to look at so there's nothing bad in just running the commands and see what they contain.

After this you are finished doing the *patch-o-matic* parts of installation, you may either compile a new kernel making use of the new patches that you have added to the source. Don't forget to configure the kernel again since the new patches probably are not added to the configured options and so on. You may wait with the kernel compilation until after the compilation of the userland program *iptables* if you feel like it, though.

Continue by compiling the *iptables* userland application. To compile *iptables* you issue a simple command that looks like this:

make KERNEL_DIR=/usr/src/linux/

The userland application should now compile properly, if not, you're on your own, or possibly try the netfilter mailing list who might help you with your problems. There is a few things that might go wrong with the installation of *iptables* so don't panic if it won't work, try to think logically about it and find out what's wrong or get someone to help you.

If everything has worked smoothly, you're ready to install the binaries by now. To do this, you would issue the following command to install them:

make install KERNEL_DIR=/usr/src/linux/

Hopefully everything should work in the program now. To use any of the changes in the **iptables** userland applications you should definitely recompile and reinstall your kernel by now if you haven't done so before. For more information about installing the userland applications from source, check the INSTALL file in the source which contains excellent information on the subject of installation.

Installation on Red Hat 7.1

Red Hat 7.1 comes preinstalled with a 2.4.x kernel that has *netfilter* and **iptables** compiled in. It also contains all the basic userland programs and configuration files that is needed to run it, however, they have disabled the whole thing by using the backwards compatible **ipchains** module. Annoying to say the least, and a lot of people are asking different mailing lists why **iptables** don't work. So, let's take a brief look at how to turn the module off and how to install **iptables** instead.

(Note) The defaul

The default Red Hat 7.1 installation today comes with an utterly old version of the userspace applications so you might want to compile a new version of the applications as well as install a new and homecompiled kernel before fully exploiting *iptables*.

First of all you will need to turn off the *ipchains* modules so it won't start in the future. To do this, you will need to change some filenames in the /etc/rc.d/ directory-structure. The following command should do it:

chkconfig -level 0123456 ipchains off

By doing this we move all the soft links that points to the real script to K92ipchains. The first letter which per default would be S tells the initscripts to start the script. By changing this to K we tell it to Kill the service instead, or to not run it if it was not previously started. Now the service won't be started in the future.

However, to stop the service from actually running right now we need to run another command. This is the **service** command which can be used to work on currently running services. We would then issue the following command to stop the **ipchains** service:

service ipchains stop

Finally, to start the **iptables** service. First of all, we need to know which runlevels we want it to run in. Normally this would be in runlevel 2, 3 and 5. These runlevels are used for the following things:

- 2. Multiuser without NFS or the same as 3 if there is no networking.
- 3. Full multiuser mode, ie. the normal runlevel to run in.
- 5. X11. This is used if you automatically boot into Xwindows.

To make iptables run in these runlevels we would do the following commands:

chkconfig -level 235 iptables on

The above commands would in other words make the **iptables** service run in runlevel 2, 3 and 5. If you'd like the **iptables** service to run in some other runlevel you would have to issue the same command in those. However, none of the other runlevels should be used, so you should not really need to activate it for those runlevels. Level 1 is for single user mode, ie, when you need to fix a screwed up box. Level 4 should be unused, and level 6 is for shutting the computer down.

To activate the **iptables** service, we just run the following command:

service iptables start

Of course, there is no rules in the *iptables* script. To add rules to an Red Hat 7.1 box, there is two common ways. First of all, you chould edit the /etc/rc.d/init.d/iptables script. This would have the bad effect that the rules would be deleted if you updated the iptables package by RPM. The other way would be to load the ruleset and then save them with the *iptables-save* command and then have it loaded automatically by the rc.d scripts.

First we will describe the possibility of doing the set up by cut and paste to the *iptables* init.d script. To add rules that should be run when the computer starts the service, you add them under the start) section, or in the start() function. Note, if you add the rules under the start) section don't forget to stop the start() function from running in the start) section. Also, don't forget to edit a the stop) section either which tells the script what to do when the computer is going down for example, or when we are entering a runlevel that don't require iptables to run. Also, don't forget to check out the restart section and condrestart. Note that this set up may be automatically erased if you have, for example, Red Hat Network automatically updating your packages. It may also be erased by updating from the *iptables* RPM package.

The second way of doing the set up would require the following steps to be taken. First of all, make and write a ruleset in a file, or directly with iptables, that will meet your requirements, and don't forget to experiment a bit. When you find a set up that works without problems or bugs as you can see, use the iptables-save command. You could either use it normally, such as iptables-save > /etc/sysconfig/iptables which would save the ruleset to the file /etc/sysconfig/iptables. This file is automatically used by the iptables rc.d script to restore the ruleset in the future. The other way to save the script would be to use service iptables save which would save the script automatically to this file. When you reboot the computer in the future, the iptables rc.d script will use the command iptables-restore to

restore the ruleset from the save-file /etc/sysconfig/iptables. Do not intermix this and the previous set up instruction since they may heavily damage eachother and render each and one useless.

When all of these steps are finished we can deinstall the currently installed *ipchains* and *iptables* packages. We do this since we don't want the system to mix up the new *iptables* userland application with the old preinstalled *iptables* applications. This step is only necessary if you will install *iptables* from the source package. It's not unusual that the new and the old package get's mixed up since the rpm based installation installs the package in non-standard places and won't get overwritten by the installation for the new *iptables* package. To do the deinstallation, do as follows:

rpm -e iptables

And of course, why keep **ipchains** lying around when it is of no use? That is done the same way as with the old **iptables** binaries, etc:

rpm -e ipchains

After all this is done you are finished to update the **iptables** package from source according to the source installation instructions. None of the old binaries, libraries or include files etc should be lying around any more.

Chapter 3. Traversing of tables and chains

This chapter will talk about how packets traverse the the different chains and in which order. Also we will speak about in which order the tables are traversed. This is extremely valuable information later on when you write your own specific rules. We will also look at which points certain other parts that also are kernel dependant gets in the picture. With this we mainly mean the different routing decisions and so on. This is especially needed if you want to write rules with **iptables** that could change how different packets get routed, good examples of this is **DNAT** and **SNAT** and of course the *TOS* bits.

General

When a packet first enters the firewall, it hits the hardware and then get's passed on to the proper device driver in the kernel. Then the packet starts to go through a series of steps in the kernel before it is either sent to the correct application (locally), or forwarded to another host or whatever happens to it. In this example, we're assuming that the packet is destined for another host on another network. The packet goes through the different steps in the following fashion:

Step	Table	Chain	Comment
1			On the wire(ie, internet)
2			Comes in on the interface(ie, eth0)
3	mangle	PREROUTING	This chain is normally used for mangling packets, ie, changing <i>TOS</i> and so on.
4	nat	PREROUTING	This chain is used for <i>Destination</i> Network Address Translation mainly. Source Network Address Translation is done further on. Avoid filtering in this chain since it will be passed through in certain cases.
5			Routing decision, ie, is the packet destined for our localhost or to be forwarded and where.
6	filter	FORWARD	The packet got routed onto the <i>FORWARD</i> chain, only forwarded packets go through here, we do all the filtering here. Note that all traffic that's forwarded goes through here (not only in one direction), so you need to think about it when writing your ruleset.
7	nat	POSTROUTING	This chain should first and foremost be used for Source Network Address Translation, avoid doing filtering here since certain packets might pass this chain without ever hitting it. This is also where Masquerading is done.

Table 3-1. Forwarded packets

Step	Table	Chain	Comment	
8			Goes out on the outgoing interface (ie, eth1).	
9			Out on the wire again (ie, LAN).	

As you can see, there's quite a lot of steps to pass through. The packet can be stopped at any of the **iptables** chains, or anywhere else in case it is malformed, however, we are mainly interested in the **iptables** aspect of this lot. Do note that there is no specific chains or tables for different interfaces or anything like that. *FORWARD* is always passed by all packets that are forwarded over this firewall/router. Now, let us have a look at a packet that is destined for our own localhost. It would pass through the following steps before actually being delivered to our application to receive it:

Step	Table	Chain	Comment	
1			On the wire (ie, Internet)	
2			Comes in on the interface(ie, eth0)	
3	mangle	PREROUTING	This chain is normally used for mangling packets, ie, changing TOS and so on.	
4	nat	PREROUTING	This chain is used for <i>Destination</i> Network Address Translation mainly. Avoid filtering in this chain since it will be passed through in certain cases.	
5			Routing decision, ie, is the packet destined for our localhost or to be forwarded and where.	
6	filter	INPUT	This is where we do filtering for all incoming traffic destined for our localhost. Note that all incoming packets destined for this host passes through this chain, no matter what interface and so on it came from.	
7			Local process/application (ie, server/client program)	

Table 3-2. Destination localhost


Note that this time the packet was passed through the *INPUT* chain instead of the *FORWARD* chain. Quite logical. Most probably the only thing that's really logical about the traversing of tables and chains in your eyes in the beginning, but if you continue to dig in it, I think it gets clearer with time. I think. Finally we look at the outgoing packets from our own localhost and what steps they go through.

Table	3-3.	Source	localhost
-------	------	--------	-----------

Step	Table	Chain	Comment
1			Local process/application (ie, server/client
			program)

Step	Table	Chain	Comment
2	Mangle	OUTPUT	This is where we mangle packets, it is suggested that you do not filter in this chain since it can have sideeffects.
3	Nat	OUTPUT	This is currently broken, could someone tell me when this will be fixed? Please?
4	Filter	OUTPUT	This is where we filter packets going out from localhost.
5			Routing decision. This is where we decide where the packet should go.
6	Nat	POSTROUTING	This is where we do <i>Source</i> Network Address Translation as described earlier. It is suggested that you don't do filtering here since it can have sideeffects, and certain packets might slip through even though you set a default policy of DROP.
7			Goes out on some interface (ie, eth0)
8			On the wire (ie, Internet)

We have now seen how the different chains are traversed in three separate scenarios. If we would figure out a good map of all this, it would look something like this:



Chapter 3. Traversing of tables and chains

Hopefully you got a clearer picture of how the packets traverses the built in chains now. All

comments welcome, this might still be wrong or it might change in the future. If you feel that you want more information, you could use the *rc.test-iptables.txt* script. This test script should give you the necessary rules to test how the tables and chains are traversed.

Mangle table

This table should as we've already noted mainly be used for mangling packets. In other words, you may freely use the mangle matches etc that could be used to change TOS (Type Of Service) fields and so on.

Caution

It is strongly adviced that you don't use this table to do any filtering in, nor will any DNAT, SNAT or Masquerading work in this table.

Target's that only valid in the mangle table:

- TOS
- TTL
- MARK

The **TOS** target is used to set and/or change the *Type of Service field* in the packet. This could be used for setting up policies on the network regarding how a packet should be routed and so on. Note that this has not been perfected and is not really implemented on the internet and most of the routers don't care about the value in this field, and sometimes, they act faulty on what they get. Don't set this in other words for packets going to the internet unless you want to do routing decisions on it with iproute2.

The **TTL** target is used to change the *TTL* (Time To Live) field of the packet. We could tell packets to only have a specific *TTL* and so on. One good reason for this could be that we don't want to give ourself away to nosy Internet Service Providers. Some Internet Service Providers does not like users running multiple computers on one single connection, and there are some Internet Service Providers known to look for a single host generating many different *TTL* values, and takes this as one of many signs of multiple computers connected to a single connection.

The **MARK** target is used to set special *mark* values to the packet. These marks could then be recognised by the **iproute2** programs to do different routing on the packet depending on what *mark* they have, or if they don't have any. We could also do bandwidth limiting and Class Based Queuing based on these marks.

Nat table

This table should only be used for *NAT* (Network Address Translation) on different packets. In other words, it should only be used to translate packets source field or destination field. Note

that, as we have said before, only the first packet in a stream will hit this chain. After this, the rest of the packets will automatically have the same action taken on them as the first packet. The actual targets that does these kind of things are:

- DNAT
- SNAT
- MASQUERADE

The **DNAT** (Destination Network Address Translation) target is mainly used in cases such as when you have one IP and want to redirect accesses to the firewall to some other host on a *DMZ* for example. In other words, we change the destination address of the packet and reroute it to some other host.

SNAT (Source Network Address Translation) is mainly used for changing the source address of packets. This is mainly done to hide our local networks or *DMZ*, etcetera. A good example when this is very good is when we have a firewall that we know the outside IP address of, but need to change our local networks IP numbers to the same of the IP of our firewall. The firewall will with this target automatically **SNAT** and **De-SNAT** the packets, hence making it possible to make connections from the *LAN* to the Internet. If you're network uses 192.168.x.x netmask for example, the packets would never get back from the Internet because these networks are regulated to be used in *LAN*'s by IANA.

The MASQUERADE target is used in exactly the same way as SNAT, but the MASQUERADE target takes a little bit more overhead to compute. The reason for this is that each time that the MASQUERADE target gets hit by a packet, it automatically checks for the IP address to use, instead of doing as the SNAT target does and just use an IP address submitted while the rule was parsed. The MASQUERADE target will on the other hand work properly with Dynamic IP addresses that you may be provided when you connect to the Internet with, for example *PPP*, *SLIP* or *DHCP*.

Filter table

The *filter* table is, of course, mainly used for filtering packets. We can match packets and filter them however we want, and there is nothing special to this chain or special packets that might slip through because they are malformed, etc. This is the place that we actually take action against packets and look at what they contain and DROP/ACCEPT depending on their payload. Of course we may do filtering earlier too, however, this is the place that was designed for it. Almost all targets are usable in this chain, however, the targets discussed previously in this chapter are only usable in their respective tables. We will not go into deeper discussion about this table though, as you already know, this is where we (should) do the main filtering.

Chapter 4. How a rule is built

This chapter will discuss in legth how to build your rules. A rule could be described as the pure rules the firewall will follow when blocking different connections and packets in each chain. Each line you write that's inserted to a chain should be considered a rule. We will also discuss the basic matches that str available and how to use them as well as the different targets and how we can make new targets to use (ie, new subchains).

Basics

As we have already explained each rule is a line that the kernel looks at to find out what to do with a packet. If all the criterias, or matches, are met, we perform the target, or jump, instruction. Normally we would write a rule something like this:

iptables [-t table] command [match] [target/jump]

There is nothing that says that the target instruction must be last in the line, however, you would do this normally to get a better readability. Also, we have used this way of writing rules since it is the most usual way of writing them. Hence, if you read someone elses script you'll most likely recognise the way of writing a rule and understand it quickly.

If you want to use another table than the standard table, you could insert the table specification where [table] is specified. However, it is not necessary to specify it explicitly all the time since **iptables** per default uses the *filter* table to implement your commands on. It is not required to put the table specification at this location, either. It could be set pretty much anywhere in the rule, however, it is more or less standard to put the table specification at the beginning of the commandline.

One thing to think about though; the command should always be first, or directly after the table specification. This tells the *iptables* command what to do. We will enter this a bit further on. We use this first variable to tell the program what to do, for example to insert a rule or to add a rule to the end of the chain, or to delete a rule.

The match is the part which we send to the kernel that says what a packet must look like to be matched. We could specify what IP address the packet must come from, or which network interface the packet must come from etc. There is a heap of different matches that we can use that we will look closer at further on in this chapter.

Finally we have the target of the packet. If all the matches are met for a packet we tell the kernel to perform this action on the packet. We could tell the kernel to send the packet to another chain that we create ourself, which must be part of this table. We could tell the kernel to drop this packet dead and do no further processing, or we could tell kernel to send a specified reply to be sent back. As with the rest of the content in this section, we'll look closer at them further on in the chapter.

Tables

The -t option specifies which table to use. Per default, the *filter* table is used. We may specify one of the following tables with the -t option. Do note that this is an extremely brief repetition of the *Traversing of tables and chains* chapter in certain parts.

Table Explanation nat The nat table is used mainly for Network Address Translation. Packets in a stream only traverse this table once. The first packet of a stream is allowed, we presume. The rest of the packets in the same stream are automatically NAT'ed or Masqueraded etc, in case they are supposed to have those actions taken on them. The rest of the packets in the stream will in other words not go through this table again, but instead they will automatically have the same actions taken to them as the first packet in the stream. This is one reason why you should not do any filtering in this table, as we will discuss more in length further on. The *PREROUTING* chain is used to alter packets as soon as they get in to the firewall. The OUTPUT chain is used for altering locally generated packets (ie, on the firewall) before they get to the routing decision. Note that OUTPUT is currently broken. Finally we have the POSTROUTING chain which is used to alter packets just as they are about to leave the firewall. mangle This table is used mainly for mangling packets. We could change different packets and how their headers look among other things. Examples of this would be to change the TTL, TOS or MARK. Note that the MARK is not really a change to the packet, but a mark for the packet is set in kernelspace which other rules or programs might use further on in the firewall to filter or do advanced routing on with tc as an example. The table consists of two built in chains, the PREROUTING and OUTPUT chains. PREROUTING is used for altering packets just as they enter the firewall and before they hit the routing decision. OUTPUT is used for changing and altering locally generated packets before they enter the routing decision. Note that mangle can not be used for any kind of *Network Address Translation* or *Masquerading*, the nat table was made for these kinds of operations. filter The *filter* table should be used for filtering packets generally. For example, we could **DROP**, **LOG**, **ACCEPT** or **REJECT** packets without problems as in the other tables. There are three chain built in to this table. The first one is named FORWARD and is used on all non-locally generated packets that are not destined for our localhost (the firewall, in other words). INPUT is used on all packets that are destined for our local host (the firewall) and OUTPUT is finally used for all locally generated packets.

Table 4-1. Tables

The listing above has hopefully explained the basics about the three different tables that are available. They should be used for totally different things, and you should know what to use each chain for. If you do not understand their usage you may well fall into a pit once someone finds the hole you have unknowingly placed in the firewall yourself. We have already discussed the tables and chains in more detail within the *Traversing of tables and chains* chapter. If you do

not understand this fully you are recommended to go back and read through that chapter again.

Commands

In this section we will bring up all the different commands and what can be done with them. The command tells **iptables** what to do with the rest of the commandline that we send to the program. Normally we want to either add or delete something to some table or another. The following commands are available to iptables:

Table 4-2. Commands

Command Example Explanation -A, -append iptables -A INPUT ... This command appends the rule to the end of the chain. The rule will will in other words always be put last in the ruleset in comparison to previously added rules, and hence be checked last, unless you append or insert more rules later on. -D, -delete

iptables -D INPUT -dport 80 -j DROP, iptables -D INPUT 1

This command deletes a rule in a chain. This could be done in two ways, either by specifying a rule to match with the -D option (as in the first example) or by specifying the rule number that we want to match. If you use the first way of deleting rules, they must match totally to the entry in the chain. If you use the second way, the rules are numbered from the top of each chain, and the top rule is number 1.

-R, -replace

iptables -R INPUT 1 -s 192.168.0.1 -j DROP

This command replaces the old entry at the specified line. It works in the same way as the -delete command, but instead of totally deleting the entry, it will replace it with a new entry. This might be good while experimenting with iptables mainly.

-I, -insert

iptables -I INPUT 1 -dport 80 -j ACCEPT

Insert a rule somewhere in a chain. The rule is inserted at the actual number that we give. In other words, the above example would be inserted at place 1 in the *INPUT* chain, and hence it would be the absolutely first rule in the chain from now on.

-L,-list

iptables -L INPUT

Command

Example

Explanation

This command lists all the entries in the specified chain. In the above case, we would list all the entries in the *INPUT* chain. It's also legal to not specify any chain at all. In the last case, the command would list all the chains in the specified table (To specify a table, see the *Tables* section). The exact output is affected by other options sent to the program, for example the -n and -v options, etcetera.

-F, -flush

iptables -F INPUT

This command flushes the specified chain from all rules and is equivalent to deleting each rule one by one but is quite a bit faster. The command can be used without options, and will then delete all rules in all chains within the specified table.

-Z, -zero

iptables -Z INPUT

This command tells the program to zero all counters in a specific chain or in all chains. If you have used the -v option with the -L command, you have probably seen the packet counter in the beginning of each field. To zero this packet counter, use the -z option. This option works the same as -L except that -z won't list the rules. If -L and -z is used together (which is legal), the chains will first be listed, and then the packet counters are zeroised.

-N, -new-chain

iptables -N allowed

This command tells the kernel to create a new chain by the specified name in the specified table. In the above example we create a chain called allowed. Note that there must be no target of the same name previously to creating it.

-X, -delete-chain

iptables -X allowed

This command deletes the specified chain from the table. For this command to work, there must be no rules that are referring to the chain that is to be deleted. In other words, you would have to replace or delete all rules referring to the chain before actually deleting the chain. If this command is used without any options, all chains that are not built in will be deleted from the specified table.

-P, -policy

iptables -P INPUT DROP

This command tells the kernel to set a specified default target, or policy, on a chain. All packets that don't match any rule will then be forced to use the policy of the chain. Legal targets are: **DROP**, **ACCEPT** and **REJECT** (There might be more, mail me if so)

-E, -rename-chain

iptables -E allowed disallowed

Command

Example

Explanation

The **-E** command tells **iptables** to rename the first name of a chain, to the second name. In the example above we would, in other words, change the name of the chain from allowed to disallowed. Note that this will not affect the actual way the table will work. It is, in other words, just a cosmetic change to the table.

A command should always be specified, unless you just want to list the built-in help for **iptables** or get the version of the command. To get the version, use the **-v** option and to get the help message, use the **-h** option. As usual, in other words. Here comes a few options that can be used together with a few different commands. Note that we tell you with which commands the options can be used and what effect they will have. Also note that we do not tell you any options here that is only used to affect rules and matches. The matches and targets are instead looked upon in a later section of this chapter.

Table 4-3. Options

Option

Commands used with

Explanation

-v, -verbose

-list, -append, -insert, -delete, -replace

This command shows a verbose output and is mainly used together with the -list command. If used together with the -list command it makes the output from the command include the interface address, rule options and TOS masks. The -list command will also include a bytes and packet counter for each rule if the -verbose option is set. These counters uses the K (x1000), M (x1,000,000) and G (x1,000,000,000) multipliers. To overcome this and to get exact output, you could use the -x option described later. If this option is used with the -append, -insert, -delete or -replace commands, the program will output detailed information on what happens to the rules and if it was inserted correctly etcetera.

-x, -exact

-list

This option expands the numerics. The output from -list will in other words not contain the K, M or G multipliers. Instead we will get an exact output of how many packets and bytes that has matched the rule in question from the packets and bytes counters. Note that this option is only usable in the -list command and isn't really relevant for any of the other commands.

-n, -numeric

-list

This option tells iptables to output numerical values. IP addresses and port numbers will be printed by using their numerical values and not hostnames, network names or application names. This option is only applicable to the **-list** command. This option overrides the default of resolving all numerics to hosts and names if possible.

Option

Commands used with

Explanation

-line-numbers

-list

The **-line-numbers** command is used to output line numbers together with the **-list** command. Each rule is numbered together with this option and it might be easier to know which rule has which number when you're going to insert rules. This option only works with the **-list** command.

-c, -set-counters

-insert, -append, -replace

This option is used when creating a rule in some way or modifying it. We can then use the option to initialize the packets and bytes counters of the rule. The syntax would be something like **-set-counters 20 4000**, which would tell the kernel to set the packet counter to 20 and byte counter to 4000.

-modprobe

All

The **-modprobe** option is used to tell iptables which command to use when probing for modules to the kernel. It could be used if your **modprobe** command is not somewhere in the searchpath etc. In such cases it might be necessary to specify this option so the program knows what to do in case a needed module is not loaded. This option can be used with all commands.

Matches

This section will talk a bit more about the matches. I've chosen to split down the matches into five different subcategories here. First of all we have the *generic matches* which are generic and can be used in all rules. Then we have the *TCP matches* which can only be applied to *TCP* packets. We have *UDP matches* which can only be applied to *UDP* packets and *ICMP matches* which can only be used on *ICMP* packets. Finally we have special matches such as the state, owner and limit matches and so on. These final matches has in turn been split down to even more subcategories even though they might not necessarily be different matches at all. I hope this is a reasonable breakdown and that all people out there can understand this breakdown.

Generic matches

This section will deal with *Generic matches*. A generic match is a kind of match that is always available whatever kind of protocol we are working on or whatever match extensions we have loaded. No special parameters are in other words needed to load these matches at all. I have also added the -protocol match here, even though it is needed to use some protocol specific matches. For example, if we want to use an *TCP match*, we need to use the -protocol match

and send *TCP* as an option to the match. However, **-protocol** is in itself a match, too, since it can be used to match specific protocols. The following matches are always available.

Table	4-4.	Generic	matches
-------	------	---------	---------

Command

Example

Explanation

-p, -protocol

iptables -A INPUT -p tcp

This match is used to check for certain protocols. Examples of protocols are *TCP*, *UDP* and *ICMP*. This list can vary a bit at the same time since it uses the /etc/protocols (http://people.unix-fu.org/andreasson/iptables-tutorial/other/protocols.txt) if it can not recognise the protocol itself. First of all the protocol match can take one of the three aforementioned protocols, as well as ALL, which means to match all of the previous protocols. The protocol may also take a numeric value, such as 255 which would mean the RAW IP protocol. Finally, the program knows about all the protocols in the /etc/protocols, such as udp,tcp which would match all *UDP* and *TCP* packets. If this match is given the numeric value of zero (0), it means ALL protocols, which in turn is the default behaviour in case the -protocol match is not used. This match can also be inversed with the ! sign, so -protocol ! tcp would mean to match the *ICMP* and *UDP* protocols.

-s, -src, -source

iptables -A INPUT -s 192.168.1.1

This is the source match which is used to match packets based on their source IP address. The main form can be used to match single IP addresses such as *192.168.1.1*. It could be used with a netmask in a bits form. One way is to do it with an regular netmask in the *255.255.255.255.255* form (ie, *192.168.0.0/255.255.255.0*), and the other way is to only specify the number of ones (1's) on the left side of the network mask. This means that we could for example add */24* to use a *255.255.255.0* netmask. We could then match whole IP ranges, such as our local networks or network segments behind the firewall. The line would then look something like, for example, *192.168.0.0/24*. This would match all packets in the *192.168.0.x* range. We could also inverse the match with an ! just as before. If we would match all packets with a source address not coming from within the *192.168.0.x* range. The default is to match all IP addresses.

-d, -dst, -destination

iptables -A INPUT -d 192.168.1.1

Command

Example

Explanation

The -destination match is used to match packets based on their destination address or addresses. It works pretty much the same as the -source match and has the same syntax, except that it matches based on where the packets are going. To match an IP range, we can add a netmask either in the exact netmask form, or in the number of ones (1's) counted from the left side of the netmask bits. It would then look like either 192.168.0.0/255.255.255.0 or like 192.168.0.0/24 and both would be equivalent to each other. We could also invert the whole match with an ! sign, just as before. -destination ! 192.168.0.1 Would in other words match all packets except those not destined to the 192.168.0.1 IP address.

-i, -in-interface

iptables -A INPUT -i eth0

This match is used to match based on which interface the packet came in on. Note that this option is only legal in the *INPUT*, *FORWARD* and *PREROUTING* chains and will render an error message when used anywhere else. The default behaviour of this match, in case the match is not specified, is to assume a string value of +. The + value is used to match a string of letters and numbers. A single + would in other words tell the kernel to match all packets without considering which interface it came in on. The + string can also be used at the end of an interface, and eth+ would in other words match all ethernet devices. We can also invert the meaning of this option with the help of the ! sign. The line would then have a syntax looking something like -i ! eth0, which would mean to match all incoming interfaces, except eth0.

-o, -out-interface

iptables -A FORWARD -o eth0

The -out-interface match is used to match packets depending on which interface they are leaving on. Note that this match is only available in the *OUTPUT*, *FORWARD* and *POSTROUTING* chains, in opposite of the -in-interface match. Other than this, it works pretty much the same as the -in-interface match. The + extension is understood so you can match all eth devices with eth+ and so on. To inverse the meaning of the match, you can use the ! sign in exactly the same sense as in the -in-interface match. Of course, the default behaviour if this match is left out is to match all devices, regardless of where the packet is going.

-f, -fragment

iptables -A INPUT -f

Command

Example

Explanation

This match is used to match the second and third part of a fragmented packet. The reason for this is that in the case of fragmented packets, there is no way to tell the source or destination ports of the fragments, nor *ICMP* types, among other things. Also, fragmented packets might in rather special cases be used to compile attacks against computers. Such fragments of packets will not be matched by other rules when they look like this, and hence this match was created. This option can also be used in conjunction with the ! sign, however, in this case the ! sign must precede the match, like this ! -f. When this match is inversed, we match all head fragments and/or unfragmented packets. What this means is that we match all the first fragments of a fragmented packets, and not the second, third, and so on, fragments. We also match all packets that has not been fragmented during the transfer. Also note that there are defragmentation options within the kernel that can be used which are really good. As a secondary note, in case you use connection tracking you will not see any defragmented packets since they are dealt with before hitting any chain or table in *iptables*.

Implicit matches

This section will describe the matches that are loaded implicitly. *Implicit matches* are loaded automatically when we tell **iptables** that this rule will match for example *TCP* packets with the **-protocol** match. There are currently three types of *implicit matches* that are loaded automatically for three different protocols. These are *TCP matches*, *UDP matches* and *ICMP matches*. The *TCP* based matches contain a set of different matches that are available for only *TCP* packets, and *UDP* based matches contain another set of matches that are available only for *UDP* packets, and the same thing for *ICMP* packets. There is also explicitly loaded matches that you must load explicitly with the **-m** or **-match** option which we will go through later on in the next section.

TCP matches

These matches are protocol specific and are only available when working with *TCP* packets and streams. To use these matches you need to specify **-protocol tcp** on the command line before trying to use these matches. Note that the **-protocol tcp** match must be to the left of the protocol specific matches. These matches are loaded implicitly in a sense, just as the *UDP* and *ICMP matches* are loaded implicitly. The other matches will be looked over in the continuation of this section, after the *TCP match* section.

Table	4-5.	TCP	matches
-------	------	-----	---------

Match	
Example	
Explanation	
-sport, -source-port	

Match

Example

Explanation

iptables -A INPUT -p tcp -sport 22

The -source-port match is used to match packets based on their source port. This match can either take a service name or a port number. If you specify a service name, the service name must be in the /etc/services

(http://people.unix-fu.org/andreasson/iptables-tutorial/other/services.txt) file since iptables uses this file to look up the service name in. If you specify the port by port number, the entry of the rule will be slightly faster since iptables don't have to check up the service name, however, it could be a little bit harder to read in case you specify the numeric value. If you are writing a ruleset consisting of a 200 rules or more, you should definitely do this by port numbers since you will be able to notice the difference(On a slow box, this could make as much as 10 seconds if you are running a large ruleset consisting of 1000 rules or so). The -source-port match can also be used to match a whole range of ports in this fashion -source-port 22:80 for example. This example would match all source ports between 22 and 80. If we omit the first port specification, the port 0 is assumed to be the one we mean. -source-port :80 would then match port 0 through 80. And if the last port specification is omitted, port 65535 is assumed. If we would write -source-port 22: we would in turn get a port specification that tells us to match all ports from port 22 through port 65535. If we inversed the port specification in the port range so the highest port would be first and the lowest would be last, iptables automatically reverses the inversion. If a source port definition looked like -source-port 80:22, it would be understood just the same as -source-port 22:80. We could also invert a match by adding a ! sign like -source-port ! 22 which would mean that we want to match all ports but port 22. The inversion could also be used together with a port range and would then look like -source-port ! 22:80, which in turn would mean that we want to match all ports but port 22 through 80. Note that this match does not handle multiple separated ports and port ranges. For more information about this, look at the multiport match extension.

-dport, -destination-port

iptables -A INPUT -p tcp -dport 22

This match is used to match *TCP* packets depending on its destination port. It uses exactly the same syntax as the **-source-port** match. It understands port and port range specifications, as well as inversions. It does also reverse high and low ports in a port range specification if the high port went into the first spot and the low port into the last spot. The match will also assume the values of 0 or 65535 if the high or low port is left out in a port range specification. In other words, exactly the same as **-source-port** in syntax. Note that this match does not handle multiple separated ports and port ranges. For more information about this, look at the multiport match extension.

-tcp-flags

iptables -p tcp -tcp-flags SYN,ACK,FIN SYN

Match

Example

Explanation

This match is used to match depending on the *TCP* flags in a packet. First of all the match takes a list of flags to compare (a mask) and second it takes list of flags that should be set to 1, or turned on. Both lists should be comma-delimited. The match knows about the *SYN*, *ACK*, *FIN*, *RST*, *URG*, *PSH* flags but it also recognizes the words ALL and NONE. ALL and NONE is pretty much self describing, ALL means to use all flags and NONE means to use no flags for the option it is set. -tcp-flags ALL NONE would in other words mean to check all of the *TCP* flags and match if none of the flags are set. This option can also be inverted with the ! sign. For example, if we specify the example rule above as an inversion, we would get a match that would match packets that had the ACK and FIN bits set, but not the SYN bit. Also note that the comma delimitation should not include spaces. The correct syntax could be seen in the example above.

-syn

iptables -p tcp -syn

The -syn match is more or less an old relic from the ipchains days and is still there out of compatibility reasons, and for ease of traversing from one to the other. This match is used to match packets if they have the *SYN* bit set and the *ACK* and *FIN* bits unset. This command would in other words be exactly the same as the -tcp-flags *SYN*, *ACK*, *FIN SYN* match. Such packets are used to request new *TCP* connections from a server mainly. If you block these packets, you should have effectively blocked all incoming connection attempts, however, you will not have blocked the outgoing connections which a lot of exploits today uses (for example, hack a legit service and then make a program or such make the connect to you instead of setting up an open port on your host). This match can also be inverted with the *!* sign in this, *! -syn*, way. This would tell the match to match all packet with the *FIN* or the *ACK* bits set, in other words packets in an already established connection.

-tcp-option

iptables -p tcp -tcp-option 16

This match is used to match packets depending on their TCP options.

UDP matches

This section describes matches that will only work together with *UDP* packets. These matches are implicitly loaded when you specify the **-protocol UDP** match and will be available after this specification. Note that *UDP* packets are not connection oriented, and hence there is no such thing as different flags to set in the packet to give data on what the datagram is supposed to do, such as open or closing a connection, or if they are just simply supposed to send data. *UDP* packets do not require any kind of acknowledgement either. If they are lost, they are simply lost (Not taking *ICMP* error messaging etcetera into account). This means that there is quite a lot less matches to work with on a *UDP* packet than there is on *TCP* packets. Note that the state machine will work on all kinds of packets even though *UDP* or *ICMP* packets are counted as connectionless protocols. The state machine works pretty much the same on *UDP* packets as on *TCP* packets. There will be more about the state machine in a future chapter.

Table 4-6. UDP matches

Match

Example

Explanation

-sport, -source-port

iptables -A INPUT -p udp -sport 53

This match works exactly the same as its *TCP* counterpart. It is used to perform matches on packets based on their source *UDP* ports. It has support for port ranges, single ports and port inversions with the same syntax. To make a *UDP* port range you could do 22:80 which would match *UDP* ports 22 through 80. If the first value is omitted, port 0 is assumed. If the last port is omitted, port 65535 is assumed. If the high port comes before the low port, the ports switch place with eachother automatically. Single *UDP* port matches look as in the example above. To invert the port match, add a ! sign in this, -source-port ! 53 fashion. This would match all ports but port 80. Of course, the match can understand service names as long as they are available in the /etc/services

(http://people.unix-fu.org/andreasson/iptables-tutorial/other/services.txt) file. Note that this match does not handle multiple separated ports and port ranges. For more information about this, look at the multiport match extension.

-dport, -destination-port

iptables -A INPUT -p udp -dport 53

The same goes for this match as for the *UDP* version of -source-port, it is exactly the same as the equivalent *TCP* match, but will work with *UDP* packets instead. The match is used to match packets based on their *UDP* destination port. The match handles port ranges, single ports and inversions. To match a single port we do -destination-port 53, to invert this we could do -destination-port ! 53. The first would match all *UDP* packets going to port 53 while the second would match packets but those going to the destination port 53. To specify a port range, we would do -destination-port 22:80 for example. This example would match all packets destined for *UDP* port 22 through 80. If the first port is omitted, port 0 is assumed. If the second port is omitted, port 65535 is assumed. If the high port is placed before the low port, they automatically switch place so the low port winds up before the high port. Note that this match does not handle multiple ports and port ranges. For more information about this, look at the multiport match extension.

ICMP matches

These are the *ICMP matches*. These packets are even worse than *UDP* packets in the sense that they are connectionless. The *ICMP* protocol is mainly used for error reporting and for connection controlling and such features. *ICMP* is not a protocol subordinated to the IP protocol, but more of a protocol beside the IP protocol that helps handling errors. The headers of a *ICMP* packet are very similar to those of the IP headers, but contains differences. The main feature of this protocol is the type header which tells us what the packet is to do. One example is if we try to access an unaccessible IP adress, we would get an *ICMP host unreachable* in return.For a complete listing of *ICMP* types, see the *ICMP types* appendix. There is only one

ICMP specific match available for *ICMP* packets, and hopefully this should suffice. This match is implicitly loaded when we use the **-protocol ICMP** match and we get access to it automatically. Note that all the generic matches can also be used, so we can know source and destination adress too, among other things.

Table 4-7. ICMP matches

Match
Example
Explanation
-icmp-type
iptables -A INPUT -p icmp -icmp-type 8
This match is used to specify the <i>ICMP</i> type to match. <i>ICMP</i> types can be specified either by their numeric values or by their names. Numerical values are specified in RFC 792. To find a complete listing of the <i>ICMP</i> name values, do a iptables -protocol icmp -help , or check the <i>ICMP</i> types appendix. This match can also be inverted with the ! sign in this, -icmp-type ! 8, fashion. Note that some <i>ICMP</i> types are obsolete, and others again may
be "dangerous" for a simple host since they may, among other things, redirect packets to the

Explicit matches

wrong places.

Explicit matches are matches that must be specifically loaded with the -m or -match option. If we would like to use the state matches for example, we would have to write -m state to the left of the actual match using the state matches. Some of these matches may be specific to some protocols, or was created for testing/experimental use or plainly to show examples of what could be accomplished with iptables. This in turn means that all these matches may not always be useful, however, they should mostly be useful since it all depends on your imagination and your needs. The difference between implicitly loaded matches and explicitly loaded ones is that the implicitly loaded matches will automatically be loaded when you, for example, match *TCP* packets, while explicitly loaded matches will not be loaded automatically in any case and it is up to you to activate them before using them.

MAC match

Table 4-8. MAC match options

Match	
Example	
Explanation	
-mac-source	
iptables -A INPUT -m mac -mac-source	00:00:00:00:00:01

Match

Example

Explanation

This match is used to match packets based on their MAC source address. The MAC address specified must be in the form XX:XX:XX:XX:XX; else it will not be legal. The match may be reversed with an ! sign and would look like -mac-source ! 00:00:00:00:00:00:01. This would in other words reverse the meaning of the match so all packets except packets from this MAC address would be matched. Note that since MAC addresses are only used on ethernet type networks, this match will only be possible to use on ethernet based networks. This match is also only valid in the PREROUTING, FORWARD and INPUT chains and nowhere else.

Limit match

The limit match extension must be loaded explicitly with the -m limit option. This match is excellent to use to do limited logging of specific rules etcetera. For example, you could use this to match all packets that goes over the edge of a certain chain, and get limited logging of this. What this means, is that when we add this match we limit how many times a certain rule may be matched in a certain timeframe. This is its main usage, but there are more usages, of course. The limit match may also be inversed by adding a ! flag in front of the limit match explicit loading, it would then look like -m ! limit. This means that all packets will be matched after they have broken the limit.

Match
Example
Explanation
-limit
iptables -A INPUT -m limit -limit 3/hour
This sets the maximum average matching rate of the limit match. This match is specified with a number and an optional time specifier. The following time specifiers are currently recognised: /second /minute /hour /day. The default value here is 3 per hour, or 3/hour. This tells the limit match how many times to let this match run per timeunit (ie /minute).
-limit-burst
iptables -A INPUT -m limit -limit-burst 5

Table 4-9. Limit match options

Example

Explanation

This is the setting for the *burst limit* of the limit match. It tells iptables the maximum initial number of packets to match. This number gets recharged by one every time the average limit specified (with the -limit option) is not reached, up to the number specified with the -limit-burst option. When and if the burst limit is reached, we go down to the lowest possible delimiter, 1. After this, we get one "token" for every timeround specified that we do not hit the new delimiter, until the delimiter reach the burst limit again. The default -limit-burst value is 5. For a simple way of checking out how this works, you can use the example limit-test.txt (http://www.boingworld.com/workshops/linux/iptables-tutorial/scripts/limit-test.txt) one-rule-script. Together with this script, you can try out how the limit rule works by simply sending ping packets in different intervals and in different numbers. All *echo replies* will be blocked until the burst limit is reached.

Multiport match

The multiport match extension can be used to specify more destination ports and port ranges than one, which would sometimes mean you would have to make several rules looking exactly the same just to match different ports.

Note

You can not use both standard port matching and multiport matching at the same time, such as -sport 1024:63353 -m multiport -dport 21,23,80. This will simply not work and the rule will not be added at all. What happens is that iptables will automatically use the first syntax used in the rule, and it will not recognize the multiport syntax.

Table 4-10. Multiport match options

 Match

 Example

 Explanation

 -source-port

 iptables -A INPUT -p tcp -m multiport -source-port 22,53,80,110

 This match matches multiple source ports. A maximum of 15 separate ports may be specified.

 The ports must be comma delimited, as you can see in the example. This match may only be used in conjunction with the -p tcp or -p udp matches. It is mainly an enhanced version of the normal -source-port

 -destination-port

iptables -A INPUT -p tcp -m multiport -destination-port 22,53,80,110

Example

Explanation

This match is used to match multiple destination ports. It works exactly the same way as the source port match mentioned just above, except that it matches destination ports. It has a maximum specification of 15 ports and may only be used in conjunction with -p tcp and -p udp.

-port

iptables	-A IN	NPUT -	p tcp	> -m	multiport	-port	22,53,80,110
----------	-------	--------	-------	------	-----------	-------	--------------

This match extension can be used to match packets based both on their destination port and their source port. It works the same way as the -source-port and -destination-port matches above. It can take a maximum of 15 ports specified to it in one argument. It can only be used in conjunction with -p tcp and -p udp. Note that this means that it will only match packets that comes from, for example, port 80 to port 80 and if you have specified port 80 to the -port match.

Mark match

The mark match extension is used to match packets based on the marks they have set. A mark is a special field only maintained within the kernel that is associated with the packets as they travel through the computer. They may be used by different kernel routines for such tasks as traffic shaping and filtering. As of today, there is only one way of setting a mark in Linux, namely the MARK target in iptables. This was previously done with the FWMARK target in iptables. This was previously done with the FWMARK target in iptables. The wark in advanced routing areas. The mark field is currently set to an unsigned integer, or 4294967296 possible values on a 32 bit system. In other words, you are probably not going to run into this limit in quite some time.

Match
Example
Explanation
-mark
iptables -t mangle -A INPUT -m mark -mark 1
This match is used to match packets that have previously been marked. Marks can be set with
the MARK target which we will discuss a bit more later on in the next section. All packets
traveling through $netfilter$ gets a special mark field associated with them. Note that this

Table 4-11. Mark match options

This match is used to match packets that have previously been marked. Marks can be set with the **MARK** target which we will discuss a bit more later on in the next section. All packets traveling through *netfilter* gets a special mark field associated with them. Note that this *mark* field does not in any way travel outside, with or without the packet, the actual computer itself. If this *mark field* matches the **mark** match it is a match. The *mark field* is an unsigned integer, hence there can be a maximum of 65535 different marks. You may also use a mask with the mark. The mark specification would then look like, for example, **-mark 1/1**. If a mask is specified, it is logically ANDed with the mark specified before the actual comparison.

Owner match

The **owner** match extension is used to match packets based on who created them. This extension was originally written as an example on what **iptables** might be used for. This match only works within the *OUTPUT* chain as it looks today, for obvious reasons. It is pretty much impossible to find out any information about who sent a packet on the other end, or if we where an intermediate hop to the real destination. Even within the *OUTPUT* chain it is not very reliable since certain packets may not have an owner. Notorious packets of that sort is different *ICMP* responses among other things. *ICMP* responses will, hence, never match.

Table 4-12. Owner match options

Match

Example

Explanation

-uid-owner

iptables -A OUTPUT -m owner -uid-owner 500

This packet match will match if the packet was created by the given User ID (UID). This could be used to match outgoing packets based on who created them. One possible use would be to block any other user than root to open new connections outside your firewall, or another possible use could be to block everyone but the httpuser from creating packets from HTTP.

-gid-owner

iptables -A OUTPUT -m owner -gid-owner 0

This match is used to match all packets based on their *Group ID* (GID). This means that we match all packets based on what group the user creating the packets are in. This could be used to block all but the users part of the "network" group from getting out onto the internet, or as described above to only allow "httpgroup" to be able to create packets going out on the *HTTP* port.

-pid-owner

iptables -A OUTPUT -m owner -pid-owner 78

This match is used to match packets based on their *Process ID* (*PID*) and which *PID* created the packets. This match is a bit harder to use, but one example would be to only allow *PID* 94 to send packets on the *HTTP* port (in case the *HTTP* is not threaded, of course), or we could write a small script that grabs the *PID* from a **ps** output for a specific daemon and then adds a rule for it. For an example, you could have a rule as shown in the pid-owner.txt (http://www.boingworld.com/workshops/linux/iptables-tutorial/scripts/pid-owner.txt) example.

-sid-owner

iptables -A OUTPUT -m owner -sid-owner 100

Example

Explanation

This match is used to match packets based on their *Session ID* and the *Session ID* used by the program in question. The *SID*, or *Session ID*, value is set upon different processes depending on their originating process if they are threaded, or upon which process created it. So, for example, all of our *HTTPD* processes should have the same *SID* as their parent process (the original *HTTPD*) *PID*, if our *HTTPD* is threaded that is (most *HTTPD* are, Apache and Roxen for instance). To show this in example, we have created a small script called sid-owner.txt (http://www.boingworld.com/workshops/linux/iptables-tutorial/sid-owner.txt). This script could possibly be run every hour or so together with some extra code to check if the *HTTPD* is actually running and start it again if necessary, then flush and re-enter our *OUTPUT* chain if needed.

State match

The state match extension is used in conjunction with the connection tracking code in the kernel and allows access to the connection tracking state of the packets. This allows us to know in what state the connection is, and works for pretty much all protocols, including stateless protocols such as *ICMP* and *UDP*. In all cases, there will be a default timeout for the connection and it will then be dropped from the connection tracking database. This match needs to be loaded explicitly by adding a -m state statement to the rule. You will then have access to one new match. This concept will be more deeply introduced in a future chapter since it is such a large area.

Table 4-13. State matches

Match						
Example						
Explanation						
-state						
intables -A	τνριιψ	-m	gtato	-stato	RELATED ESTABLISHED	

Example

Explanation

This match option tells the state match what states the packets must be in to be matched. There is currently 4 states that can be used. INVALID, ESTABLISHED, NEW and RELATED. INVALID means that the packet is associated with no known stream or connection and that it may contain faulty data or headers. ESTABLISHED means that the packet is part of an already established connection that has seen packets in both directions and is fully valid. NEW means that the packet has or will start a new connection, or that it is associated with a connection that has not seen packets in both directions. Finally, RELATED means that the packet is starting a new connection and is associated with an already established connection. This could for example mean an *FTP data transfer*, or an *ICMP error* associated with an *TCP* or *UDP* connection for example. Note that the NEW state does not look for *SYN* bits in *TCP* packets trying to start a new connection and should, hence, not be considered very good in cases where we have only one firewall and no load balancing between different firewalls. However, there may be times where this could be useful. For more information on how this could be used, read in the future chapter on the state machine.

Unclean match

The unclean match takes no options and requires no more than explicit loading when you want to use it. Note that this option is regarded as experimental and may not work at all times, nor will it take care of all unclean packages or problems. This match tries to match packets which seems malformed or unusual, such as packets with bad headers or checksums and so on. This could be used to DROP connections and to check for bad streams etcetera, however you should be aware that this may break legal connections too.

TOS match

The **TOS** match can be used to match packets based on their *TOS* field. *TOS* stands for T_{YPP} Of Service, consists of 8 bits, and is located in the IP header. This match is loaded explicitly by adding -m tos to the rule. *TOS* is normally used to tell intermediate hosts the preceeding of the stream, and what kind of content it has(not really, but it tells us if there is any specific requirements for this stream such as that it needs to be sent as fast as possible, or it needs to be able to send as much payload as possible). How different routers and people deal with these values depends. Most do not care at all, while others try their best to do something good with the packets in question and the data they provide.

Match		
Example		
Explanation		
-tos		

Example

Explanation

iptables -A INPUT -p tcp -m tos -tos 0x16

This match is used as described above, it can match packets based on their TOS field and their value. This could be used for, among other things, to mark packets for later usage together with the iproute2 and advanced routing functions in linux. The match takes an hex or numeric value as an option, or possibly one of the names given if you do an iptables -m tos -h. At the time of writing it contained the following named values: Minimize-Delay 16 (0x10), Maximize-Throughput 8 (0x08), Maximize-Reliability 4 (0x04), Minimize-Cost 2 (0x02), and Normal-Service 0 (0x00). Minimize-Delay means to minimize the delay for the packets, example of standard protocols that this includes are telnet, SSH and FTP-control. Maximize-Throughput means to find a path that allows as big throughput as possible, a standard protocol would be FTP-data.

Maximize-Reliability means to maximize the reliability of the connection and to use lines that are as reliable as possible, some good protocols that would fit with this *TOS* values would be *BOOTP* and *TFTP*. Minimize-Cost means to minimize the cost until the packets gets through all the way to the client/server, for example to find the route that costs the least to travel through. Some normal protocols that would use this would be *RTSP* (Real Time Stream Control Protocol) and other streaming video/radio protocols. *Normal-Service* would finally mean any normal protocol that has no special needs for their transfers.

TTL match

The **TTL** match is used to match packets based on their *TTL* (Time To Live) field residing in the IP header. The *TTL field* contains 8 bits of data and is decremented once every time it is processed by an intermediate host between the client and host. If the *TTL* reaches 0, an *ICMP* type 11 code 0 (TTL equals 0 during transit) or code 1 (TTL equals 0 during reassembly) is transmitted to the party sending the packet and telling about the problem. This match is only used to match packets based on their *TTL*, and not to change anything. This is true here, as well as in all kinds of matches. To load this match, you need to add an **-m** ttl to the rule.

Table	4-15.	TTL	matches
-------	-------	-----	---------

Command	
Example	
Explanation	
-ttl	
iptables -A OUTPUT -m ttl -ttl 60	

Command

Example

Explanation

This match option is used to specify which TTL value to match. It takes an numeric value and matches based on this value. There is no inversion and there is no other specifics to this match. This target could be used for debugging your local network, for example hosts which seems to have problems connecting to hosts on the internet, or to find possible infestations of trojans etcetera. The usage is pretty much limited, however, it is only your imagination which stops you. One example, as described above, would be to find hosts with bad TTL values set as default (may be due to badly implemented TCP/IP stack, or due to a malconfiguration).

Targets/Jumps

The target/jumps tells the rule what to do with a packet that is a perfect match with the match section of the rule. There is a few basic targets, the **ACCEPT** and **DROP** targets which we will deal with first of all targets. However, before we do that, let us have a brief look at how a jump is done.

The jump specification is done exactly the same as the target definition except that it requires a chain within the same table to jump to. To jump to a specific chain, it is required that the chain has already been created. As we have already explained before, a chain is created with the -N command. For example, let's say we create a chain in the filter table called tcp_packets like this: iptables -N tcp_packets. We could then add a jump target to it like this: iptables -A INPUT -p tcp -j tcp_packets. We would then jump from the INPUT chain to the tcp_packets chain and start traversing that chain. When/If we reach the end of that chain, we get dropped back to the INPUT chain and the packet starts traversing from the rule one step below where it jumped to the other chain (tcp_packets in this case). If a packet is ACCEPT'ed within one of the subchains, it will automatically be ACCEPT'ed in the superset chain also and it will not traverse any of the superset chains any further. However, do note that the packet will traverse all other chains in the other tables in a normal fashion. For more information on table and chain traversing, see the *Traversing of tables and chains* chapter.

Targets on the other hand specify an action to take on the packet in question. We could for example, **DROP** or **ACCEPT** the packet depending on what we want to do. There is also a number of other actions we may want to take which we will describe further on in this section. Targets may also end with different results one could say, some targets will make the packet stop traversing the specific chain and superset chains as described above. Good examples of such rules are **DROP** and **ACCEPT**. Rules that are stopped, will not pass through any of the rules further on in the chain or superset chains. Other targets, may take an action on the packet and then the packet will continue passing through the rest of the rules anyway, a good example of this would be the **LOG**, **DNAT** and **SNAT** targets. These packets may be logged, Network Address Translationed and then be passed on to the other rules in the same chains. This may be good in cases where we want to take two actions on the same packet, such as both mangling the *TTL* and the *TOS* value of a specific packet/stream. Some targets will also take

options that may be necessary (What address to do NAT to, what TOS value to use etcetera) while others have options not necessary, but available in any case (log prefixes, masquerade to ports and so on). We will try to answer all these questions as we go in the descriptions. Let us have a look at what kinds of targets there are.

ACCEPT target

This target takes no special options first of all. When a packet is perfectly matched and this target is set, it is accepted and will not continue traversing the chain where it was accepted in, nor any of the calling chains. Do note, that packets that was accepted in one chain will still travel through any subsequent chains within the other tables and may be dropped there. There is nothing special about this target whatsoever, and it does not require, or have the possibility, to add options to the target. To use this target, we specify it like -j ACCEPT.

DROP target

The DROP target does just what it says, it drops packets dead to the ground and refuses to process them anymore. A packet that matches a rule perfectly and then has this action taken on it will be blocked and no further processing will be done. Note that this action may be a bit bad in certain cases since it may leave dead sockets around on the server and client. A better solution would be to use the REJECT target in those cases, especially when you want to block certain portscanners from getting to much information, such as filtered ports and so on. Also note that if a packet has the DROP action taken on them in a subchain, the packet will not be processed in any of the above chains in the structure, nor by any other tables. The packet is in other words totally dead. The target will not send any kind of information in either direction, either to tell the client or the server as told previously.

QUEUE target

The QUEUE target is used to queue packets to userland programs and applications. This is done in a programmatic way and may be used to, for example, create network accounting or to create specific and advanced applications to proxy or filter packets. We will not discuss this target in depth in this chapter, nor anywhere else within this document since it is out of the scope how to code such an application. First of all because it would simply take too much time, and second, because this documentation does not have anything to do with the programming side of netfilter and iptables. All of this should be fairly well covered in the netfilter hacking HOWTO (http://www.iptables.org/documentation/HOWTO//netfilter-hacking-HOWTO.html).

RETURN target

The **RETURN** target will make the current packet stop travelling through the chain where it hit the rule. If it is a subchain to another chain, the packet will continue to travel through the above chains in the structure as if nothing had happened. If the chain is the main chain, for example

the INPUT chain, the packet will have the default policy taken on it. The default policy is normally set to **ACCEPT** or **DROP** or something the like.

For example, lets say a packet enters the INPUT chain and then hits a rule that it matches and that gives it -jump EXAMPLE_CHAIN. The packet will then start traversing the EXAMPLE_CHAIN, and all of a sudden it matches a specific rule which has the -jump RETURN target set. It will then jump back to the previous chain, which in this case would be the *INPUT* chain. Another example would be if the packet hit a -jump RETURN rule in the *INPUT* chain. It would then be dropped to the default policy as previously described, and no more actions would be taken in this chain.

LOG target

The LOG target is specially made to make it possible to log snippets of information about packets that may be illegal, or for pure bughunting and errorfinding. The LOG target will log specific information such as most of the IP headers and other interesting information via the kernel logging facility. This information may then be read with dmesg or syslogd and likely programs and applications. This is an excellent target to use while you are debugging your rulesets to see what packets go where and what rules are applied on what packets. Also note that it may be a really great idea to use the LOG target instead of the DROP target while you are testing a rule you are not 100% sure about on a production firewall since this may otherwise cause severe connectivity problems for your users. Also note that the ULOG target may be interesting in case you are getting heavy logs, since the ULOG target has support for logging directly to MySQL databases and such.

Note that it is not a **iptables** or *netfilter* problem in case you get your logs to the consoles or likely, but instead a problem of your syslogd configuration which you may find in /etc/syslog.conf. Read more in **man syslog.conf** for information about these kind of problems.

The **LOG** target currently takes five options that may be interesting to use in case you have specific needs for more information, or want to set different options to specific values. They are all listed below.

Option
Example
Explanation
-log-level
iptables -A FORWARD -p tcp -j LOG -log-level debug

Table 4-16. LOG target options

Example

Explanation

This is the option that we can use to tell iptables and syslog which log level to use. For a complete list of loglevels read the syslog.conf manual. Normally there are the following log levels, or priorities as they are normally referred to: *debug*, *info*, *notice*, *warning*, *warn*, *err*, *error*, *crit*, *alert*, *emerg* and *panic*. The keyword *error* is the same as *err*, *warn* is the same as *warning* and *panic* is the same as *emerg*. Note that all three of these are deprecated, in other words do not use *error*, *warn* and *panic*. The priority defines the severity of the message being logged. All messages are logged through the kernel facility. In other words, setting kern.=info /var/log/iptables in your syslog.conf file and then letting all your LOG messages in iptables use log level info, would make all messages appear in the *(var/log/iptables file*. Note that there may be other messages here as well from other parts of the kernel that uses the info priority. For more information on logging I recommend you to read the syslog and syslog.conf manpages as well as other HOWTO's etcetera.

-log-prefix

iptables -A INPUT -p tcp -j LOG -log-prefix "INPUT packets"

This option tells **iptables** to prefix all log messages with a specific prefix which may then be very good to use together with, for example, **grep** and other tools to distinguish specific problems and outputs from specific rules. The prefix may be up to 29 letters long, including whitespace and those kind of symbols.

-log-tcp-sequence

iptables -A INPUT -p tcp -j LOG -log-tcp-sequence

This option will log the *TCP* Sequence numbers together with the log message. The *TCP* Sequence number are special numbers that identify each packet and where it fits into a *TCP* sequence and how the stream should be reassembled. Note that this option is a security risk if the log is readable by any users, or by the world for that matter. Any log that is, which may contain logging messages from *iptables*.

-log-tcp-options

iptables -A FORWARD -p tcp -j LOG -log-tcp-options

The -log-tcp-options option will log the different options from the *TCP* packets header. These may be valuable when trying to debug what may go wrong and what has gone wrong. This option takes no variable fields or anything like that, just as most of the **LOG** options.

-log-ip-options

iptables -A FORWARD -p tcp -j LOG -log-ip-options

The -log-ip-options option will log most of the IP packet header options. This works exactly thesame as the -log-tcp-options option, but instead works on the IP options. These logging messages may be valuable when trying to debug or finding out specific culprits and what goes wrong, just the same as the previous option.

MARK target

The MARK target is used to set netfilter mark values that are associated with specific packets. This target is only valid in the *mangle* table, and will not work outside there. The MARK values may be used in conjunction with the advanced routing capabilities in Linux to send different packets through different routes and to tell them to use different queue disciplines (qdisc), etcetera. For more information on advanced routing, check out the LARTC HOWTO (http://www.lartc.org). Note that the mark value is not set within the actual package, but is an value that is associated within the kernel with the packet. In other words, you may not set a MARK for a package and then expect the MARK to still be there on another computer. If this is what you want, you will be better off with the TOS target which will mangle the *TOS value* in the IP header.

Table 4-17. MARK target options

Option
Example
Explanation
-set-mark
iptables -t mangle -A PREROUTING -p tcp -dport 22 -j MARK -set-mark 2
The -set-mark option is required to set a mark. The -set-mark match takes an integer value. For example, we may set mark 2 to a specific stream of packets, or on all packets from a specific host and then do advanced routing on that host, limiting or unlimiting their network speed etcetera.

REJECT target

The **REJECT** target works basically the same as the **DROP** target, but it also sends back an error message to the host sending the packet that was blocked. The **REJECT** target is as of today only valid in the *INPUT*, *FORWARD* and *OUTPUT* chain or subchains of those chains, which would also be the only chains where it would make any sense to put this target in. Note that the chains that uses the **REJECT** target may only be called upon by the *INPUT*, *FORWARD*, and *OUTPUT* chains, else they won't work. There currently is only one option which controls the nature of how this target works, which in turn may take a huge set of variables. Most of them are fairly easy to understand if you have a basic knowledge of *TCP/IP*.

Table	4-18.	REJECT	target
-------	-------	--------	--------

Dption
Example
Explanation
·reject-with
ptables -A FORWARD -p TCP -dport 22 -j REJECT -reject-with tcp-reset

Example

Explanation

This option tells the **REJECT** target what response to send to the host that sent the packet that we found to be a match. Once we get a packet that matches a specific rule and we specify this target, the target will first of all send the specified reply, and then the packet is dropped dead to the ground, just the same as with the **DROP** target. There are currently the following reject types that can be used: *icmp-net-unreachable*, *icmp-host-unreachable*,

icmp-port-unreachable, *icmp-proto-unreachable*, *icmp-net-prohibited* and *icmp-host-prohibited*. The default error message is to send an **port-unreachable** to the host. All of the above are *ICMP error messages* and may be set as you wish, and you may get some more information by looking in the appendix *ICMP types*. There is also an option called **echo-reply**, but this option may only be used in conjunction with rules which would match ICMP ping packets. Finally, there is one more option called **tcp-reset** which may only be used together with the *TCP* protocol. the tcp-reset option will tell **REJECT** to send an *TCP RST* packet in reply to the sending host. *TCP RST* are used to close open connections gracefully. For more information about the *TCP RST* read RFC 793 - Transmission Control Protocol (http://www.boingworld.com/workshops/linux/iptables-tutorial/other/rfc793.txt). As stated in the **iptables** man page, this is mainly useful for blocking ident probes which frequently occur when sending mail to broken mail hosts, which won't accept your mail otherwise.

TOS target

Caution

The **TOS** target is used to set the T_{YPP} of Service field within the IP header. The TOS field consists of 8 bits which are used to route packets. This is one of the fields that can be used directly within **iproute2** and its subsystem to route packets. Also note that if you handle several separate firewalls and routers, this is the only way to propagate routing information between these routers and firewalls within the actual packet. As noted before, the **MARK** target which sets a **MARK** associated with a specific packet is only available within the kernel, and can not be propagated with the packet. If you feel a need to propagate routing information on how to do routing for a specific packet or stream, you should hence set the TOS field which was developed for this. There are currently a lot of routers on the internet which do a pretty bad job at this so it may be a bit useless as of now to do any TOS mangling before sending the packets on to the internet. At best the routers will do nothing with the TOS field, and they will not even look at them. At worst, they will look at the TOS field and do the wrong thing based on the information. As stated previously, however, there is most definitely a good use if you have a large WAN or LAN with several routers and actually have the possibility to give packets different routes and preference depending on their TOS value, at least within your own network.

The TOS target will only be able to set specific values, or named values on packets. These predefined TOS values can be found in the kernel include files, or more precisely, the linux/ip.h file.

The reasons are many, and you should actually never need to set any other values, however, there are ways around this limitation. To get around the limitation of only being able to set the named values on packets, you can use the FTOS (http://www.paksecured.com/patches/) patch made by Matthew G. Marsh. Do be cautious with this patch. You should not need to use any other than the default values except in extreme cases.

Note that this target is only valid within the mangle table and can not be used outside it.

Note

Also note that some old versions (1.2.2 or below) of iptables provided a broken implementation of this target which would not fix the packet checksum upon mangling, and hence rendered the packets bad and in need of retransmission, which in turn most probably would be mangled and the connection would never work.

The **TOS** target only takes one option as described below.

Table 4-19. TOS target

Option

Example

Explanation

-set-tos

iptables -t mangle -A PREROUTING -p TCP -dport 22 -j TOS -set-tos 0x10

The -set-tos option tells the TOS mangler what TOS value to set on packets that are matched. The option takes a numeric value, either in hex or in decimal value. As the TOS value consists of 8 bits, the value may be 0-255, or in hex 0x00-0xFF. Note that in the standard TOS target you are limited using the named values available (which should be more or less standardized), as mentioned in the previous warning. These values are *Minimize-Delay* (decimal value 16, hex value 0x10), *Maximize-Throughput* (decimal value 8, hex value 0x08), *Maximize-Reliability* (decimal value 4, hex value 0x04), *Minimize-Cost* (decimal value 2, hex 0x02) or *Normal-Service* (decimal value 0, hex value 0x00). The default value on most packets are *Normal-Service*, or 0. Note that you can, of course, use the actual names instead of the actual hex values to set up the *TOS* value, and it should generally be recommended since the values behind the names may be changed if you are unlucky. For a complete listing of the "descriptive values", do an *iptables -j TOS -h*. This listing is complete as of iptables 1.2.5 and should hopefully be so for another period of time.

MIRROR target

The MIRROR target is an experimental demonstration target only, and you should be warned of using this since it may result in really bad loops, hence resulting in a bad kind of Denial of Service, among other things. The MIRROR target is used to invert the source and destination fields in the IP header, and then to retransmit the packet. This results in some really funny things, and I would be quite sure that someone has had a good laugh at some cracker or another that has cracked his own box via this target by now. The result of this target is really simple. Lets say we set up a MIRROR target for port 80 at computer A. If computer B would be coming from yahoo.com, and tried to access the HTTP server at computer A, the MIRROR target would make so computer B got the webpage at yahoo.com back (since this is where he came from).

Note that the **MIRROR** target is only valid within the *INPUT*, *FORWARD* and *PREROUTING* chains, and any user-defined chains which are only called from those chains. Also note that the outgoing packets created by the **MIRROR** target is not seen by any of the normal chains in the filter, **NAT** or mangle tables to avoid loops and other problems. However, this does not make the target free of any likely problems. One thing would for example be to send a spoofed packet to a host that uses the **MIRROR** command with a **TTL** of 255, and see to it that the packet is spoofed so it looks as if it comes from another host that uses the **MIRROR** command. The packet will then bounce back and forth a huge set of times, depending on how many hops there is between them. If there is only 1 hop, the packet will jump back and forth 240-255 times. Not bad for a cracker in other words to send 1500 bytes of data, and eat up 380 kbyte of your connection. Note that this is a best case scenario for the cracker or scriptkiddie, whichever we want to call them.

SNAT target

The **SNAT** target is used to do Source Network Address Translation, which means that this target will rewrite the Source IP address in the IP header of the packet. For example, this is good when we want several computers to share an internet connection. We could then turn on ip forwarding in the kernel, and then set an **SNAT** rule which would translate all packets from our local network to the **source IP** of our own internet connection. Without doing this, the outside world would not know where to send reply packets, since our local networks should use the IANA specified IP addresses which are allocated for **LAN** networks. If we forwarded these packets as is, noone on the internet would know that they where actually from us. The **SNAT** target does all the translation needed to do this kind of work, letting all packets leaving our **LAN** look as if they came from a single host, which would be our firewall.

The **SNAT** target is only valid within the nat table, within the *POSTROUTING* chain. This is in other words the only place that you may do **SNAT** in. If the first packet in a connection is mangled in this fashion, then all future packets in the same connection will also be **SNAT**'ed and, also, no further processing of rules in the *POSTROUTING* chain will be commenced on the packets in the same stream.

Table 4-20. SNAT target

Example

Explanation

-to-source

iptables -t nat -A POSTROUTING -o eth0 -j SNAT -to-source 194.236.50.155-194.236.50.160:1024-32000

The -to-source option is used to specify which source the packets should use. This option, at it simplest, takes one IP address to which we should transform all the source IP addresses in the IP header. If we want to balance between several IP addresses we could use an range of IP addresses separated by a hyphen, it would then look like, for example, 194.236.50.155-194.236.50.160 as described in the example above. The source IP would then be set randomly for each stream that we open, and a single stream would always use the same IP address for packets within that stream. There may also be an range of ports specified that should only be used by **SNAT**. All the source ports would then be mapped to the ports specified. This would hence look as within the example above, :1024-32000 or something alike. iptables will always try to not make any port alterations if it is possible, but if two hosts tries to use the same ports, iptables will map one of them to another port. If no port range is specified, then all source ports below 512 will be mapped to other ports below 512 if needed. Those between source ports 512 and 1023 will be mapped to ports below 1024. All other ports will be mapped to 1024 or above. As previously stated, iptables will always try to maintain the source ports used by the actual workstation making the connection. Note that this has nothing to do with destination ports, so if a client tries to make contact with an **HTTP** server outside the firewall, it will not be mapped to the **FTP** control port.

DNAT target

The **DNAT** target is used to do *Destination Network Address Translation*, which means that it is used to rewrite the Destination IP address of a packet. If a packet is matched, and this is the target of the rule, the packet, and all subsequent packets in the same stream will be translated, and then routed on to the correct device, host or network. This target can be extremely useful, for example, when you have an host running your webserver inside a LAN, but no real IP to give it that will work on the internet. You could then tell the firewall to forward all packets going to its own *HTTP* port, on to the real webserver within the *LAN*. We may also specify a whole range of destination IP addresses, and the **DNAT** mechanism will choose the destination IP address at random for each stream. Hence, we will be able to deal with a kind of load balancing by doing this.

Note that the **DNAT** target is only available within the *PREROUTING* and *OUTPUT* chains in the *nat* table, and any of the chains called upon from any of those listed chains. Note that chains containing **DNAT** targets may not be used from any other chains, such as the *POSTROUTING* chain.

Table 4-21. DNAT target

Example

Explanation

-to-destination

iptables -t nat -A PREROUTING -p tcp -d 15.45.23.67 -dport 80 -j DNAT -to-destination 192.168.1.1-192.168.1.10

The -to-destination option tells the DNAT mechanism which Destination IP to set in the IP header, and where to send packets that are matched. The above example would send on all packets destined for IP address 15.45.23.67 to a range of LAN IP's, namely 192.168.1.1 through 10. Note, as described previously, that a single stream will always use the same host, and that each stream will randomly be given an IP address that it will always be Destinated for, within that stream. We could also have specified only one IP address, in which case we would always be connected to the same host. Also note that we may add an port or port range to which the traffic would be redirected to. This is done by adding, for example, an :80 statement to the IP addresses to which we want to DNAT the packets. A rule could then look like -to-destination 192.168.1.1:80 for example, or like -to-destination 192.168.1.1:80-100 if we wanted to specify a port range. As you can see, the syntax is pretty much the same for the DNAT target, as for the SNAT target even though they do two totally different things. Do note that port specifications are only valid for rules that specify the TCP or UDP protocols with the -protocol option.

MASQUERADE target

The MASQUERADE target is used basically the same as the SNAT target, but it does not require any -to-source option. The reason for this is that the MASQUERADE target was made to work with, for example, dialup connections, or *DHCP* connections, which gets dynamic IP addresses when connecting to the network in question. This means that you should only use the MASQUERADE target with dynamically assigned IP connections, which we don't know the actual address of at all times. If you have a static IP connection, you should instead use the SNAT target.

When you masquerade a connection, it means that we set the IP address used on a specific network interface instead of the -to-source option, and the IP address is automatically grabbed from the information about the specific interface. The MASQUERADE target also has the effect that connections are forgotten when an interface goes down, which is extremely good if we, for example, kill a specific interface. If we would have used the SNAT target, we may have been left with a lot of old connection tracking data, which would be lying around for days, swallowing up worthful connection tracking memory. This is in general the correct behaviour when dealing with dialup lines that are probable to be assigned a different IP every time it is up'ed. In case we are assigned a different IP, the connection is lost anyways, and it is more or less idiotic to keep the entry around.

It is still possible to use the **MASQUERADE** target instead of **SNAT** even though you do have an static IP, however, it is not favorable since it will add extra overhead, and there may be inconsistencies in the future which will thwart your existing scripts and render them "unusable".

Note that the **MASQUERADE** target is only valid within the *POSTROUTING* chain in the nat table, just as the **SNAT** target. The **MASQUERADE** target takes on option specified below, which is optional.

Table 4-22. MASQUERADE target

Option

Example

Explanation

-to-ports

iptables -t nat -A POSTROUTING -p TCP -j MASQUERADE -to-ports 1024-31000

The -to-ports option is used to set the source port or ports to use on outgoing packets. Either you can specify a single port like -to-ports 1025 or you may specify a port range as -to-ports 1024-3000. In other words, the lower port range delimiter and the upper port range delimiter separated with a hyphen. This alters the default SNAT port-selection as described in the SNAT target section. The -to-ports option is only valid if the rule match section specifies the TCP or UDP protocols with the -protocol match.

REDIRECT target

The **REDIRECT** target is used to redirect packets and streams to the machine itself. This means that we could for example **REDIRECT** all packets destined for the *HTTP* ports to an *HTTP proxy* like squid, on our own host. Locally generated packets are mapped to the 127.0.0.1 address. In other words, this rewrites the destination address to our own host for packets that are forwarded, or something alike. The **REDIRECT** target is extremely good to use when we want, for example, transparent proxying, where the *LAN* hosts do not know about the proxy at all.

Note that the **REDIRECT** target is only valid within the *PREROUTING* and *OUTPUT* chains of the nat table. It is also valid within user-defined chains that are only called from those chains, and nowhere else. The **REDIRECT** target takes only one option, as described below.

Option
Example
Explanation
-to-ports
iptables -t nat -A PREROUTING -p tcp -dport 80 -j REDIRECT -to-ports 8080

Table 4-23. REDIRECT target

Example

Explanation

The -to-ports option specifies the destination port, or port range, to use. Without the -to-ports option, the destination port is never altered. This is specified, as above, -to-ports 8080 in case we only want to specify one port. If we would want to specify an port range, we would do it like -to-ports 8080-8090, which tells the **REDIRECT** target to redirect the packets to the ports 8080 through 8090. Note that this option is only available in rules specifying the *TCP* or *UDP* protocol with the -protocol matcher, since it wouldn't make any sense anywhere else.

TTL target

The **TTL** target is used to modify the *Time To Live* field in the IP header. One useful application of this is to change all *Time To Live* values to the same value on all outgoing packets. One reason for doing this is if you have a bully *ISP* which don't allow you to have more than one machine connected to the same internet connection, and who actively pursue this. Setting all **TTL** values to the same value, will effectively make it a little bit harder for them to notify that you are doing this. We may then reset the **TTL** value for all outgoing packets to a standardized value, such as 64 as specified in Linux kernel.

For more information on how to set the default value used in Linux, read the *ip-sysctl.txt*, which you may find within the *Other resources and links* appendix.

The **TTL** target is only valid within the *mangle* table, and nowhere else. It takes 3 options as of writing this, all of them described below in the table.

Option
Example
Explanation
-ttl-set
iptables -t mangle -A PREROUTING -o eth0 -j TTL -ttl-set 64
The $-ttl-set$ option tells the TTL target which <i>TTL</i> value to set on the packet in question. A good value would be around 64 somewhere. It's not too long, and it is not too short. Do not set this value too high, since it may affect your network and it is a bit immoral to set this value to high, since the packet may start bouncing back and forth between two misconfigured routers, and the higher the <i>TTL</i> , the more bandwidth will be eaten unnecessary in such a case.
-ttl-dec
iptables -t mangle -A PREROUTING -o eth0 -j TTL -ttl-dec 1

Table 4-24. TTL target

Example

Explanation

The -ttl-dec option tells the TTL target to decrement the Time To Live value by the amount specified after the -ttl-dec option. In other words, if the TTL for an incoming packet was 53 and we had set -ttl-dec 3, the packet would leave our host with a *TTL value* of 49. The reason for this is that the networking code will automatically decrement the *TTL value* by 1, hence the packet will be decremented by 4 steps, from 53 to 49 in other words.

-ttl-inc

iptables -t mangle -A PREROUTING -o eth0 -j TTL -ttl-inc 1

The -ttl-inc option tells the **TTL** target to increment the *Time To Live value* with the value specified to the -ttl-inc option. This means that we should raise the *TTL value* with the value specified in the -ttl-inc option, and if we specified -ttl-inc **4**, a packet entering with a *TTL* of 53 would leave the host with *TTL* 56. Note that the same thing goes here, as for the previous example of the -ttl-dec option, where the network code will automatically decrement the *TTL value* by 1, which it always does. This may be used to make our firewall a bit more stealthy to traceroutes among other things. By setting the *TTL* one value higher for all incoming packets, we effectively make the firewall hidden from traceroutes. Traceroutes are a loved and hated thing, since they provide excellent information on problems with connections and where it happens, but at the same time, it gives the hacker/cracker some good information about your upstreams if they have targeted you. For a good example on how this could be used, see the ttl-inc.txt

(http://www.boingworld.com/workshops/linux/iptables-tutorial/scripts/ttl-inc.txt) script.

ULOG target

The **ULOG** target is used to provide userspace logging of matching packets. If a packet is matched and the **ULOG** target is set, the packet information is multicasted together with the whole packet through a netlink socket. One or more userspace processes may then subscribe to various multicast groups and receive the packet. This is in other words a more complete and more sophisticated logging facility that is only used by iptables and netfilter so far, and it contains much better facilities for logging packets. This target enables us to log information to $M_{Y}SQL$ databases, and other databases, making it much simpler to search for specific packets, and to group log entries. You can find the ULOGD userland applications at the ULOGD project page (http://www.gnumonks.org/gnumonks/projects/project_details?p_id=1).

Table 4-25. ULOG target

Option	
Example	
Explanation	
-ulog-nlgroup	
iptables -A INPUT -p TCP -dport 22 -j ULOG -ulog-nlgroup	2

Example

Explanation

The -ulog-nlgroup option tells the ULOG target which netlink group to send the packet to. There are 32 netlink groups, which are simply specified as 1-32. If we would like to reach netlink group 5, we would simply write -ulog-nlgroup 5. The default netlink groupd used is 1.

-ulog-prefix

iptables -A INPUT -p TCP -dport 22 -j ULOG -ulog-prefix "SSH connection attempt: "

The -ulog-prefix option works just the same as the prefix value for the standard LOG target. This option prefixes all log entries with a userspecified log prefix. It can be 32 characters long, and is definitely most useful to distinguish different logmessages and where they came from.

-ulog-cprange

iptables -A INPUT -p TCP -dport 22 -j ULOG -ulog-cprange 100

The -ulog-cprange option tells the ULOG target how many bytes of the packet to send to the userspace daemon of ULOG. If we specify 100 as above, we would copy 100 bytes of the whole packet to userspace, which would include the whole header hopefully, plus some leading data within the actual packet. If we specify 0, the whole packet will be copied to userspace, regardless of the packets size. The default value is 0, so the whole packet will be copied to userspace.

-ulog-qthreshold

iptables -A INPUT -p TCP -dport 22 -j ULOG -ulog-qthreshold 10

The **-ulog-qthreshold** option tells the **ULOG** target how many packets to queue inside the kernel before actually sending the data to userspace. For example, if we set the threshold to 10 as above, the kernel would first accumulate 10 packets inside the kernel, and then transmit it outside to the userspace as one single netlink multipart message. The default value here is 1 because of backwards compatibility, the userspace daemon did not know how to handle multipart messages previously.

Chapter 5. rc.firewall file

This chapter will deal with an example firewall setup and how the script file could look. We have used one of the basic setups and dug deeper into how it works and what we do in it. This should be used to get a basic idea on how to solve different problems and what you may need to think about before actually putting your scripts into work. It could be used as is with some changes to the variables, but is not suggested since it may not work perfectly together with your network setup. As long as you have a very basic setup however, it will very likely run quite smooth with just a few fixes to it.

note that there might be more efficient ways of making the ruleset, however, the script has been written for readability so that everyone can understand it without having to know too much BASH scripting before reading this

example rc.firewall

Ok, so you have everything set up and are ready to check out an example configuration script. You should at least be if you have come this far. This example rc.firewall.txt (http://www.boingworld.com/workshops/linux/iptables-tutorial/scripts/rc.firewall.txt) (also included in the *Example scripts codebase* appendix) is fairly large but not a lot of comments in it. Instead of looking for comments, I suggest you read through the script file to get a basic hum about how it looks, and then you return here to get the nitty gritty about the whole script.

explanation of rc.firewall

Configuration options

The first section you should note within the example rc.firewall.txt

(http://www.boingworld.com/workshops/linux/iptables-tutorial/scripts/rc.firewall.txt) is the configuration section. This should always be changed since it contains the information that is vital to your actual configuration. For example, your IP address will always change, hence it is available here. The **\$INET_IP** should always be a fully valid IP address, if you got one (if not, then you should probably look closer at the *rc.DHCP.firewall.txt*, however, read on since this script will introduce a lot of interesting stuff anyways). Also, the **\$INET_IFACE** variable should point to the actual device used for your internet connection. This could be *eth0*, *eth1*, *ppp0*, *tr0*, etcetera just to name a few possible device names.

This script does not contain any special configuration options for DHCP or PPPoE, hence these sections are empty. The same goes for all sections that are empty, they are however left there so you can spot the differences between the scripts in a more efficient way. If you need these

parts, then you could always create a mix of the different scripts, or (hold yourself) create your own from scratch.

The *Local* Area Network section contains most of the configuration options for your *LAN*, which are necessary. For example, you need to specify the *IP* address of the physical interface connected to the *LAN* as well as the *IP* range which the *LAN* uses and the interface that the box is connected to the *LAN* through.

Also, as you may see there is a Localhost configuration section. We do provide it, however you will with 99% certainty not change any of the values within this section since you will almost always use the 127.0.0.1 *IP* address and the interface will amost certainly be named 10. Also, just below the Localhost configuration, you will find a brief section that pertains to the iptables. Mainly, this section only consists of the **\$IPTABLES** variable, which will point the script to the exact location of the **iptables** application. This may vary a bit, and the default location when compiling the iptables package by hand is /usr/local/sbin/iptables. However, many distributions put the actual application in another location such as /usr/sbin/iptables and so on.

Initial loading of extra modules

First, we see to it that the module dependencies files are up to date by issuing an /sbin/depmod -a command. After this we load the modules that we will require for this script. Always avoid loading modules that you do not need, and if possible try to avoid having modules lying around at all unless you will be using them. This is for security reasons, since it will take some extra effort to make additional rules this way. Now, for example, if you want to have support for the *LOG*, **REJECT** and **MASQUERADE** targets and don't have this compiled statically into your kernel, we load these modules as follows:

/sbin/insmod ipt_LOG
/sbin/insmod ipt_REJECT
/sbin/insmod ipt_MASQUERADE

Caution

In these scripts we forcedly load the modules, which could lead to failures of loading the modules. If a module fails to load, it could depend upon a lot of factors, and it will generate an error message. If some of the more basic modules fail to load, it biggest probable error is that the module, or functionality, is statically compiled into the kernel. For further information on this subject, read the *Problems loading modules* section in the *Common problems and questions* appendix.

Next is the option to load *ipt_owner* module, which could for example be used to only allow certain users to make certain connections, etcetera. I will not use that module in this example but basically, you could allow only *root* to do *FTP* and *HTTP* connections to redhat and **DROP** all the others. You could also disallow all users but your own user and root to connect from your box to the Internet, might be boring for others, but you will be a bit more secure to bouncing

hacker attacks and attacks where the hacker will only use your host as an intermediate host. For more information about the ipt_owner match, look at the *Owner match* section within the *How a rule is built* chapter.

We may also load extra modules for the state matching code here. All modules that extend the state matching code and connection tracking code are called ip conntrack * and ip nat *. Connection tracking helpers are special modules that tells the kernel how to properly track the specific connections. Without these so called helpers, the kernel would not know what to look for when it tries to track specific connections. The NAT helpers on the other hand, are extensions of the connection tracking helpers that tells the kernel what to look for in specific packets and how to translate these so the connections will actually work. For example, FTP is a complex protocol by definition, and it sends connection information within the actual payload of the packet. So, if one of your NAT'ed boxes connect to a FTP server on the internet, it will send its own local network IP address within the payload of the packet, and tells the FTP server to connect to that IP address. Since this local network address is not valid outside your own network, the FTP server will not know what to do with it and hence the connection will break down. The FTP NAT helpers do all of the translations within these connections so the FTP server will actually know where to connect. The same thing applies for DCC file transfers (sends) and chats. Creating these kind of connections requires the IP address and ports to be sent within the IRC protocol, which in turn requires some translation to be done. Without these helpers, some FTP and IRC stuff will work no doubt, however, some other things will not work. For example, you may be able to receive files over DCC, but not be able to send files. This is due to how the DCC starts a connection. First off, you tell the receiver that you want to send a file and where he should connect to. Without the helpers, the DCC connection will look as if it wants the receiver to connect to some host on the receivers own local network. In other words, the whole connection will be broken. However, the other way around, it will work flawlessly since the sender will (most probably) give you the correct address to connect to.

Note

If you are experiencing problems with mIRC DCC's over your firewall and everything works properly with other IRC clients, read the *mIRC DCC problems* section in the *Common problems and questions* appendix.

As of this writing, there is only the option to load modules which add support for the *FTP* and *IRC* protocols. For a long explanation of these conntrack and nat modules, read the *Common* problems and questions appendix. There are also *H*. 323 conntrack helpers within the *patch-o-matic*, as well as some other conntrack as well as *NAT* helpers. To be able to use these helpers, you need to use the *patch-o-matic* and compile your own kernel. For a better explanation on how this is done, read the *Preparations* chapter.

Note that you need to load the *ip_nat_irc* and *ip_nat_ftp* if you want *Network* Adress Translation to work properly on any of the *FTP* and *IRC* protocols. You will also need to load the *ip_conntrack_irc* and *ip_conntrack_ftp* modules before actually loading the *NAT* modules. They are used the same way as the conntrack modules, but it will make it possible for the computer to do *NAT* on these two protocols.

proc set up

At this point we start the *IP* forwarding by echoing a 1 to /proc/sys/net/ipv4/ip_forward in this fashion:

echo "1" > /proc/sys/net/ipv4/ip_forward

Caution

It may be worth a thought where and when we turn on the *IP forwarding*. In this script and all others within the tutorial, we turn it on before actually creating any kind of *IP filters* (ie, **iptables** rulesets). This will lead to a brief period of time where the firewall will accept forwarding any kind of traffic for everything between a millisecond to a minute depending on what script we are running and on what box. This may give malicious people a small timeframe to actually get through our firewall. In other words, this option should really be turned on *after* creating all firewall rules, however, I have chosen to turn it on here to maintain consistency with the script breakdown currently user.

In case you need dynamic *IP* support, for example if you use *SLIP*, *PPP* or *DHCP* you may enable the next option, ip_dynaddr by doing the following :

echo "1" > /proc/sys/net/ipv4/ip_dynaddr

If there is any other options you might need to turn on you should follow that style, there's other documentations on how to do these things and this is out of the scope of this documentation. There is a good but rather brief document about the proc system available within the kernel, which is also available within the *Other resources and links* appendix. The *Other resources and links* appendix is generally a good place to start looking when you have specific areas that you are looking for information on, that you do not find here.

Note


The rc.firewall.txt script, and all other scripts contained within this tutorial, do contain a small section of non-required proc settings. These may be a good primer to look at when something is not working exactly as you want it to, however, do not change these values before actually knowing what they mean.

Displacement of rules to different chains

This section will briefly describe my choices within the tutorial regarding user specified chains and some choices specific to the rc.firewall.txt script. Some of the paths I have chosen to go


here may be wrong from one or another of aspect. I hope to point these aspects and possible problems out to you when and where they occur. Also, this section contains a brief look back to the *Traversing of tables and chains* chapter. Hopefully, this will remind you a little bit of how the specific tables and chains are traversed in a real live example.

I have displaced all the different user-chains in the fashion I have to save as much CPU as possible but at the same time put the main weight on security and readability. Instead of letting a *TCP* packet traverse *ICMP*, *UDP* and *TCP* rules, I simply match all *TCP* packets and then let the *TCP* packets traverse an user specified chain. This way we do not get too much overhead out of it all. The following picture will try to explain the basics of how an incoming packet traverses netfilter. With these pictures and explanations, I wish to explain and clarify the goals of this script. We will not discuss any specific details yet, but instead further on in the chapter. This is a really trivial picture in comparison to the one in the *Traversing of tables and chains* chapter where we discussed the whole traversal of chains and tables in depth.




Based upon this picture, let us make clear what our goals are. This whole example script is based upon the assumption that we are looking at a scenario containing one local network, one firewall and an Internet connection connected to the firewall. This example is also based upon the assumption that we have a static *IP* to the internet (as opposed to *DHCP*, *PPP* and *SLIP* and others). In this case, we also want to allow the firewall to act as a server for certain services on the internet, and we trust our local network fully and hence we will not block any of the traffic from the local network. Also, this script has as a main priority to only allow traffic that we explicitly want to allow. To do this, we want to set default policies within the chains to *DROP*. This will effectively kill all connections and all packets that we do not explicitly allow inside our network or our firewall.

In the case of this scenario, we would also like to let our local network do connections to the internet. Since the local network is fully trusted, we want to allow all kind of traffic from the local network to the internet. However, the Internet is most definitely not a trusted network and hence we want to block them from getting to our local network. Based upon these general assumptions, let's look at what we need to do and what we do not need and want to do.



First of all, we want the local network to be able to connect to the internet, of course. To do this, we will need to *NAT* all packets since none of the local computers have real IP addresses. All of this is done within the *PREROUTING* chain, which is created last in this script. This means that we will also have to do some filtering within the *FORWARD* chain since we will otherwise allow outsiders full access to our local network. We trust our local network to the fullest, and because of that we specifically allow all traffic from our local network to the internet. Since noone on the Internet should be allowed to contact our local network computers, we will want to block all traffic from the Internet to our local network except already established and related connections, which in turn will allow all return traffic from the Internet to our local network.




As for our firewall, we may be a bit low on funds perhaps, or we just want to offer a few services to people on the internet. Therefore, we have decided to allow *HTTP*, *FTP*, *SSH* and *IDENTD* access to the actual firewall. All of these protocols are available on the actual firewall, and hence it should be allowed through the *INPUT* chain, and we need to allow the return traffic through the *OUTPUT* chain. However, we also trust the local network fully, and the loopback device and *IP* address are also trusted. Because of this, we want to add special rules to allow all traffic from the local network as well as the loopback network interface. Also, we do not want to allow specific packets or packet headers in specific conjunctions, nor do we want to allow some IP ranges to reach the firewall from the Internet. For instance, the *10.0.0/8* address range is reserved for local networks and hence we would normally not want to allow packets from such a address range since they would with 90% certainty be spoofed. However, before we implement this, we must note that certain Internet Service Providers actually use these address ranges within their own networks. For a closer discussion of this, read the *Common problems and questions* chapter.

Since we have an *FTP* server running on the server, as well as the fact we want to traverse as few rules as possible, we add a rule which lets all established and related traffic through at the top of the *INPUT* chain. For the same reason, we want to split the rules down into subchains. By doing this, our packets will hopefully only need to traverse as few rules as possible. By traversing less rules, we make the ruleset less timeconsuming for each packet, and reduce redundancy within the network.

In this script, we choose to split the different packets down by their protocol family, for example TCP, UDP or ICMP. All TCP packets traverse a specific chain named $tcp_packets$, which will contain rules for all TCP ports and protocols that we want to allow. Also, we want to do some extra checking on the TCP packets, so we would like to create one more subchain for all packets that are accepted for using valid port numbers to the firewall. This chain we choose to call the *allowed* chain, and should contain a few extra checks before finally accepting the packet. As for ICMP packets, these will traverse the $icmp_packets$ chain. When we decided on how to create this chain, we could not see any specific needs for extra checks before allowing the ICMP packets through if we agree with the type and code of the ICMP packet, and

hence we accept the directly. Finally, we have the UDP packets which needs to be dealt with. These packets, we send to the $udp_packets$ chain which handles all incoming UDP packets. All incoming UDP packets should be sent to this chain, and if they are of an allowed type we should accept them immediately without any further checking.

Since we are running on a relatively small network, this box is also used as a secondary workstation and to give some extra levy for this, we want to allow certain specific protocols to make contact with the firewall itself, such as **speak freely** and **ICQ**.



Finally, we have the firewalls *OUTPUT* chain. Since we actually trust the firewall quite a lot, we allow pretty much all traffic leaving the firewall. We do not do any specific user blocking, nor do we do any blocking of specific protocols. However, we do not want people to use this box to spoof packets leaving the firewall itself, and hence we only want to allow traffic from the IP addresses assigned to the firewall itself. We would most likely implement this by adding rules that *ACCEPT* all packets leaving the firewall in case they come from one of the *IP* addresses assigned to the firewall, and if not they will be dropped by the default policy in the *OUTPUT* chain.

Setting up default policies

Quite early on in the process of creating our ruleset, we set up the default policies. We set up the default policies on the different chains with a fairly simple command, as described below.

iptables [-P {chain} {policy}]

The default policy is used every time the packets do not match a rule in the chain. For example, lets say we get a packet that match no single rule in our whole ruleset. If this happens, we must decide what should happen to the packet in question, and this is where the default policy comes into the picture. The default policy is used on all packets that does not match with any other rule in our ruleset.

Do be cautious with what default policy you set on chains in other tables since they are simply not made for filtering, and it may lead to very strange behaviours.

Setting up user specified chains in the filter table

Now you got a good picture on what we want to accomplish with this firewall, so let us get on to the actual implementation of the ruleset. It is now high time that we take care of setting up all the rules and chains that we wish to create and to use, as well as all of the rulesets within the chains.

After this, we create the different special chains that we want to use with the **-N** command. The new chains are created and set up with no rules inside of them. The chains we will use are, as previously described, *icmp_packets*, *tcp_packets*, *udpincoming_packets* and the *allowed* chain, which is used by the *tcp_packets* chain. Incoming packets on **\$INET_IFACE**, of *ICMP* type, will be redirected to the chain *icmp_packets*. Packets of *TCP* type, will be redirected to the *tcp_packets* chain and incoming packets of *UDP* type from **\$INET_IFACE** go to *udpincoming_packets* chain. All of this will be explained more in detail in the *INPUT chain* section below. To create a chain is quite simple and only consists of a short declaration of the chain as this:

iptables [-N chain]

In the upcoming sections we will have a closer look at each and one of the user defined chains that we have by now created. Let us have a closer look at how they look and what rules they contain and what we will accomplish within them.

The bad_tcp_packets chain

The *bad_tcp_packets* chain is devoted to contain rules that inspects incoming packets for malformed headers or other problems. As it is, we have only chosen to include a packet filter which blocks all incoming *TCP* packets that are considered as **NEW** but does not have the *SYN* bit sent. This chain could be used to check for all possible inconsistencies, such as above or *XMAS* portscans etcetera. We could also add rules that looks for state **INVALID**.

If you want to fully understand this, you need to look at the *State NEW packets but no SYN bit set* section in the *Common problems and questions* appendix regarding state NEW and non-SYN packets getting through other rules. These packets could be allowed under certain circumstances but in 99% of the cases we wouldn't want these packets to get through. Hence, we log them to our logs and then we DROP them.

The allowed chain

If a packet comes in on **\$INET_IFACE** and is of *TCP* type, it travels through the *tcp_packets* chain and if the connection is against a port that we want to allow traffic on, we want to do some final checks on it to see if we actually do want to allow it or not. All of these final checks are done within the *allowed* chain.

First of all, we check if the packet is a *SYN* packet. If it is a *SYN* packet, it is most likely to be the first packet in a new connection so, of course, we allow this. Then we check if the packet comes from an **ESTABLISHED** or **RELATED** connection, if it does, then we, again of course, allow it. An **ESTABLISHED** connection is a connection that has seen traffic in both directions, and since we have seen a *SYN* packet, the connection then must be in state **ESTABLISHED**, according to the state machine. The last rule in this chain will **DROP** everything else. In this case this pretty much means everything that has not seen traffic in both directions, ie, we didn't reply to the *SYN* packet, or they are trying to start the connection with a non *SYN* packet. There is *no* practical use of not starting a connection with a *SYN* packet, except to portscan people pretty much. There is no currently available TCP/IP implementation that supports opening a TCP connection with something else than a *SYN* packet to my knowledge, hence, **DROP** it since it is 99% sure to be a portscan.

The TCP chain

The *tcp_packets* chain specifies what ports that are allowed to use on the firewall from the Internet. There is, however, even more checks to do, hence we send each and one of the packets on to the allowed chain, which we described previously.

-A tcp_packets tells iptables in which chain to add the new rule, the rule will be added to the end of the chain. -p TCP tells it to match TCP packets and -s 0/0 matches all source addresses from 0.0.0.0 with netmask 0.0.0.0, in other words *all* source addresses. This is actually the default behaviour but I am using it just to make everything as clear as possible. -dport 21 means destination port 21, in other words if the packet is destined for port 21 they also match. If all the criteria are matched, then the packet will be targeted for the *allowed* chain. If it doesn't match any of the rules, they will be passed back to the original chain that sent the packet to the $tcp_packets$ chain.

As it is now, I allow *TCP* port 21, or *FTP* control port, which is used to control *FTP* connections and later on I also allow all **RELATED** connections, and that way we allow PASSIVE and ACTIVE connections since the *ip_conntrack_ftp* module is, hopefully, loaded. If we do not want to allow *FTP* at all, we can unload the *ip_conntrack_ftp* module and delete the **\$IPTABLES -A tcp_packets -p TCP -s 0/0 -dport 21 -j allowed** line from the rc.firewall.txt file.

Port 22 is *SSH*, which is much better than allowing telnet on port 23 if you want to allow anyone from the outside to use a shell on your box at all. Note that you are dealing with a firewall. It is always a bad idea to give others than yourself any kind of access to a firewall box. Firewalls should always be kept to a bare minimum and no more.

Port 80 is *HTTP*, in other words your web server, delete it if you do not want to run a web server directly on your firewall.

And finally we allow port 113, which is *IDENTD* and might be necessary for some protocols like IRC, etc to work properly. Do note that it may be worth to use the **oidentd** package if you *NAT* several hosts on your local network. **oidentd** has support for relaying *IDENTD* requests on to the correct boxes within your local network.

If you feel like adding more open ports with this script, well, it should be quite obvious how to do that by now. Just cut and paste one of the other lines in the $tcp_packets$ chain and change it to the port you want to open.

The UDP chain

If we do get a *UDP* packet on the *INPUT* chain, we send them on to *udpincoming_packets* where we once again do a match for the *UDP* protocol with -p **UDP** and then match everything with a source address of 0.0.0.0 and netmask 0.0.0.0, in other words everything again. Except this, we only accept specific *UDP* ports that we want to be open for hosts on the Internet. Do note that we do not need to open up holes depending on the sending hosts source port, since this should be taken care of by the state machine. We only need to open up ports on our host if we are to run a server on any *UDP* port, such as *DNS* etcetera. Packets that are entering the firewall and that are part of an already established connection (by our local network) will automatically be accepted back in by the *-state ESTABLISHED*, *RELATED* rules at the top of the *INPUT* chain.

As it is, we do not **ACCEPT** incoming *UDP* packets from port 53, which is what we use to do *DNS* lookups. The rule is there, but it is per default commented out. If you want your firewall to act as an *DNS* server, uncomment this line.

I personally also allow port 123, which is *NTP* or *network time protocol*. This protocol is used to set your computer clock to the same time as certain other time servers which have *very* accurate clocks. Most of you probably do not use this protocol and hence I am not allowing it per default. The same thing applies here however, the rule is there and it is simple to uncomment to get it working.

We do currently allow port 2074, which is used for certain real-time *multimedia* applications like **speak freely** which you can use to talk to other people in real-time by using speakers and a microphone, or even better, a headset. If you would not like to use this, you could turn it off quite simply by commenting it out.

Port 4000 is the *ICQ* protocol. This should be an extremely well known protocol that is used by the Mirabilis application named **ICQ**. There is at least 2-3 different **ICQ** clones for Linux and it is one of the most widely used chat programs in the world. I doubt there is any further need to explain what it is.

The ICMP chain

This is where we decide what *ICMP* types to allow. If a packet of *ICMP* type comes in on eth0 on the *INPUT* chain, we then redirect it to the *icmp_packets* chain as explained before. Here we check what kind of *ICMP* types to allow. For now, I only allow incoming *ICMP Echo requests*, *TTL* equals 0 during transit and *TTL* equals 0 during *reassembly*. The reason that we do not allow any other ICMP types per default here, is that almost all other ICMP types should be covered by the RELATED state rules. The reason that I allow these *ICMP* packets are as follows, Echo Requests are used to request an echo reply, which in turn is used to mainly ping other hosts to see if they are available on any of the networks. Without this rule, other hosts will not be able to ping us to see if we are available on any network connection. Do note that some people would tend to erase this rule, since they simple do not want to be seen on the Internet. Deleting this rule will effectively render any pings to our firewall totally useless from the Internet since the firewall will simply not respond to them.

Time Exceeded (ie, TTL equals 0 during transit and TTL equals 0 during reassembly), is allowed in the case we want to traceroute some host or if a packet gets its Time To Live set to 0, we will get a reply about this. For example, when you traceroute someone, you start out with TTL = 1, and it gets down to 0 at the first hop on the way out, and a Time Exceeded is sent back from the first gateway en route to the host we are trying to traceroute, then TTL = 2 and the second gateway sends Time Exceeded, and so on until we get an actual reply from the host we finally want to get to. This way, we will get a reply from each host on our way to the actual host we want to reach, and we can see every host in between and find out what host is broken.

For a complete listing of all *ICMP* types, see the *ICMP types* appendix . For more information on *ICMP* types and their usage, i suggest reading the following documents and reports:

- The Internet Control Message Protocol (http://www.ee.siue.edu/~rwalden/networking/icmp.html)
- RFC 792 (http://www.boingworld.com/workshops/linux/iptables-tutorial/other/rfc792.txt) -Internet Control Message Protocol by J. Postel.

As a side-note, I might be wrong in blocking some of these *ICMP* types for you, but in my case, everything works perfectly while blocking all the *ICMP* types that I do not allow.

INPUT chain

The *INPUT* chain as I have written it uses mostly other chains to do the hard work. This way we do not get too much load from iptables, and it will work much better on slow machines which might otherwise drop packets at high loads. This is done by checking for specific details that should be the same for a lot of different packets, and then sending those packets into specific user specified chains. By doing this, we can split down our ruleset to contain much less rules that needs to be traversed by each packet and hence the firewall will be put through a lot less overhead by packet filtering.

First of all we do certain checks for bad packets. This is done by sending all *TCP* packets to the *bad_tcp_packets* chain. This chain contains a few rules that will check for badly formed packets or other anomalies that we do not want to accept. For a full explanation of the *The bad_tcp_packets chain* section in this chapter.

At this point we start looking for traffic from generally trusted networks. These include the local network adapter and all traffic coming from there, all traffic to and from our *loopback* interface, including all our currently assigned *IP* addresses (this means all of them, including

our Internet IP address). As it is, we have chosen to put the rule that allows LAN activity to the firewall at the top, since our local network generates more traffic than the Internet connection. This allows for less overhead used to try and match each packet with each rule and it is always a good idea to look through what kind of traffic mostly traverses the firewall. By doing this, we can shuffle around the rules to be more efficient, leading to less overhead on the firewall and less congestion on your network.

After this, We match all *TCP* packets in the *INPUT* chain that comes in on the **\$INET_IFACE** interface, and send those to the *tcp_packets*, which was previously described. Now we do the same match for *UDP* packets on the **\$INET_IFACE** and send those to the *udpincoming_packets* chain, and after this all *ICMP* packets are sent to the *icmp_packets* chain. Normally, a firewall would be hardest hit by *TCP* packets, then *UDP* and last of them all *ICMP* packets. This is in normal case, mind you, and it may be wrong for you. The absolute same thing should be looked upon here, as with the network specific rules. Which causes the most traffic? Should the rules be thrown around to generate less overhead? On networks sending huge amounts of data, this is an absolute necessity since a *pentium III* equivalent machine may be brought to its knees by a simple ruleset containing 100 rules and a single 100mbit *ethernet* card running at full capacity if the ruleset is badly written. This is an important piece to look at when writing a ruleset for your own local network.

Before we hit the default policy of the *INPUT* chain, we log it so we may be able to find out about possible problems and/or bugs. Either it might be a packet that we just do not want to allow or it might be someone who is doing something bad to us, or finally it might be a problem in our firewall not allowing traffic that should be allowed. In either case we want to know about it so it can be dealt with. Though, we do not log more than 3 packets per minute as we do not want to flood our logs with crap which in turn may fill up our whole logging partition, also we set a prefix to all log entries so we know where it came from.

Everything that has not yet been caught will be **DROP**'ed by the default policy on the *INPUT* chain. The default policy was set quite some time back, in the *Setting up default policies* section, in this chapter.

FORWARD chain

The *FORWARD* chain contains quite few rules in this scenario. We have a single rule which sends all packets to the *bad_tcp_packets* chain, which was also used in the *INPUT* chain as described previously. The *bad_tcp_packets* chain is constructed in such a fashion that it can be used recycled in several calling chains, disregarding of what packet traverses it.

After this first check for bad *TCP* packets, we have the main rules in the *FORWARD* chain. The first rule will allow all traffic from our **\$LAN_IFACE** to any other interface to flow freely, without restrictions. This rule will in other words allow all traffic from our *LAN* to the Internet. The second rule will allow **ESTABLISHED** and **RELATED** traffic back through the firewall. This will in other words allow packets belonging to connections that was initiated from our internal network to flow freely back to our local network. These rules are required for our local network to be able to access the Internet, since the default policy of the *FORWARD* chain was previously set to **DROP**. This is quite clever, since it will allow hosts on our local network to the hosts on our internet, but at the same time block hosts on the internet to connect to the hosts on our internal network.

Finally we also have a logging rule which will log packets that are not allowed in one or another way to pass through the *FORWARD* chain. This will most likely show one or another occurance of a badly formed packet or other problem. One cause may be hacker attacks, and others may be malformed packets. This is exactly the same rule as the one used in the *INPUT* chain except for the logging prefix, "IPT FORWARD packet died: ". The logging prefix is mainly used to separate log entries, and may be used to distinguish log entries to find out where the packet was logged from and some header options.

OUTPUT chain

Since i know that there is pretty much no one but me using this box which is partially used as a Firewall and a workstation currently, I allow almost everything that goes out from it that has a source address **\$LOCALHOST_IP**, **\$LAN_IP** or **\$STATIC_IP**. Everything else might be spoofed in some fashion, even though I doubt anyone that I know would do it on my box. Last of all we log everything that gets dropped. If it does get dropped, we will most definitely want to know about it so we may take action against the problem. Either it is a nasty error, or it is a weird packet that is spoofed. Finally we **DROP** the packet in the default policy.

PREROUTING chain of the nat table

aution

The *PREROUTING* chain is pretty much what it says, it does network adress translation on packets before they actually hit the routing decision that sends them onwards to the *INPUT* or *FORWARD* chains in the filter table. The only reason that we talk about this chain in this script is that we once again feel obliged to point out that you should not do any filtering in it. The *PREROUTING* chain is only traversed by the first packet in a stream, which means that all subsequent packets will go totally unchecked in this chain. As it is with this script, we do not use the *PREROUTING* chain at all, however, this is the place we would be working in right now if we wanted to do *DNAT* on any specific packets, for example if you want to host your *web server* within your local network. For more information about the *PREROUTING* chain, read the *Traversing of tables and chains* chapter.

The *PREROUTING* chain should not be used for any filtering since, among other things, this chain is only traversed by the first packet in a stream. The *PREROUTING* chain should be used for network adress translation only, unless you really know what you are doing.

Starting SNAT and the POSTROUTING chain

So, our final mission would be to get the *Network Address Translationing* up, correct? At least to me. First of all we add a rule to the *nat* table, in the *POSTROUTING* chain that will *NAT* all packets going out on our interface connected to the Internet. For me this would be *eth0*. However, there are specific variables added to all of the example scripts that may be

used to automatically configure these settings. The -t option tells iptables which table to insert the rule in, in this case the *nat* table. The -A command tells us that we want to Append a new rule to an existing chain named *POSTROUTING* and -o **\$INET_IFACE** tells us to match all outgoing packets on the **INET_IFACE** interface (or *eth0*, per default settings in this script) and finally we set the target to **SNAT** the packets. So all packets that match this rule will be *Source Network* Address Translationed to look as it came from your Internet interface. Do note that you must set which IP address to give outgoing packets with the -to-source option sent to the SNAT target.

In this script we have chosen to use the **SNAT** target instead of **MASQUERADE** for a couple of reasons. The first one is that this script was supposed to run on a firewall that has a static *IP* address. A follow up reason to the first one, would hence be that it is faster and more efficient to use the *SNAT* target if possible. Of course, it was also used to show how it would work and how it would be used in a real live example. If you do not have a static *IP* address, you should definitely give thought to use the **MASQUERADE** target instead which provides a simple and easy facility that will also do *NAT* for you, but that will automatically grab the *IP* address that it should use. This takes a little bit extra computing power, but it may most definitely be worth it if you use *DHCP* for instance. If you would like to have a closer look at how the **MASQUERADE** target may look, you should look at the *rc.DHCP.firewall.txt* script.

Chapter 6. Example scripts

The objective of this chapter is to give a fairly brief and short explanation of each script available with this tutorial, and to provide an overlook of the scripts and what services they provide. These scripts are not in any way perfect, and they may not fit your exact intentions perfectly. It is in other words up to you to make these scripts suitable for your needs. The rest of this tutorial should most probably be helpful in making this feat. The first section of this tutorial deals with the actual structure that I have established in each script so we may find our way within the script a bit easier.

rc.firewall.txt script structure

All scripts written for this tutorial has been written after a specific structure. The reason for this is that they should be fairly conformative to each other and to make it easier to find the differences between the scripts. This structure should be fairly well documented in this brief chapter. This chapter should hopefully give a short understanding to why all the scripts has been written as they have, and why I have chosen to maintain this structure.

Even though this is the structure I have chosen, do note that this may not be the best structure for your scripts. It is only a structure that I have chosen to use since it fits the need of being easy to read and follow the best according to my logic.

The structure

This is the structure that all scripts in this tutorial should follow. If they differ in some way it is probably an error on my part, unless it is specifically explained why I have broken this structure.

- Configuration First of all we have the configuration options which the rest of the script should use. Configuration options should pretty much always be the first thing in any shell-script.
 - 1.1. *Internet* This is the configuration section which pertains to the Internet connection. This could be skipped if we do not have any Internet connection. Note that there may be more subsections than those listed here, but only such that pertains to our Internet connection.
 - 1.1.1. *DHCP* If there are possibly any special DHCP requirements with this specific script, we will add the DHCP specific configuration options here.
 - 1.1.2. *PPPoE* If there are a possibility that the user that wants to use this specific script, and if there are any special circumstances that raises the chances that he is using a PPPoE connection, we will add specific options for those here.

- 1.2. *LAN* If there is any LAN available behind the firewall, we will add options pertaining to that in this section. This is most likely, hence this section will almost always be available.
- 1.3. *DMZ* If there is any reason to it, we will add a DMZ zone configuration at this point. Most scripts lacks this section, mainly because any normal home network, or small corporate network, will not have one.
- 1.4. *Localhost* These options pertain to our localhost. These variables are highly unlikely to change, but we have put most of it into variables anyway. Hopefully, there should be no reason to change these variables.
- 1.5. *iptables* This section contains iptables specific configuration. In most scripts and situations this should only require one variable which tells us where the iptables binary is located.
- 1.6. *Other* If there are any other specific options and variables, they should first of all be fitted into the correct subsection (If it pertains to the Internet connection, it should be subsectioned there, etcetera). If it does not fit in anywhere, it should be subsectioned directly to the configuration options somewhere.
- 2. *Module loading* This section of the scripts should maintain a list of modules. The first part should contain the required modules, while the second part should contain the non-required modules.



Note that some modules that may raise security, or add certain services or possibilities, may have been added even though they are not required. This should normally be noted in such cases within the example scripts.

- 2.1. *Required modules* This section should contain the required modules, and possibly special modules that adds to the security or adds special services to the administrator or clients.
- 2.2. *Non-required modules* This section contains modules that are not required for normal operations. All of these modules should be commented out per default, and if you want to add the service it provides, it is up to you.
- 3. *proc configuration* This section should take care of any special configuration needed in the proc filesystem. If some of these options are required, they will be listed as such, if not, they should be commented out per default, and listed under the non-required proc configurations. Most of the useful proc configurations will be listed here, but far from all of them.
 - 3.1. *Required proc configuration* This section should contain all of the required proc configurations for the script in question to work. It could possibly also contain

configurations that raises security, and possibly which adds special services or possibilities for the administrator or clients.

- 3.2. *Non-required proc configuration* This section should contain non-required proc configurations that may prove useful. All of them should be commented out, since they are not actually necessary to get the script to work. This list will contain far from all of the proc configurations or nodes.
- 4. rules set up By now the scripts should most probably be ready to insert the ruleset. I have chosen to split all the rules down after table and then chain names. All user specified chains are created before we do anything to the system builtin chains. I have also chosen to set the chains and their rulespecifications in the same order as they are output by the iptables -L command.
 - 4.1. *Filter table* First of all we go through the filter table and its content. First of all we should set up all the policies in the table.
 - 4.1.1. Set policies Set up all the default policies for the systemchains. Normally I will set DROP policies on the chains in the filter table, and specifically ACCEPT services and streams that I want to allow inside. This way we will get rid of all ports that we do not want to let people use.
 - 4.1.2. Create user specified chains At this point we create all the user specified chains that we want to use later on within this table. We will not be able to use these chains in the systemchains anyways if they are not already created so we could as well get to it as soon as possible.
 - 4.1.3. Create content in user specified chains After creating the user specified chains we may as well enter all the rules within these chains. The only reason I have to enter this data at this point already is that may as well put it close to the creation of the user specified chains. You may as well put this later on in your script, it is totally up to you.
 - 4.1.4. *INPUT chain* When we have come this far, we do not have a lot of things left to do within the filter table so we get onto the INPUT chain. At this point we should add all rules within the INPUT chain.

Note

At this point we start following the output from the iptables -L command as you may see. There is no reason for you to stay with this structure, however, do try to avoid mixing up data from different tables and chains since it will become much harder to read such rulesets and to fix possible problems.

- 4.1.5. *FORWARD chain* At this point we go on to add the rules within the FORWARD chain. Nothing special about this decision.
- 4.1.6. *OUTPUT chain* Last of all in the filter table, we add the rules dealing with the OUTPUT chain. There should hopefully not be too much to do at this point.

- 4.2. nat table After the filter table we take care of the nat table. This is done after the filter table because of a number of reasons within these scripts. First of all we do not want to turn the whole forwarding mechanism and NAT function on at a too early stage, which could possibly lead to packets getting through the firewall at just the wrong timepoint (ie, when the NAT has been turned on, but none of the filter rules has been run). Also, I look upon the nat table as a sort of layer that lies just outside the filter table and kind of surrounds it. The filter table would hence be the core, while the nat table acts as a layer lying around the filter table, and finally the mangle table lies around the nat table as a second layer. This may be wrong in some perspectives, but not too far from reality.
 - 4.2.1. Set policies First of all we set up all the default policies within the nat table. Normally, I will be satisfied with the default policy set from the beginning, namely the ACCEPT policy. This table should not be used for filtering anyways, and we should not let packets be dropped here since there are some really nasty things that may happen in such cases due to our own presumptions. I let these chains be set to ACCEPT since there is no reason not to do so.
 - 4.2.2. Create user specified chains At this point we create any user specified chains that we want within the nat table. Normally I do not have any of these, but I have added this section anyways, just in case. Note that the user specified chains must be created before they can actually be used within the systemchains.
 - 4.2.3. Create content in user specified chains By now it should be time to add all the rules to the user specified chains in the nat table. The same thing goes here as for the user specified chains in the filter table. We add this material here since I do not see any reason not to.
 - 4.2.4. *PREROUTING chain* The PREROUTING chain is used to do DNAT on packets in case we have any need for it. In most scripts this feature is not used, or at the very least commented out, reason being that we do not want to open up big holes to our local network without knowing about it. Within some scripts we have this turned on by default since the sole purpose of those scripts are to provide such services.
 - 4.2.5. *POSTROUTING chain* The POSTROUTING chain should be fairly well used by the scripts I have written since most of them depend upon the fact that you have one or more local networks that we want to firewall against the Internet. Mainly we will try to use the SNAT target, but in certain cases we are forced to use the MASQUERADE target instead.
 - 4.2.6. *OUTPUT chain* The OUTPUT chain is barely used at all in any of the scripts. As it looks now, it is not broken, but I have been unable to find any good reasons to use this chain so far. If anyone has a reason to use this chain, send me a line and I will add it to the tutorial.
- 4.3. *mangle table* The last table to do anything about is the mangle table. Normally I will not use this table at all, since it should normally not be used for anyone, unless they have specific needs, such as masking all boxes to use the exact same TTL or to change TOS fields etcetera. I have in other words chosen to leave these parts of the

scripts more or less blank, with a few exceptions where I have added a few examples of what it may be used for.


- 4.3.1. Set policies Set the default policies within the chain. The same thing goes here as for the nat table pretty much. The table was not made for filtering, and hence you should avoid it all together. I have not set any policies in any of the scripts in the mangle table one way or the other, and you are encouraged not to do so either.
- 4.3.2. Create user specified chains Create all the user specified chains. Since I have barely used the mangle table at all in the scripts, I have neither created any chains here since it is fairly unusable without any data to use within it. However, this section was added just in case someone, or I, would have the need for it in the future.
- 4.3.3. *Create content in userspecified chains* If you have any user specified chains within this table, you may att this point add the rules that you want within them here.
- 4.3.4. *PREROUTING* At this point there is barely any information in any of the scripts in this tutorial that contains any rules here.
- 4.3.5. *INPUT chain* At this point there is barely any information in any of the scripts in this tutorial that contains any rules here.
- 4.3.6. *FORWARD chain* At this point there is barely any information in any of the scripts in this tutorial that contains any rules here.
- 4.3.7. *OUTPUT chain* At this point there is barely any information in any of the scripts in this tutorial that contains any rules here.
- 4.3.8. *POSTROUTING chain* At this point there is barely any information in any of the scripts in this tutorial that contains any rules here.

Hopefully this should explain more in detail how each script is structured and why they are structured in such a way.

Caution

Do note that these descriptions are extremely brief, and should mainly just be seen as a brief explanation to what and why the scripts has been split down as they have. There is nothing that says that this is the only and best way to go.

rc.firewall.txt



The rc.firewall.txt


(http://www.boingworld.com/workshops/linux/iptables-tutorial/scripts/rc.firewall.txt) script is the main core on which the rest of the scripts are based upon. The *rc.firewall file* chapter should explain every detail in the script most thoroughly. Mainly it was written for a dual homed network. For example, where you have one *LAN* and one Internet Connection. This script also makes the assumption that you have a static IP to the Internet, and hence don't use *DHCP*, *PPP*, *SLIP* or some other protocol that assigns you an IP automatically. If you are looking for a script that will work with those setups, please take a closer look at the *rc.DHCP.firewall.txt* script.

The rc.firewall.txt script requires the following options to be compiled statically to the kernel, or as modules. Without one or more of these, the script will become more or less flawed since parts of the scripts required functionalities will be unusable. As you change the script you use, you could possibly need more options to be compiled into your kernel depending on what you want to use.

- CONFIG_PACKET
- CONFIG_PACKET
- CONFIG_NETFILTER
- CONFIG_IP_NF_CONNTRACK
- CONFIG_IP_NF_IPTABLES

- CONFIG_IP_NF_MATCH_LIMIT
- CONFIG_IP_NF_MATCH_STATE
- CONFIG_IP_NF_FILTER
- CONFIG_IP_NF_NAT
- CONFIG_IP_NF_TARGET_LOG

rc.DMZ.firewall.txt



The rc.DMZ.firewall.txt

(http://www.boingworld.com/workshops/linux/iptables-tutorial/scripts/rc.DMZ.firewall.txt) script was written for those people out there that has one *Trusted Internal Network*, one *De-Militarized Zone* and one *Internet Connection*. The *De-Militarized Zone* is in this case 1-to-1 *NAT* 'ed and requires you to do some IP aliasing on your firewall, ie, you must make the box recognise packets for more than one IP. There are several ways to get this to work, one is to set 1-to-1 *NAT*, another one if you have a whole subnet is to create a subnetwork, giving the firewall one IP both internally and externally. You could then set the IP's to the *DMZ*'ed boxes as you wish. Do note that this will "steal" two IP's for you, one for the broadcast address and one for the network address. This is pretty much up to you to decide and to implement, this tutorial will give you the tools to actually accomplish the firewalling and

NAT'ing part, but it will not tell you exactly what you need to do since it is out of the scope of the tutorial.

The rc.DMZ.firewall.txt script requires these options to be compiled into your kernel, either statically or as modules. Without these options, at the very least, available in your kernel, you will not be able to use this scripts functionality. You may in other words get a lot of errors complaining about modules and targets/jumps or matches missing. If you are planning to do traffic control or any other things like that, you should see to it that you have all the required options compiled into your kernel there as well.

- CONFIG_PACKET
- CONFIG_PACKET
- CONFIG_NETFILTER
- CONFIG_IP_NF_CONNTRACK
- CONFIG_IP_NF_IPTABLES
- CONFIG_IP_NF_MATCH_LIMIT
- CONFIG_IP_NF_MATCH_STATE
- CONFIG_IP_NF_FILTER
- CONFIG_IP_NF_NAT
- CONFIG_IP_NF_TARGET_LOG


You need to have two internal networks with this script as you can see from the picture. One uses IP range 192.168.0.0/24 and consists of a *Trusted Internal Network*. The other one uses IP range 192.168.1.0/24 and consists of the *De-Militarized Zone* which we will do 1-to-1 *NAT* to. For example, if someone from the internet sends a packet to our DNS_IP, then we use *DNAT*, which stands for *Destination Network Adress Translation*, to send the packet on to our *DNS* on the *DMZ* network. When the *DNS* sees our packet, the packet will be destined for the actual *DNS* internal network IP, and not to our external *DNS* IP. If the packet would not have been translated, the *DNS* wouldn't have answered the packet. We will show a short example of how the *DNAT* code looks:

\$IPTABLES -t nat -A PREROUTING -p TCP -i \$INET_IFACE -d \$DNS_IP -dport 53 -j DNAT -to-destination \$DMZ_DNS_IP

First of all, *DNAT* can only be performed in the *PREROUTING* chain of the *nat* table. Then we look for *TCP* protocol on our \$INET_IFACE with destination IP that matches our \$DNS_IP, and is directed to port 53, which is the *TCP* port for zone transfers between *DNS*'s. If we actually get such a packet we give a target of *DNAT*, in other words *Destination NAT*. After that we specify where we want the packet to go with the **-to-destination** option and give it the value of \$DMZ_DNS_IP, in other words the IP of the *DNS* on our *DMZ* network. This is how basic *DNAT* works. When the reply to the *DNAT*'ed packet is sent through the firewall, it automatically gets un-DNAT'ed.

By now you should have enough understanding of how everything works to be able to understand this script pretty well without any huge complications. If there is something you don't understand, that hasn't been gone through in the rest of the tutorial, mail me since it is probably a fault on my side.

rc.DHCP.firewall.txt



The rc.DHCP.firewall.txt

(http://www.boingworld.com/workshops/linux/iptables-tutorial/scripts/rc.DHCP.firewall.txt) script is pretty much identical to the original *rc.firewall.txt*. However, this script no longer uses the **STATIC_IP** variable, which is the main change to the original rc.firewall.txt script. The reason is that this won't work together with a dynamic IP connection. The actual changes needed to be done to the original script is minimal, however, I've had some people mail me and ask about the problem so this script will be a good solution for you. This script will allow people who uses *DHCP*, *PPP* and *SLIP* connections to connect to the internet.

The rc.DHCP.firewall.txt script requires the following options to be compiled statically to the kernel, or as modules, as a bare minimum to run properly.

- CONFIG_PACKET
- CONFIG_PACKET
- CONFIG_NETFILTER
- CONFIG_IP_NF_CONNTRACK
- CONFIG_IP_NF_IPTABLES
- CONFIG_IP_NF_MATCH_LIMIT
- CONFIG_IP_NF_MATCH_STATE

- CONFIG_IP_NF_FILTER
- CONFIG_IP_NF_NAT
- CONFIG_IP_NF_TARGET_MASQUERADE
- CONFIG_IP_NF_TARGET_LOG

The main changes done to the script consists of erasing the STATIC_IP variable as I already said and deleting all references to this variable. Instead of using this variable the script now does it's main filtering on the variable INET_IFACE. In other words -d \$STATIC_IP has been changed to -i \$INET_IFACE. This is pretty much the only changes made and that's all that's needed really.

There is some more things to think about though. We can no longer filter in the *INPUT* chain depending on, for example, -in-interface \$LAN_IFACE -dst \$INET_IP. This in turn forces us to filter only based on interfaces in such cases where the internal machines must access the internet adressable IP. One great example is if we are running an *HTTP* on our firewall. If we go to the main page, which contains static links back to the same host, which could be some dyndns solution, we would get a real hard trouble. The *NAT*'ed box would ask the DNS for the IP of the *HTTP* server, then try to access that IP. In case we filter based on interface and IP, the *NAT*'ed box would be unable to get to the *HTTP* because the *INPUT* chain would DROP the packets flat to the ground. This also applies in a sense to the case where we got a static IP, but in such cases it could be gotten around by adding rules which checks the *LAN* interface packets for our INET_IP, and if so ACCEPT them.

As you may read from above, it may be a good idea to get a script, or write one, that handles dynamic IP in a better sense. We could for example make a script that grabs the IP from **ifconfig** and adds it to a variable, upon bootup of the internet connection. A good way to do this, would e to use for example the ip-up scripts provided with **pppd** and some other programs. For a good site, check out the linuxguruz.org iptables site which has a huge collection of scripts available to download. You will find a link to the linuxguruz.org site from the *Other resources and links* appendix.

Note

This script might be a bit less secure than the rc.firewall.txt script. I would definitely advise you to use that script if at all possible since this script is more open to attacks from the outside.


Also, there is the possibility to add something like this to your scripts:

```
INET_IP=`ifconfig $INET_IFACE | grep inet | cut -d : -f 2 | cut -d \
-f 1`
```

The above would automatically grab the *IP* address of the **\$INET_IFACE** variable, grep the correct line which contains the *IP* address and then cuts it down to a manageable *IP* address. For a more elaborate way of doing this, you could apply the snippets of code available within the retreiveip.txt (scripts/retrieveip.txt) script, which will automatically grab your Internet IP address when you run the script. Do note that this may in turn lead to a little bit of "weird" behaviours, such as stalling connections to and from the firewall on the internal side. The most common strange behaviours are described in the following list.

- 1. If the script is run from within a script which in turn is executed by, for example, the *PPP* daemon, it will hang all currently active connections due to the NEW not SYN rules (see the *State NEW packets but no SYN bit set* section). It is possible to get by, if you get rid of the *NEW not SYN* rules for example, but it is questionable.
- 2. If you got rules that are static and always want to be around, it is rather harsh to add and erase rules all the time, without hurting the already existing ones. For example, if you want to block hosts on your *LAN* to connect to the firewall, but at the same time operate a script from the *PPP daemon*, how would you do it without erasing your already active rules blocking the *LAN*?
- 3. It may get unnecessarily complicated, as seen above which in turn could lead to security compromises. If the script is kept simple, it is easier to spot problems, and to keep order in it.

rc.UTIN.firewall.txt



The rc.UTIN.firewall.txt

(http://www.boingworld.com/workshops/linux/iptables-tutorial/scripts/rc.UTIN.firewall.txt) script will in contrast to the other scripts block the *LAN* that is sitting behind us. In other words, we don't trust anyone on any networks we are connected to. We also disallow people on our *LAN* to do anything but specific tasks on the Internet. The only things we actually allow is *POP3*, *HTTP* and *FTP* access to the internet. We also don't trust the internal users to access the

firewall more than we trust users on the Internet.

The rc.UTIN.firewall.txt script requires the following options to be compiled statically to the kernel, or as modules. Without one or more of these, the script will become more or less flawed since parts of the scripts required functionalities will be unusable. As you change the script you use, you could possibly need more options to be compiled into your kernel depending on what you want to use.

- CONFIG_PACKET
- CONFIG_PACKET
- CONFIG_NETFILTER
- CONFIG_IP_NF_CONNTRACK
- CONFIG_IP_NF_IPTABLES
- CONFIG_IP_NF_MATCH_LIMIT
- CONFIG_IP_NF_MATCH_STATE
- CONFIG_IP_NF_FILTER
- CONFIG_IP_NF_NAT
- CONFIG_IP_NF_TARGET_LOG

This script follows the golden rule to not trust anyone, not even our own employees. This is a sad fact, but a large part of the hacks and cracks that a company gets hit by is a matter of people from their own staff perpetrating the hit. This script will hopefully give you some clues as to what you can do with your firewall to strengthen it up. It's not very different from the original rc.firewall.txt script, but it does give a few hints at what we would normally let through etc.

rc.test-iptables.txt

The rc.test-iptables.txt

(http://www.boingworld.com/workshops/linux/iptables-tutorial/scripts/rc.test-iptables.txt) script can be used to test all the different chains, but it might need some tweaking depending on your configuration, such as turning on ip_forwarding, and setting up masquerading etcetera. It will work for mostly everyone though who has all the basic set up and all the basic tables loaded into kernel. All it really does is set some LOG targets which will log ping reply's and ping requests. This way, you will get information on which chain was traversed and in which order. For example, run this script and then do:

ping -c 1 host.on.the.internet

And tail -n 0 -f /var/log/messages while doing the first command. This should show you all the different chains used and in which order, unless the log entries are swapped around for some reason.

This script was written for testing purposes only. In other words, it's not a good idea to have rules like this that logs everything of one sort since your log partitions might get filled up quickly and it would be an effective Denial of Service attack against you and might lead to real attacks on you that would be unlogged after the initial Denial of Service attack.

rc.flush-iptables.txt

The rc.flush-iptables.txt

(http://www.boingworld.com/workshops/linux/iptables-tutorial/scripts/rc.flush-iptables.txt) script should not really be called a script in itself. The rc.flush-iptables.txt

(http://www.boingworld.com/workshops/linux/iptables-tutorial/scripts/rc.flush-iptables.txt) script will reset and flush all your tables and chains. The script starts by setting the default policies to **ACCEPT** on the *INPUT*, *OUTPUT* and *FORWARD* chains of the *filter* table. After this we reset the default policies of the *PREROUTING*, *POSTROUTING* and *OUTPUT* chains of the *nat* table. We do this first so we won't have to bother about closed connections and packets not getting through. This script is intended for actually setting up and troubleshooting your firewall, and hence we only care about opening the whole thing up and reset it to default values.

After this we flush all chains first in the *filter* table and then in the *NAT* table. This way we know there is no redundant rules lying around anywhere. When all of this is done, we jump down to the next section where we erase all the user specified chains in the *NAT* and *filter* tables. When this step is done, we consider the script done. You may consider adding rules to flush your *MANGLE* table if you use it.

One final word on this issue. Certain people has mailed me asking from me to put this script into the original rc.firewall script using redhat Linux syntax where you type something like rc.firewall start and the script starts. However, I will not do that since this is a tutorial and should be used as a

into the original rc.firewall script using redhat Linux syntax where you type something like rc.firewall start and the script starts. However, I will not do that since this is a tutorial and should be used as a place to fetch ideas mainly and it shouldn't be filled up with shell scripts and strange syntax. Adding shell script syntax and other things makes the script harder to read as far as I am concerned and the tutorial was written with readability in mind and will continue being so.

Appendix A. Detailed explanations of special commands

Listing your active ruleset

To list your currently active ruleset you run a special option to the **iptables** command, which we have discussed briefly previously in the *How a rule is built* chapter. This would look like the following:

iptables -L

This command should list your currently active ruleset, and translate everything possible to a more readable form. For example, it will translate all the different ports according to the /etc/services file as well as *DNS* all the IP addresses to get *DNS* records instead. The later can be a bit of a problem though. For example, it will try to resolve *LAN* IP addresses, ie *192.168.1.1*, to something useful. *192.168.0.0/16* is a private range though and should not resolve to anything and the command will seem to hang while resolving the IP. To get around this problem we would do something like the following:

iptables -L -n

Another thing that might be interesting is to see a few statistics about each policy, rule and chain. We could get this by adding the verbose flag. It would then look something like this:

iptables -L -n -v

There is also a few files that might be interesting to look at in the /proc filesystem. For example, it might be interesting to know what connections are currently in the conntrack table. This table contains all the different connections currently tracked and serves as a basic table so we always know what state a connection currently is in. This table can not be edited and even if it was possible, it would be a bad idea. To see the table you can run the following command:

cat /proc/net/conntrack | less

The above command will show all currently tracked connections even though it might be a bit hard to understand everything.

Updating and flushing your tables

If at some point you screw up your **iptables**, there are actually commands to flush them, so you don't have to reboot. I've actually gotten this question a couple times by now so I thought I'd answer it right here. If you added a rule in error, you might just change the **-A** parameter to **-D** in the line you added in error. **iptables** will find the erroneous line and erase it for you, in case you've got multiple lines looking exactly the same in the chain, it erases the first instance it finds matching your rule. If this is not the wanted behaviour you might try to use the **-D** option as **iptables -D INPUT 10** which will erase the 10th rule in the *INPUT* chain.

There is also instances where you want to flush a whole chain, in this case you might want to run the **-F** option. For example, **iptables -F INPUT** will erase the whole *INPUT* chain,

though, this will not change the default policy, so if this is set to *DROP* you'll block the whole *INPUT* chain if used as above. To reset the chain policy, do as how you set it to *DROP*, for example **iptables** -P **INPUT** ACCEPT.

I have made a small script

(http://www.boingworld.com/workshops/linux/iptables-tutorial/scripts/rc.flush-iptables.txt) (available as an appendix as well) that will flush and reset your **iptables** that you might consider using while setting up your rc.firewall.txt file properly. One thing though, if you start mucking around in the *mangle* table, this script will not erase those, it is rather simple to add the few lines needed to erase those but I have not added those here since the *mangle* table is not used in my rc.firewall.txt script so far.

Appendix B. Common problems and questions

Problems loading modules

You may run into a few problems with loading modules. For example, you could get errors claiming that there is no module by such a name and so on. This may, for example look like the following.

insmod: iptable_filter: no module by that name found

This is no reason for concern yet. This or these modules may possibly have been statically compiled into your kernel. This is the first thing you should look at when trying to solve this problem. The simplest way to see if these modules have been loaded already or if they are statically compiled into the kernel, is to simply try and run a command that uses the specific functionality. In the above case, we could not load the *filter* table. If this functionality is not there, we should be unable to use the *filter* table at all. To check if the *filter* table is there, we do the following.

iptables -t filter -L

This should either output all of the chains in the *filter* table properly, or it should fail. If everything is ok, then it should look something like this depending on if you have rules inserted or not.

Chain INPUT (policy ACCEPT)					
target prot opt source	destination				
Chain FORWARD (policy ACCEPT)					
target prot opt source	destination				
Chain OUTPUT (policy ACCEPT)					
target prot opt source	destination				

If you do not have the *filter* table loaded, you would get an error that looks something like this instead.

iptables v1.2.5: can't initialize iptables table `filter': Table does not exist (do you need to insmod?) Perhaps iptables or your kernel needs to be upgraded.

This is a bit more serious since it points out that we first of all do not have the functionality compiled into the kernel, and second, that the module is not possible to find in our normal module paths. This may either mean that you have forgotten to install your modules, you have

forgotten to run depmod -a to update your module databases or you have not compiled the functionality as either module or statically into kernel. There may of course be other reasons for the module not to be loaded, but these are the main reasons. Most of these problems are easily solved. The first problem would simply be solved by running make modules_install in the kernel source directory (if the source has already been compiled and the modules have already been built). The second problem is solved by simply running depmod -a once and see if it works afterwards. The third problem is a bit out of the league for this explanation, and you are more or less left to your own wits here. You will most probably find more information about this on the Linux Documentation Project homepage (http://www.linuxdoc.org).

Another error that you may get when running iptables is the following error.

iptables: No chain/target/match by that name

This error tells us that there is no such chain, target or match. This could depend upon a huge set of factors, the most common being that you have mispelled the chain, target or match in question. Also, this could be generated in case you are trying to use a match that is not available, either because you did not load the proper module, it was not compiled into kernel or iptables failed to automatically load the module. In general, you should look for all of the above solutions but also look for mispelled targets of some sort or another in your rule.

Passive FTP but no DCC

This is one of the really nice parts about the new iptables support in the 2.4.x kernels, you can for example allow *Passive FTP* connections, but not allow *DCC send* functions with the new state matching code. You may ask yourself how, well, its quite simple once you get to think of it. Just compile the *ip_conntrack_irc*, *ip_nat_irc*, *ip_conntrack_ftp* and *ip_nat_ftp* code as modules and not statically into the kernel. What these modules do is that they add support to the connection tracking machine and the *NAT* machine so they can distinguish and modify a *Passive FTP* connection or a *DCC send* connection. Without these modules they can't recognize these kinds of connections.

If you for example want to allow *Passive FTP*, but not *DCC send*, you would load the *ip_conntrack_ftp* and *ip_nat_ftp* modules, but not the *ip_conntrack_irc* and *ip_nat_irc modules* and then do:

/usr/local/sbin/iptables -A INPUT -p TCP -m state -state RELATED -j ACCEPT

To allow *Passive FTP* but not *DCC*. If you would want to do the reverse, you'd just load the *ip_conntrack_irc* and *ip_nat_irc* modules, but not the *ip_conntrack_ftp* and *ip_nat_ftp* modules. Do note that the *ip_nat_** modules are only needed in case you need and want to do *Network Adress Translation* on the connections, ie, if you want to let people run IRC from your local network which is using a *NAT*'ed or masqueraded connection to the internet.

For more information about *Active* and *Passive FTP*, read RFC 959 (http://www.boingworld.com/workshops/linux/iptables-tutorial/other/rfc959.txt) - File Transfer Protocol by J. Postel and J. Reynolds. This RFC contains information regarding the *FTP* protocol and *Active* and *Passive FTP* and how they work. As you can understand from this document, during *Active FTP* the client sends the server an IP address and random port to use and then the server connects to this port on the client. In case your client sits behind a *Network Address Translationing* system (**iptables**), then the packets data section needs to be *NAT*'ed too, that is what the **ip_nat_ftp** module does. In *Passive FTP*, the proceeding is reversed. The client tells the server that it wants to send or receive data and the server replies, telling the client what address to connect to and what port to use.

State NEW packets but no SYN bit set

aution

There is a certain *feature* in *iptables* that is not so well documented and may therefore be overlooked by a lot of people(yes, including me). If you use state **NEW**, packets with the *SYN* bit unset will get through your firewall. This feature is there because in certain cases we want to consider that a packet may be part of an already **ESTABLISHED** connection on, for instance, another firewall. This feature makes it possible to have two or more firewalls, and for one of the firewalls to go down without any loss of data. The firewalling of the subnet could then be taken over by our secondary firewall. This does however lead to the fact that state **NEW** will allow pretty much any kind of TCP connection, regardless if this is the initial 3-way handshake or not. To take care of this problem we add the following rules to our firewalls *INPUT*, *OUTPUT* and *FORWARD* chain:

\$IPTABLES -A INPUT -p tcp ! -syn -m state -state NEW -j LOG -log-prefix "New not s \$IPTABLES -A INPUT -p tcp ! -syn -m state -state NEW -j DROP

The above rules will take care of this problem. This is a badly documented behaviour of the **netfilter/iptables** project and should definitely be more highlighted. In other words, a huge warning is in it's place for this kind of behaviour on your firewall.

Note that there is some troubles with the above rules and bad Microsoft TCP/IP implementations. The above rules will lead to certain conditions where packets generated by microsoft products gets labeled as a state **NEW** and hence get logged and dropped. It will however not lead to broken connections to my knowledge. The matter is that when a connection gets closed and the final *FIN/ACK* has been sent and the state machine of **netfilter** has closed this connection and it is no longer in the conntrack table. At this point the faulty Microsoft implementation sends another packet which is considered as state **NEW** but lacks the *SYN* bit and hence gets matched by the above rules. In other words, don't worry to much about this rule, or if you are worried anyways, set the **-log-headers** option to the rule and log the headers too and you'll get a better look at what the packet looks like.

There is one more known problem with these rules. If someone is currently connected to the firewall, lets say from the *LAN*, and you have the script set to be activated when running a *PPP* connection. In this case, when you start the *PPP* connection, the person previously connected

through the LAN will be more or less killed. This only applies when you are running with the conntrack and nat codebases as modules, and the modules are loaded and unloaded each time you run the script. Another way to get this problem is to run the rc.firewall.txt script from a telnet connection from a host not on the actual firewall. To put it simple, you connect with telnet or some other stream connection. Start the connection tracking modules, then load the **NEW** not *SYN* packet rules. Finally, the telnet client or daemon tries to send something. the connection tracking code will not recognise this connection as a legal connection since it has not seen packets in any direction on this connection. Hence, the packet will match to the rules and be logged and afterwards dropped to the ground.

Internet Service Providers who use assigned IP addresses

I have added this since a friend of mine told me something I have totally forgotten. Certain stupid Internet Service Providers use IP addresses assigned by *IANA* for their local networks on which you connect to. For example, the swedish Internet Service Provider and phone monopoly Telia uses this approach for example on their *DNS* servers, which uses the 10.x.x.x IP address range. The problem you will most probably run into is that we, in this script, do not allow connections from any IP addresses in the 10.x.x.x range to us, because of spoofing possibilities. Well, here is unfortunately an example where you actually might have to lift a bit on those rules. You might just insert an **ACCEPT** rule above the spoof section to allow traffic from those *DNS* servers, or you could just comment out that part of the script. This is how it might look:

/usr/local/sbin/iptables -t nat -I PREROUTING -i eth1 -s 10.0.0.1/32 -j ACCEPT

I would like to take my moment to bitch at these Internet Service Providers. These IP address ranges are not assigned for you to use for dumb stuff like this, at least not to my knowledge. For large corporate sites it is more than ok, or your own home network, but you are not supposed to force us to open up ourself just because of some whince of yours.

Letting DHCP requests through a iptables

This is a fairly simple task really, once you get to know how *DHCP* works, however, you must be a little bit cautious with what you do let in and what you do not let in. First of all, we should know that *DHCP* works over the *UDP* protocol. Hence, this is the first thing to look for. Second, we should check which interface we get and send the request from. For example, if our *eth0* interface is set up with *DHCP*, we should not allow *DHCP* requests on *eth1*. To make the rule a bit more specific, we only allow the actual *UDP* ports used by *DHCP*, which should be ports 67 and 68. These are the criterions that we choose to match packets on, and that we allow. The rule would now look like this:

\$IPTABLES -I INPUT -i \$LAN_IFACE -p udp -dport 67:68 -sport 67:68 -j ACCEPT Do note that we allow all trafic to and from *UDP* port 67 and 68 now, however, this should not be such a huge problem since it only allows requests from hosts doing the connection from port 67 or 68 as well. This rule could, of course, be even more restrictive, but it should be enough to actually accept all *DHCP* requests and updates without opening up too large holes. If you are concerned, this rule could of course be made even more restrictive.

mIRC DCC problems

mIRC uses a special setting which allows it to connect through a firewall and to make DCC connections work properly without the firewall knowing about it. If this option is used together with iptables and specifically the ip_conntrack_irc and ip_nat_irc modules, it will simply not work. The problem is that mIRC will automatically NAT the inside of the packets for you, and when the packet reaches the firewall, the firewall will simply not know how and what to do with it. mIRC does not expect the firewall to be smart enough to take care of this by itself by simply querying the IRC server for its IP address and sending DCC requests with that address instead.

Turning on the "I am behind a firewall" configuration option and using the ip_conntrack_irc and ip_nat_irc modules will result in netfilter creating log entries with the following content "Forged DCC send packet".

The simplest possible solution is to just uncheck that configuration option in mIRC and let iptables do the work. This means, that you should tell mIRC specifically that it is *not* behind a firewall.

Appendix C. ICMP types

This is a complete listing of all ICMP types:

Table C-1. ICMP types

TYPE	CODE	Description	Query	Error
0	0	Echo Reply	х	
3	0	Network Unreachable		x
3	1	Host Unreachable		x
3	2	Protocol Unreachable		x
3	3	Port Unreachable		x
3	4	Fragmentation needed but no frag. bit set		x
3	5	Source routing failed		x
3	6	Destination network unknown		x
3	7	Destination host unknown		x
3	8	Source host isolated (obsolete)		x
3	9	Destination network administratively prohibited		x
3	10	Destination host administratively prohibited		x
3	11	Network unreachable for TOS		x
3	12	Host unreachable for TOS		x
3	13	Communication administratively prohibited by filtering		х
3	14	Host precedence violation		x
3	15	Precedence cutoff in effect		x
4	0	Source quench		
5	0	Redirect for network		
5	1	Redirect for host		
5	2	Redirect for TOS and network		
5	3	Redirect for TOS and host		
8	0	Echo request	x	
9	0	Router advertisement		
10	0	Route sollicitation		
11	0	TTL equals 0 during transit		x
11	1	TTL equals 0 during reassembly		x
12	0	IP header bad (catchall error)		x
12	1	Required options missing		х

TYPE	CODE	Description	Query	Error
13	0	Timestamp request (obsolete)	х	
14		Timestamp reply (obsolete)	x	
15	0	Information request (obsolete)	x	
16	0	Information reply (obsolete)	x	
17	0	Address mask request	x	
18	0	Address mask reply	x	

Appendix D. Other resources and links

Here is a list of links to resources and where I have gotten information from, etc :

- ip-sysctl.txt (http://www.boingworld.com/workshops/linux/iptables-tutorial/other/ip-sysctl.txt) from the 2.4.14 kernel. A little bit short but a good reference for the IP networking controls and what they do to the kernel.
- ip_dynaddr.txt

(http://www.boingworld.com/workshops/linux/iptables-tutorial/other/ip_dynaddr.txt) - from the 2.4.14 kernel. A really short reference to the ip_dynaddr settings available via sysctl and the proc filesystem.

- iptables.8 (http://www.boingworld.com/workshops/linux/iptables-tutorial/other/iptables.html) -The iptables 1.2.4 man page. This is an HTML'ized version of the man page which is an excellent reference when reading/writing iptables rulesets. Always have it at hand.
- http://netfilter.filewatcher.org/ The official netfilter and iptables site. It is a must for everyone wanting to set up iptables and netfilter in linux.
- http://netfilter.filewatcher.org/netfilter-faq.html The official netfilter Frequently Asked Questions. Also a good place to stat at when wondering what iptables and netfilter is about.
- http://netfilter.filewatcher.org/unreliable-guides/packet-filtering-HOWTO/index.html Rusty Russells Unreliable Guide to packet filtering. Excellent documentation about basic packet filtering with iptables written by one of the core developers of iptables and netfilter.
- http://netfilter.filewatcher.org/unreliable-guides/NAT-HOWTO/index.html Rusty Russells Unreliable Guide to Network Address Translation. Excellent documentation about *Network Address Translation* in iptables and netfilter written by one of the core developers, Rusty Russell.
- http://netfilter.filewatcher.org/unreliable-guides/netfilter-hacking-HOWTO/index.html Rusty Russells Unreliable Netfilter Hacking HOWTO. One of the few documentations on how to write code in the netfilter and iptables userspace and kernel space codebase. This was also written by Rusty Russell.
- http://www.linuxguruz.org/iptables/ Excellent linkpage with links to most of the pages on the internet about **iptables** and **netfilter**. Also maintains a list of different *iptables scripts* for different purposes.
- http://www.islandsoft.net/veerapen.html Excellent discussion on automatic hardening of iptables and how to make small changes that will make your computer automatically add hostile sites to a special banlist in iptables.
- http://kalamazoolinux.org/presentations/20010417/conntrack.html This presentation contains an excellent explanation of the conntrack modules and their work in netfilter. If you are interested in more documentation on conntrack, this is a "must read".
- http://www.docum.org Excellent information about the CBQ, tc and the ip commands in Linux. One of the few sites that has any information at all about these programs. Maintained by Stef Coene.

http://lists.samba.org/mailman/listinfo/netfilter - The official netfilter mailing-list. Extremely
useful in case you have questions about something not covered in this document or any of
the other links here.

And of course the iptables source, documentation and individuals who helped me.

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And of course everyone else I talked to and asked for comments on this file, sorry for not mentioning everyone.

Appendix F. History

Version 1.1.10 (12 April 2002) http://www.boingworld.com/workshops/linux/iptables-tutorial/ By: Oskar Andreasson Contributors: Jelle Kalf, Theodore Alexandrov, Paul Corbett, Rodrigo Rubira Branco, Alistair Tonner, Matthew G. Marsh, Uwe Dippel, Evan Nemerson and Marcel J.E. Mol.

Version 1.1.9 (21 March 2002) http://www.boingworld.com/workshops/linux/iptables-tutorial/ By: Oskar Andreasson Contributors: Vince Herried, Togan Muftuoglu, Galen Johnson, Kelly Ashe, Janne Johansson, Thomas Smets, Peter Horst, Mitch Landers, Neil Jolly, Jelle Kalf, Jason Lam and Evan Nemerson.

Version 1.1.8 (5 March 2002) http://www.boingworld.com/workshops/linux/iptables-tutorial/ By: Oskar Andreasson

Version 1.1.7 (4 February 2002) http://www.boingworld.com/workshops/linux/iptables-tutorial/ By: Oskar Andreasson Contributors: Parimi Ravi, Phil Schultz, Steven McClintoc, Bill Dossett, Dave Wreski, Erik Sjölund, Adam Mansbridge, Vasoo Veerapen, Aladdin and Rusty Russell.

Version 1.1.6 (7 December 2001) http://people.unix-fu.org/andreasson/ By: Oskar Andreasson Contributors: Jim Ramsey, Phil Schultz, Göran Båge, Doug Monroe, Jasper Aikema, Kurt Lieber, Chris Tallon, Chris Martin, Jonas Pasche, Jan Labanowski, Rodrigo R. Branco, Jacco van Koll and Dave Wreski.

Version 1.1.5 (14 November 2001) http://people.unix-fu.org/andreasson/ By: Oskar Andreasson Contributors: Fabrice Marie, Merijn Schering and Kurt Lieber.

Version 1.1.4 (6 November 2001) http://people.unix-fu.org/andreasson By: Oskar Andreasson Contributors: Stig W. Jensen, Steve Hnizdur, Chris Pluta and Kurt Lieber.

Version 1.1.3 (9 October 2001) http://people.unix-fu.org/andreasson By: Oskar Andreasson Contributors: Joni Chu, N.Emile Akabi-Davis and Jelle Kalf.

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Appendix I. Example scripts codebase

Example rc.firewall script

```
#!/bin/sh
#
# rc.firewall - Initial SIMPLE IP Firewall script for Linux 2.4.x and iptables
#
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#
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# Place, Suite 330, Boston, MA 02111-1307 USA
#
#
# 1. Configuration options.
#
#
# 1.1 Internet Configuration.
#
INET IP="194.236.50.155"
INET IFACE="eth0"
#
# 1.1.1 DHCP
#
#
# 1.1.2 PPPoE
#
```

1.2 Local Area Network configuration. # # your LAN's IP range and localhost IP. /24 means to only use the first 24 # bits of the 32 bit IP adress. the same as netmask 255.255.255.0 # LAN IP="192.168.0.2" LAN_IP_RANGE="192.168.0.0/16" LAN _BCAST_ADRESS="192.168.255.255" LAN IFACE="eth1" # # 1.3 DMZ Configuration. # # # 1.4 Localhost Configuration. # LO_IFACE="lo" LO IP="127.0.0.1" # # 1.5 IPTables Configuration. # IPTABLES="/usr/sbin/iptables" # # 1.6 Other Configuration. # # # 2. Module loading. # # # Needed to initially load modules # /sbin/depmod -a # # 2.1 Required modules

```
/sbin/modprobe ip tables
/sbin/modprobe ip_conntrack
/sbin/modprobe iptable_filter
/sbin/modprobe iptable mangle
/sbin/modprobe iptable_nat
/sbin/modprobe ipt_LOG
/sbin/modprobe ipt limit
/sbin/modprobe ipt state
#
# 2.2 Non-Required modules
#
#/sbin/modprobe ipt_owner
#/sbin/modprobe ipt REJECT
#/sbin/modprobe ipt_MASQUERADE
#/sbin/modprobe ip_conntrack_ftp
#/sbin/modprobe ip_conntrack_irc
#
# 3. /proc set up.
#
#
# 3.1 Required proc configuration
#
echo "1" > /proc/sys/net/ipv4/ip_forward
#
# 3.2 Non-Required proc configuration
#
#echo "1" > /proc/sys/net/ipv4/conf/all/rp_filter
#echo "1" > /proc/sys/net/ipv4/conf/all/proxy arp
#echo "1" > /proc/sys/net/ipv4/ip dynaddr
#
# 4. rules set up.
#
######
# 4.1 Filter table
#
#
```

```
# 4.1.1 Set policies
#
$IPTABLES -P INPUT DROP
$IPTABLES -P OUTPUT DROP
$IPTABLES -P FORWARD DROP
#
# 4.1.2 Create userspecified chains
#
#
# Create chain for bad tcp packets
#
$IPTABLES -N bad_tcp_packets
#
# Create separate chains for ICMP, TCP and UDP to traverse
#
$IPTABLES -N allowed
$IPTABLES -N icmp packets
$IPTABLES -N tcp_packets
$IPTABLES -N udpincoming_packets
#
# 4.1.3 Create content in userspecified chains
#
#
# bad_tcp_packets chain
#
$IPTABLES - A bad_tcp_packets -p tcp ! -syn -m state -state NEW -j LOG \
-log-prefix "New not syn:"
$IPTABLES -A bad_tcp_packets -p tcp ! -syn -m state -state NEW -j DROP
#
# allowed chain
#
$IPTABLES -A allowed -p TCP -syn -j ACCEPT
$IPTABLES -A allowed -p TCP -m state -state ESTABLISHED, RELATED -j ACCEPT
$IPTABLES - A allowed -p TCP -j DROP
#
# TCP rules
```

\$IPTABLES - A tcp_packets -p TCP -s 0/0 -dport 21 -j allowed \$IPTABLES -A tcp packets -p TCP -s 0/0 -dport 22 -j allowed \$IPTABLES -A tcp_packets -p TCP -s 0/0 -dport 80 -j allowed \$IPTABLES - A tcp_packets -p TCP -s 0/0 -dport 113 -j allowed # # UDP ports # #\$IPTABLES -A udpincoming_packets -p UDP -s 0/0 -destination-port 53 -j ACCEPT #\$IPTABLES -A udpincoming packets -p UDP -s 0/0 -destination-port 123 -j ACCEPT \$IPTABLES -A udpincoming_packets -p UDP -s 0/0 -destination-port 2074 -j ACCEPT \$IPTABLES -A udpincoming packets -p UDP -s 0/0 -destination-port 4000 -j ACCEPT # # ICMP rules # \$IPTABLES - A icmp packets -p ICMP -s 0/0 - icmp-type 8 - j ACCEPT \$IPTABLES - A icmp packets -p ICMP -s 0/0 - icmp-type 11 -j ACCEPT # # 4.1.4 INPUT chain # # # Bad TCP packets we don't want. # \$IPTABLES - A INPUT -p tcp -j bad_tcp_packets # # Rules for special networks not part of the Internet # \$IPTABLES -A INPUT -p ALL -i \$LAN_IFACE -s \$LAN_IP_RANGE -j ACCEPT \$IPTABLES -A INPUT -p ALL -i \$LO_IFACE -s \$LO_IP -j ACCEPT \$IPTABLES - A INPUT -p ALL -i \$LO IFACE -s \$LAN IP -j ACCEPT \$IPTABLES -A INPUT -p ALL -i \$LO_IFACE -s \$INET_IP -j ACCEPT \$IPTABLES -A INPUT -p ALL -i \$LAN_IFACE -d \$LAN_BCAST_ADRESS -j ACCEPT # # Rules for incoming packets from the internet.

\$IPTABLES -A INPUT -p ALL -d \$INET_IP -m state -state ESTABLISHED, RELATED \

```
-j ACCEPT
$IPTABLES -A INPUT -p TCP -i $INET_IFACE -j tcp_packets
$IPTABLES -A INPUT -p UDP -i $INET_IFACE -j udpincoming_packets
$IPTABLES -A INPUT -p ICMP -i $INET_IFACE -j icmp_packets
#
# Log weird packets that don't match the above.
#
$IPTABLES - A INPUT -m limit -limit 3/minute -limit-burst 3 -j LOG \
-log-level DEBUG -log-prefix "IPT INPUT packet died: "
#
# 4.1.5 FORWARD chain
#
#
# Bad TCP packets we don't want
#
$IPTABLES - A FORWARD - p tcp - j bad_tcp_packets
#
# Accept the packets we actually want to forward
#
$IPTABLES - A FORWARD - i $LAN IFACE - j ACCEPT
$IPTABLES - A FORWARD - m state - state ESTABLISHED, RELATED - j ACCEPT
#
# Log weird packets that don't match the above.
#
$IPTABLES - A FORWARD - m limit - limit 3/minute - limit-burst 3 - j LOG \
-log-level DEBUG -log-prefix "IPT FORWARD packet died: "
#
# 4.1.6 OUTPUT chain
#
#
# Bad TCP packets we don't want.
#
$IPTABLES - A OUTPUT -p tcp -j bad_tcp_packets
#
# Special OUTPUT rules to decide which IP's to allow.
```

\$IPTABLES -A OUTPUT -p ALL -s \$LO_IP -j ACCEPT \$IPTABLES -A OUTPUT -p ALL -s \$LAN_IP -j ACCEPT \$IPTABLES -A OUTPUT -p ALL -s \$INET_IP -j ACCEPT # # Log weird packets that don't match the above. # \$IPTABLES -A OUTPUT -m limit -limit 3/minute -limit-burst 3 -j LOG \ -log-level DEBUG -log-prefix "IPT OUTPUT packet died: " ###### # 4.2 nat table # # # 4.2.1 Set policies # # # 4.2.2 Create user specified chains # # # 4.2.3 Create content in user specified chains # # # 4.2.4 PREROUTING chain # # # 4.2.5 POSTROUTING chain # # # Enable simple IP Forwarding and Network Address Translation # \$IPTABLES -t nat -A POSTROUTING -o \$INET_IFACE -j SNAT -to-source \$INET_IP # # 4.2.6 OUTPUT chain #

```
# 4.3 mangle table
#
#
# 4.3.1 Set policies
#
#
# 4.3.2 Create user specified chains
#
#
# 4.3.3 Create content in user specified chains
#
#
# 4.3.4 PREROUTING chain
#
#
# 4.3.5 INPUT chain
#
#
# 4.3.6 FORWARD chain
#
#
# 4.3.7 OUTPUT chain
#
#
# 4.3.8 POSTROUTING chain
#
```

Example rc.DMZ.firewall script

```
#!/bin/sh
#
# rc.DMZ.firewall - DMZ IP Firewall script for Linux 2.4.x and iptables
#
# Copyright (C) 2001 Oskar Andreasson <bluefluxATkoffeinDOTnet>
#
```

```
# This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
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#
# This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
# but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
# MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
# GNU General Public License for more details.
#
# You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
# along with this program or from the site that you downloaded it
# from; if not, write to the Free Software Foundation, Inc., 59 Temple
# Place, Suite 330, Boston, MA 02111-1307 USA
#
#
# 1. Configuration options.
#
#
# 1.1 Internet Configuration.
#
INET IP="194.236.50.152"
HTTP IP="194.236.50.153"
DNS IP="194.236.50.154"
INET_IFACE="eth0"
#
# 1.1.1 DHCP
#
#
# 1.1.2 PPPoE
#
#
# 1.2 Local Area Network configuration.
#
# your LAN's IP range and localhost IP. /24 means to only use the first 24
# bits of the 32 bit IP adress, the same as netmask 255,255,255,0
#
LAN IP="192.168.0.2"
LAN_IP_RANGE="192.168.0.0/16"
LAN BCAST ADRESS="192.168.255.255"
```

```
LAN_IFACE="eth1"
```

```
#
# 1.3 DMZ Configuration.
#
DMZ_HTTP_IP="192.168.1.2"
DMZ_DNS_IP="192.168.1.3"
DMZ IP="192.168.1.1"
DMZ_IFACE="eth2"
#
# 1.4 Localhost Configuration.
#
LO IFACE="lo"
LO_IP="127.0.0.1"
#
# 1.5 IPTables Configuration.
#
IPTABLES="/usr/sbin/iptables"
#
# 1.6 Other Configuration.
#
#
# 2. Module loading.
#
#
# Needed to initially load modules
#
/sbin/depmod -a
#
# 2.1 Required modules
```

```
#
```

/sbin/modprobe ip_tables /sbin/modprobe ip_conntrack /sbin/modprobe iptable_filter /sbin/modprobe iptable_mangle /sbin/modprobe iptable_nat

```
/sbin/modprobe ipt LOG
/sbin/modprobe ipt_limit
/sbin/modprobe ipt_state
#
# 2.2 Non-Required modules
#
#/sbin/modprobe ipt_owner
#/sbin/modprobe ipt_REJECT
#/sbin/modprobe ipt MASQUERADE
#/sbin/modprobe ip_conntrack_ftp
#/sbin/modprobe ip_conntrack_irc
#
# 3. /proc set up.
#
#
# 3.1 Required proc configuration
#
echo "1" > /proc/sys/net/ipv4/ip_forward
#
# 3.2 Non-Required proc configuration
#
#echo "1" > /proc/sys/net/ipv4/conf/all/rp_filter
#echo "1" > /proc/sys/net/ipv4/conf/all/proxy_arp
#echo "1" > /proc/sys/net/ipv4/ip_dynaddr
#
# 4. rules set up.
#
######
# 4.1 Filter table
#
#
# 4.1.1 Set policies
#
$IPTABLES -P INPUT DROP
$IPTABLES -P OUTPUT DROP
```

```
$IPTABLES -P FORWARD DROP
#
# 4.1.2 Create userspecified chains
#
#
# Create chain for bad tcp packets
#
$IPTABLES -N bad tcp packets
#
# Create separate chains for ICMP, TCP and UDP to traverse
#
$IPTABLES -N allowed
$IPTABLES -N icmp_packets
$IPTABLES -N tcp_packets
$IPTABLES -N udpincoming packets
#
# 4.1.3 Create content in userspecified chains
#
#
# bad_tcp_packets chain
#
$IPTABLES - A bad_tcp_packets -p tcp ! -syn -m state -state NEW -j LOG \
-log-prefix "New not syn:"
$IPTABLES - A bad_tcp_packets -p tcp ! -syn -m state -state NEW -j DROP
#
# allowed chain
#
$IPTABLES -A allowed -p TCP -syn -j ACCEPT
$IPTABLES -A allowed -p TCP -m state -state ESTABLISHED, RELATED -j ACCEPT
$IPTABLES -A allowed -p TCP -j DROP
#
# ICMP rules
#
# Changed rules totally
$IPTABLES -A icmp_packets -p ICMP -s 0/0 -icmp-type 8 -j ACCEPT
$IPTABLES - A icmp_packets -p ICMP -s 0/0 - icmp-type 11 -j ACCEPT
```

```
#
# 4.1.4 INPUT chain
#
#
# Bad TCP packets we don't want
#
$IPTABLES -A INPUT -p tcp -j bad_tcp_packets
#
# Packets from the Internet to this box
#
$IPTABLES -A INPUT -p ICMP -i $INET_IFACE -j icmp_packets
#
# Packets from LAN, DMZ or LOCALHOST
#
#
# From DMZ Interface to DMZ firewall IP
#
$IPTABLES -A INPUT -p ALL -i $DMZ_IFACE -d $DMZ_IP -j ACCEPT
#
# From LAN Interface to LAN firewall IP
#
$IPTABLES - A INPUT -p ALL -i $LAN IFACE -d $LAN IP -i ACCEPT
$IPTABLES -A INPUT -p ALL -i $LAN IFACE -d $LAN BCAST ADRESS -j ACCEPT
#
# From Localhost interface to Localhost IP's
#
$IPTABLES -A INPUT -p ALL -i $LO_IFACE -s $LO_IP -j ACCEPT
$IPTABLES -A INPUT -p ALL -i $LO IFACE -s $LAN IP -j ACCEPT
$IPTABLES -A INPUT -p ALL -i $LO_IFACE -s $INET_IP -j ACCEPT
#
# All established and related packets incoming from the internet to the
# firewall
#
$IPTABLES -A INPUT -p ALL -d $INET_IP -m state = state ESTABLISHED, RELATED \
```

```
-i ACCEPT
#
# Log weird packets that don't match the above.
#
$IPTABLES - A INPUT -m limit -limit 3/minute -limit-burst 3 -j LOG \
-log-level DEBUG -log-prefix "IPT INPUT packet died: "
#
# 4.1.5 FORWARD chain
#
#
# Bad TCP packets we don't want
#
$IPTABLES - A FORWARD - p tcp - j bad_tcp_packets
#
# DMZ section
#
# General rules
#
$IPTABLES - A FORWARD - i $DMZ IFACE - o $INET IFACE - i ACCEPT
$IPTABLES - A FORWARD - i $INET_IFACE - o $DMZ_IFACE - m state \
-state ESTABLISHED, RELATED -j ACCEPT
$IPTABLES -A FORWARD -i $LAN IFACE -o $DMZ IFACE -i ACCEPT
$IPTABLES - A FORWARD - i $DMZ_IFACE - o $LAN_IFACE - j ACCEPT
#
# HTTP server
#
$IPTABLES -A FORWARD -p TCP -i $INET IFACE -o $DMZ IFACE -d $DMZ HTTP IP \
-dport 80 -j allowed
$IPTABLES -A FORWARD -p ICMP -i $INET_IFACE -o $DMZ_IFACE -d $DMZ_HTTP_IP \
-j icmp_packets
#
# DNS server
#
$IPTABLES -A FORWARD -p TCP -i $INET_IFACE -o $DMZ_IFACE -d $DMZ_DNS_IP \
-dport 53 -j allowed
$IPTABLES -A FORWARD -p UDP -i $INET_IFACE -o $DMZ_IFACE -d $DMZ_DNS_IP \
```

```
-dport 53 -j ACCEPT
$IPTABLES -A FORWARD -p ICMP -i $INET_IFACE -o $DMZ_IFACE -d $DMZ_DNS_IP \
-j icmp_packets
#
# LAN section
#
$IPTABLES - A FORWARD - i $LAN IFACE - j ACCEPT
$IPTABLES -A FORWARD -m state -state ESTABLISHED, RELATED -j ACCEPT
#
# Log weird packets that don't match the above.
#
$IPTABLES - A FORWARD -m limit -limit 3/minute -limit-burst 3 -j LOG \
-log-level DEBUG -log-prefix "IPT FORWARD packet died: "
#
# 4.1.6 OUTPUT chain
#
#
# Bad TCP packets we don't want.
#
$IPTABLES -A OUTPUT -p tcp -j bad_tcp_packets
#
# Special OUTPUT rules to decide which IP's to allow.
#
$IPTABLES - A OUTPUT -p ALL -s $LO IP -j ACCEPT
$IPTABLES -A OUTPUT -p ALL -s $LAN_IP -j ACCEPT
$IPTABLES -A OUTPUT -p ALL -s $INET_IP -j ACCEPT
#
# Log weird packets that don't match the above.
#
$IPTABLES -A OUTPUT -m limit -limit 3/minute -limit-burst 3 -j LOG \
-log-level DEBUG -log-prefix "IPT OUTPUT packet died: "
######
# 4.2 nat table
#
#
```

```
# 4.2.1 Set policies
#
#
# 4.2.2 Create user specified chains
#
#
# 4.2.3 Create content in user specified chains
#
#
# 4.2.4 PREROUTING chain
#
$IPTABLES -t nat -A PREROUTING -p TCP -i $INET_IFACE -d $HTTP_IP -dport 80 \
-j DNAT -to-destination $DMZ_HTTP_IP
$IPTABLES -t nat -A PREROUTING -p TCP -i $INET_IFACE -d $DNS_IP -dport 53 \
-j DNAT -to-destination $DMZ_DNS_IP
$IPTABLES -t nat -A PREROUTING -p UDP -i $INET_IFACE -d $DNS_IP -dport 53 \
-j DNAT -to-destination $DMZ_DNS_IP
#
# 4.2.5 POSTROUTING chain
#
#
# Enable simple IP Forwarding and Network Address Translation
#
$IPTABLES -t nat -A POSTROUTING -o $INET_IFACE -j SNAT -to-source $INET_IP
#
# 4.2.6 OUTPUT chain
#
######
# 4.3 mangle table
#
#
# 4.3.1 Set policies
#
#
# 4.3.2 Create user specified chains
#
```

```
#
# 4.3.3 Create content in user specified chains
#
#
# 4.3.4 PREROUTING chain
#
#
# 4.3.5 INPUT chain
#
#
# 4.3.6 FORWARD chain
#
#
# 4.3.7 OUTPUT chain
#
#
# 4.3.8 POSTROUTING chain
#
```

Example rc.UTIN.firewall script

#!/bin/sh # # rc.firewall - UTIN Firewall script for Linux 2.4.x and iptables # # Copyright (C) 2001 Oskar Andreasson < bluefluxATkoffeinDOTnet> # # This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify # it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by # the Free Software Foundation; version 2 of the License. # # This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, # but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of # MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the # GNU General Public License for more details. # # You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License

```
# from; if not, write to the Free Software Foundation, Inc., 59 Temple
# Place, Suite 330, Boston, MA 02111-1307 USA
#
#
# 1. Configuration options.
#
#
# 1.1 Internet Configuration.
#
INET_IP="194.236.50.155"
INET IFACE="eth0"
#
# 1.1.1 DHCP
#
#
# 1.1.2 PPPoE
#
#
# 1.2 Local Area Network configuration.
#
# your LAN's IP range and localhost IP. /24 means to only use the first 24
# bits of the 32 bit IP adress. the same as netmask 255.255.255.0
#
LAN IP="192.168.0.2"
LAN_IP_RANGE="192.168.0.0/16"
LAN_BCAST_ADRESS="192.168.255.255"
LAN_IFACE="eth1"
#
# 1.3 DMZ Configuration.
#
#
# 1.4 Localhost Configuration.
#
LO_IFACE="lo"
LO_IP="127.0.0.1"
```

1.5 IPTables Configuration. # IPTABLES="/usr/sbin/iptables" # # 1.6 Other Configuration. # # # 2. Module loading. # # # Needed to initially load modules # /sbin/depmod -a # # 2.1 Required modules # /sbin/modprobe ip tables /sbin/modprobe ip_conntrack /sbin/modprobe iptable_filter /sbin/modprobe iptable_mangle /sbin/modprobe iptable_nat /sbin/modprobe ipt_LOG /sbin/modprobe ipt_limit /sbin/modprobe ipt_state # # 2.2 Non-Required modules # #/sbin/modprobe ipt_owner #/sbin/modprobe ipt_REJECT #/sbin/modprobe ipt_MASQUERADE #/sbin/modprobe ip_conntrack_ftp #/sbin/modprobe ip_conntrack_irc # # 3. /proc set up.

```
#
# 3.1 Required proc configuration
#
echo "1" > /proc/sys/net/ipv4/ip_forward
#
# 3.2 Non-Required proc configuration
#
#echo "1" > /proc/sys/net/ipv4/conf/all/rp filter
#echo "1" > /proc/sys/net/ipv4/conf/all/proxy_arp
#echo "1" > /proc/sys/net/ipv4/ip_dynaddr
#
# 4. rules set up.
#
######
# 4.1 Filter table
#
#
# 4.1.1 Set policies
#
$IPTABLES -P INPUT DROP
$IPTABLES -P OUTPUT DROP
$IPTABLES -P FORWARD DROP
#
# 4.1.2 Create userspecified chains
#
#
# Create chain for bad tcp packets
#
$IPTABLES -N bad_tcp_packets
#
# Create separate chains for ICMP, TCP and UDP to traverse
#
$IPTABLES -N allowed
$IPTABLES -N icmp packets
$IPTABLES -N tcp_packets
```

```
$IPTABLES -N udpincoming packets
#
# 4.1.3 Create content in userspecified chains
#
#
# bad tcp packets chain
#
$IPTABLES - A bad tcp packets -p tcp ! -syn -m state -state NEW -j LOG \
-log-prefix "New not syn:"
$IPTABLES - A bad_tcp_packets -p tcp ! -syn -m state -state NEW -j DROP
#
# allowed chain
#
$IPTABLES - A allowed -p TCP -syn -j ACCEPT
$IPTABLES -A allowed -p TCP -m state -state ESTABLISHED.RELATED -j ACCEPT
$IPTABLES -A allowed -p TCP -j DROP
#
# TCP rules
#
$IPTABLES -A tcp packets -p TCP -s 0/0 -dport 21 -i allowed
$IPTABLES - A tcp_packets -p TCP -s 0/0 -dport 22 -j allowed
$IPTABLES -A tcp_packets -p TCP -s 0/0 -dport 80 -j allowed
$IPTABLES - A tcp_packets -p TCP -s 0/0 -dport 113 -j allowed
#
# UDP ports
#
#$IPTABLES -A udpincoming packets -p UDP -s 0/0 -source-port 53 -j ACCEPT
#$IPTABLES - A udpincoming packets -p UDP -s 0/0 -source-port 123 -j ACCEPT
$IPTABLES -A udpincoming_packets -p UDP -s 0/0 -source-port 2074 -j ACCEPT
$IPTABLES -A udpincoming_packets -p UDP -s 0/0 -source-port 4000 -j ACCEPT
#
# ICMP rules
#
$IPTABLES - A icmp_packets -p ICMP -s 0/0 - icmp-type 8 -j ACCEPT
$IPTABLES - A icmp_packets -p ICMP -s 0/0 - icmp-type 11 -j ACCEPT
```

```
# 4.1.4 INPUT chain
#
#
# Bad TCP packets we don't want.
#
$IPTABLES - A INPUT -p tcp -j bad_tcp_packets
#
# Rules for special networks not part of the Internet
#
$IPTABLES -A INPUT -p ALL -i $LO_IFACE -s $LO_IP -j ACCEPT
$IPTABLES -A INPUT -p ALL -i $LO IFACE -s $LAN IP -j ACCEPT
$IPTABLES -A INPUT -p ALL -i $LO_IFACE -s $INET_IP -j ACCEPT
#
# Rules for incoming packets from anywhere.
#
$IPTABLES -A INPUT -p ALL -d $INET IP -m state -state ESTABLISHED, RELATED \
-i ACCEPT
$IPTABLES - A INPUT -p TCP -j tcp_packets
$IPTABLES - A INPUT - p UDP - j udpincoming packets
$IPTABLES - A INPUT - p ICMP - j icmp_packets
#
# Log weird packets that don't match the above.
#
$IPTABLES -A INPUT -m limit -limit 3/minute -limit-burst 3 -j LOG \
-log-level DEBUG -log-prefix "IPT INPUT packet died: "
#
# 4.1.5 FORWARD chain
#
#
# Bad TCP packets we don't want
#
$IPTABLES - A FORWARD - p tcp - j bad_tcp_packets
#
# Accept the packets we actually want to forward
#
```

```
$IPTABLES - A FORWARD -p tcp -dport 21 -i $LAN IFACE -j ACCEPT
$IPTABLES - A FORWARD -p tcp -dport 80 -i $LAN_IFACE -j ACCEPT
$IPTABLES - A FORWARD -p tcp -dport 110 -i $LAN_IFACE -j ACCEPT
$IPTABLES - A FORWARD - m state - state ESTABLISHED, RELATED - j ACCEPT
#
# Log weird packets that don't match the above.
#
$IPTABLES - A FORWARD -m limit -limit 3/minute -limit-burst 3 -j LOG \
-log-level DEBUG -log-prefix "IPT FORWARD packet died: "
#
# 4.1.6 OUTPUT chain
#
#
# Bad TCP packets we don't want.
#
$IPTABLES - A OUTPUT -p tcp -j bad_tcp_packets
#
# Special OUTPUT rules to decide which IP's to allow.
#
$IPTABLES -A OUTPUT -p ALL -s $LO_IP -j ACCEPT
$IPTABLES -A OUTPUT -p ALL -s $LAN_IP -j ACCEPT
$IPTABLES -A OUTPUT -p ALL -s $INET_IP -j ACCEPT
#
# Log weird packets that don't match the above.
#
$IPTABLES - A OUTPUT -m limit -limit 3/minute -limit-burst 3 -i LOG \
-log-level DEBUG -log-prefix "IPT OUTPUT packet died: "
######
# 4.2 nat table
#
#
# 4.2.1 Set policies
#
#
# 4.2.2 Create user specified chains
#
```

4.2.3 Create content in user specified chains # # # 4.2.4 PREROUTING chain # # # 4.2.5 POSTROUTING chain # # # Enable simple IP Forwarding and Network Address Translation # \$IPTABLES -t nat -A POSTROUTING -o \$INET_IFACE -j SNAT -to-source \$INET_IP # # 4.2.6 OUTPUT chain # ###### # 4.3 mangle table # # # 4.3.1 Set policies # # # 4.3.2 Create user specified chains # # # 4.3.3 Create content in user specified chains # # # 4.3.4 PREROUTING chain # # # 4.3.5 INPUT chain

```
# 4.3.6 FORWARD chain
#
# 4.3.7 OUTPUT chain
#
# 4.3.8 POSTROUTING chain
#
```

Example rc.DHCP.firewall script

```
#!/bin/sh
#
# rc.firewall - DHCP IP Firewall script for Linux 2.4.x and iptables
#
# Copyright (C) 2001 Oskar Andreasson < bluefluxATkoffeinDOTnet>
#
# This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
# it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
# the Free Software Foundation; version 2 of the License.
#
# This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
# but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
# MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
# GNU General Public License for more details.
#
# You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
# along with this program or from the site that you downloaded it
# from; if not, write to the Free Software Foundation, Inc., 59 Temple
# Place, Suite 330, Boston, MA 02111-1307 USA
#
#
# 1. Configuration options.
#
#
# 1.1 Internet Configuration.
#
```

```
INET IFACE="eth0"
#
# 1.1.1 DHCP
#
#
# Information pertaining to DHCP over the Internet, if needed.
#
# Set DHCP variable to no if you don't get IP from DHCP. If you get DHCP
# over the Internet set this variable to yes, and set up the proper IP
# adress for the DHCP server in the DHCP_SERVER variable.
#
DHCP="no"
DHCP_SERVER="195.22.90.65"
#
# 1.1.2 PPPoE
#
# Configuration options pertaining to PPPoE.
#
# If you have problem with your PPPoE connection, such as large mails not
# getting through while small mail get through properly etc, you may set
# this option to "yes" which may fix the problem. This option will set a
# rule in the PREROUTING chain of the mangle table which will clamp
# (resize) all routed packets to PMTU (Path Maximum Transmit Unit).
#
# Note that it is better to set this up in the PPPoE package itself, since
# the PPPoE configuration option will give less overhead.
#
PPPOE PMTU="no"
#
# 1.2 Local Area Network configuration.
#
# your LAN's IP range and localhost IP. /24 means to only use the first 24
# bits of the 32 bit IP adress, the same as netmask 255,255,255,0
#
LAN IP="192.168.0.2"
LAN IP RANGE="192.168.0.0/16"
LAN_BCAST_ADRESS="192.168.255.255"
LAN_IFACE="eth1"
```

```
# 1.3 DMZ Configuration.
#
#
# 1.4 Localhost Configuration.
#
LO IFACE="lo"
LO_IP="127.0.0.1"
#
# 1.5 IPTables Configuration.
#
IPTABLES="/usr/sbin/iptables"
#
# 1.6 Other Configuration.
#
#
# 2. Module loading.
#
#
# Needed to initially load modules
#
/sbin/depmod -a
#
# 2.1 Required modules
#
/sbin/modprobe ip_conntrack
/sbin/modprobe ip tables
/sbin/modprobe iptable_filter
/sbin/modprobe iptable_mangle
/sbin/modprobe iptable_nat
/sbin/modprobe ipt_LOG
/sbin/modprobe ipt_limit
/sbin/modprobe ipt_MASQUERADE
#
# 2.2 Non-Required modules
```

```
#
```

```
#/sbin/modprobe ipt owner
#/sbin/modprobe ipt_REJECT
#/sbin/modprobe ip_conntrack_ftp
#/sbin/modprobe ip_conntrack_irc
*****
#
# 3. /proc set up.
#
#
# 3.1 Required proc configuration
#
echo "1" > /proc/sys/net/ipv4/ip forward
#
# 3.2 Non-Required proc configuration
#
#echo "1" > /proc/sys/net/ipv4/conf/all/rp_filter
#echo "1" > /proc/sys/net/ipv4/conf/all/proxy arp
#echo "1" > /proc/sys/net/ipv4/ip_dynaddr
#
# 4. rules set up.
#
######
# 4.1 Filter table
#
#
# 4.1.1 Set policies
#
$IPTABLES -P INPUT DROP
$IPTABLES -P OUTPUT DROP
$IPTABLES -P FORWARD DROP
#
# 4.1.2 Create userspecified chains
#
#
# Create chain for bad tcp packets
#
```

```
$IPTABLES -N bad_tcp_packets
#
# Create separate chains for ICMP, TCP and UDP to traverse
#
$IPTABLES -N allowed
$IPTABLES -N icmp packets
$IPTABLES -N tcp_packets
$IPTABLES -N udpincoming packets
#
# 4.1.3 Create content in userspecified chains
#
#
# bad_tcp_packets chain
#
$IPTABLES - A bad_tcp_packets -p tcp ! -syn -m state -state NEW -j LOG \
-log-prefix "New not syn:"
$IPTABLES - A bad tcp packets -p tcp ! -syn -m state -state NEW -j DROP
#
# allowed chain
#
$IPTABLES -A allowed -p TCP -syn -j ACCEPT
$IPTABLES -A allowed -p TCP -m state -state ESTABLISHED, RELATED -j ACCEPT
$IPTABLES - A allowed -p TCP -j DROP
#
# TCP rules
#
$IPTABLES -A tcp packets -p TCP -s 0/0 -dport 21 -j allowed
$IPTABLES -A tcp_packets -p TCP -s 0/0 -dport 22 -j allowed
$IPTABLES -A tcp_packets -p TCP -s 0/0 -dport 80 -j allowed
$IPTABLES -A tcp_packets -p TCP -s 0/0 -dport 113 -j allowed
#
# UDP ports
#
$IPTABLES -A udpincoming_packets -p UDP -s 0/0 -source-port 53 -j ACCEPT
if [$DHCP == "yes"]; then
$IPTABLES - A udpincoming_packets -p UDP -s $DHCP_SERVER -sport 67 \
```

```
-dport 68 -j ACCEPT
fi
#$IPTABLES - A udpincoming_packets -p UDP -s 0/0 -source-port 53 -j ACCEPT
#$IPTABLES -A udpincoming packets -p UDP -s 0/0 -source-port 123 -j ACCEPT
$IPTABLES -A udpincoming packets -p UDP -s 0/0 -source-port 2074 -j ACCEPT
$IPTABLES -A udpincoming packets -p UDP -s 0/0 -source-port 4000 -j ACCEPT
#
# ICMP rules
#
$IPTABLES -A icmp_packets -p ICMP -s 0/0 -icmp-type 8 -j ACCEPT
$IPTABLES - A icmp_packets -p ICMP -s 0/0 - icmp-type 11 -j ACCEPT
#
# 4.1.4 INPUT chain
#
#
# Bad TCP packets we don't want.
#
$IPTABLES -A INPUT -p tcp -j bad_tcp_packets
#
# Rules for special networks not part of the Internet
#
$IPTABLES -A INPUT -p ALL -i $LAN IFACE -s $LAN IP RANGE -j ACCEPT
$IPTABLES - A INPUT -p ALL -i $LO_IFACE -j ACCEPT
$IPTABLES -A INPUT -p ALL -i $LAN_IFACE -d $LAN_BCAST_ADRESS -j ACCEPT
#
# Rules for incoming packets from the internet.
#
$IPTABLES -A INPUT -p ALL -i $INET_IFACE -m state = state ESTABLISHED, RELATED \
-j ACCEPT
$IPTABLES - A INPUT -p TCP -i $INET IFACE -j tcp packets
$IPTABLES -A INPUT -p UDP -i $INET_IFACE -j udpincoming_packets
$IPTABLES -A INPUT -p ICMP -i $INET_IFACE -j icmp_packets
#
# Log weird packets that don't match the above.
#
$IPTABLES -A INPUT -m limit -limit 3/minute -limit-burst 3 -j LOG \
```

```
-log-level DEBUG -log-prefix "IPT INPUT packet died: "
#
# 4.1.5 FORWARD chain
#
#
# Bad TCP packets we don't want
#
$IPTABLES - A FORWARD - p tcp - j bad_tcp_packets
#
# Accept the packets we actually want to forward
#
$IPTABLES - A FORWARD - i $LAN_IFACE - j ACCEPT
$IPTABLES - A FORWARD - m state - state ESTABLISHED, RELATED - j ACCEPT
#
# Log weird packets that don't match the above.
#
$IPTABLES - A FORWARD -m limit -limit 3/minute -limit-burst 3 -j LOG \
-log-level DEBUG -log-prefix "IPT FORWARD packet died: "
#
# 4.1.6 OUTPUT chain
#
#
# Bad TCP packets we don't want.
#
$IPTABLES - A OUTPUT -p tcp -j bad_tcp_packets
#
# Special OUTPUT rules to decide which IP's to allow.
#
$IPTABLES -A OUTPUT -p ALL -s $LO_IP -j ACCEPT
$IPTABLES -A OUTPUT -p ALL -s $LAN_IP -j ACCEPT
$IPTABLES - A OUTPUT - p ALL - o $INET_IFACE - j ACCEPT
#
# Log weird packets that don't match the above.
#
```

```
$IPTABLES -A OUTPUT -m limit -limit 3/minute -limit-burst 3 -j LOG \
-log-level DEBUG -log-prefix "IPT OUTPUT packet died: "
######
# 4.2 nat table
#
#
# 4.2.1 Set policies
#
#
# 4.2.2 Create user specified chains
#
#
# 4.2.3 Create content in user specified chains
#
#
# 4.2.4 PREROUTING chain
#
#
# 4.2.5 POSTROUTING chain
#
if [ $PPPOE_PMTU == "yes" ]; then
$IPTABLES -t nat -A POSTROUTING -p tcp -tcp-flags SYN,RST SYN \
-j TCPMSS -clamp-mss-to-pmtu
fi
$IPTABLES -t nat -A POSTROUTING -o $INET_IFACE -j MASQUERADE
#
# 4.2.6 OUTPUT chain
#
######
# 4.3 mangle table
#
#
# 4.3.1 Set policies
#
#
# 4.3.2 Create user specified chains
#
```

4.3.3 Create content in user specified chains # # # 4.3.4 PREROUTING chain # # # 4.3.5 INPUT chain # # # 4.3.6 FORWARD chain # # # 4.3.7 OUTPUT chain # # # 4.3.8 POSTROUTING chain

Example rc.flush-iptables script

#!/bin/sh # # rc.flush-iptables - Resets iptables to default values. # # Copyright (C) 2001 Oskar Andreasson < bluefluxATkoffeinDOTnet> # # This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify # it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by # the Free Software Foundation; version 2 of the License. # # This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, # but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of # MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the # GNU General Public License for more details. # # You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License

along with this program or from the site that you downloaded it # from; if not, write to the Free Software Foundation, Inc., 59 Temple # Place, Suite 330, Boston, MA 02111-1307 USA # # Configurations # IPTABLES="/usr/sbin/iptables" # # reset the default policies in the filter table. # **\$IPTABLES -P INPUT ACCEPT** \$IPTABLES -P FORWARD ACCEPT **\$IPTABLES -P OUTPUT ACCEPT** # # reset the default policies in the nat table. # **\$IPTABLES -t nat -P PREROUTING ACCEPT** \$IPTABLES -t nat -P POSTROUTING ACCEPT \$IPTABLES -t nat -P OUTPUT ACCEPT # # reset the default policies in the mangle table. # \$IPTABLES -t mangle -P PREROUTING ACCEPT \$IPTABLES -t mangle -P OUTPUT ACCEPT # # flush all the rules in the filter and nat tables. # **\$IPTABLES -F** \$IPTABLES -t nat -F \$IPTABLES -t mangle -F # # erase all chains that's not default in filter and nat table. # **\$IPTABLES -X**

\$IPTABLES -t nat -X \$IPTABLES -t mangle -X

Example rc.test-iptables script

#!/bin/bash # # rc.test-iptables - test script for iptables chains and tables. # Copyright (C) 2001 Oskar Andreasson < bluefluxATkoffeinDOTnet> # # This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify # it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by # the Free Software Foundation; version 2 of the License. # # This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, # but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of # MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the # GNU General Public License for more details. # # You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License # along with this program or from the site that you downloaded it # from; if not, write to the Free Software Foundation, Inc., 59 Temple # Place, Suite 330, Boston, MA 02111-1307 USA # # # Filter table, all chains # iptables -t filter -A INPUT -p icmp -icmp-type echo-request \ -j LOG -log-prefix="filter INPUT:" iptables -t filter -A INPUT -p icmp -icmp-type echo-reply \ -j LOG -log-prefix="filter INPUT:" iptables -t filter -A OUTPUT -p icmp -icmp-type echo-request \ -j LOG -log-prefix="filter OUTPUT:" iptables -t filter -A OUTPUT -p icmp -icmp-type echo-reply \ -j LOG -log-prefix="filter OUTPUT:" iptables -t filter -A FORWARD -p icmp -icmp-type echo-request \ -i LOG -log-prefix="filter FORWARD:" iptables -t filter -A FORWARD -p icmp -icmp-type echo-reply \ -i LOG -log-prefix="filter FORWARD:" # # NAT table, all chains except OUTPUT which don't work. # iptables -t nat -A PREROUTING -p icmp -icmp-type echo-request \

-j LOG –log-prefix="nat PREROUTING:"

iptables -t nat -A PREROUTING -p icmp -icmp-type echo-reply \

-j LOG -log-prefix="nat PREROUTING:"

iptables -t nat -A POSTROUTING -p icmp -icmp-type echo-request \

-j LOG -log-prefix="nat POSTROUTING:" iptables -t nat -A POSTROUTING -p icmp -icmp-type echo-reply \ -j LOG -log-prefix="nat POSTROUTING:" iptables -t nat -A OUTPUT -p icmp -icmp-type echo-request \ -j LOG -log-prefix="nat OUTPUT:" iptables -t nat -A OUTPUT -p icmp -icmp-type echo-reply \ -j LOG -log-prefix="nat OUTPUT:"

#

Mangle table, all chains

#

iptables -t mangle -A PREROUTING -p icmp –icmp-type echo-request \ -j LOG –log-prefix="mangle PREROUTING:"

iptables -t mangle -A PREROUTING -p icmp -icmp-type echo-reply \

-j LOG -log-prefix="mangle PREROUTING:"

iptables -t mangle -A OUTPUT -p icmp -icmp-type echo-request \

-j LOG -log-prefix="mangle OUTPUT:"

iptables -t mangle -A OUTPUT -p icmp -icmp-type echo-reply \

-j LOG -log-prefix="mangle OUTPUT:"